From Vol. 3 (2) - Spring 2009
Georgia & Russia: The “Unknown” Prelude To The “Five Day War”
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Dr. Martin Malek
is a (civilian) researcher and CIS-area specialist at the
Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management of the
National Defense Academy in Vienna, Austria.
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Abstract
The Russian Armed Forces not only expelled invading Georgian
troops from the separatist region South Ossetia, but they
also entered Abkhazia and marched deep into Georgia proper
over the course of the “five day war” in August 2008. The
following report analyses Russia’s military preparations
since spring 2008, an aspect hitherto almost unknown among
politicians, the media and the public in Western Europe and
North America. They included the shooting down of a Georgian
drone by Russian fighter jets over Abkhazia, a massive
increase of Russian “peacekeeping troops” along the
Georgian-Abkhaz armistice line, the deployment of Russian
railway troops to Abkhazia and the “Kavkaz 2008” military
exercises. These developments occurred against the backdrop
of political events, such as demands made by the Russian
State Duma to recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia as
independent states, Russia’s decision to withdraw from the
CIS economic embargo against Abkhazia and NATO’s refusal to
offer membership to Georgia.
Keywords:
Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, preparations to
war
Introduction
At midnight on August 7-8, 2008
Georgian armed forces advanced to Tskhinvali, the capital of
South Ossetia. Georgia’s leadership therefore revealed its
intention to forcefully reintegrate South Ossetia which
since the beginning of the 1990s had not been under the
control of the government in Tbilisi. The Russian Armed
Forces immediately launched a military operation in South
Ossetia, Abkhazia and other parts of Georgia, which was
aimed at more than just securing the position of the
separatists and damaging Georgian military potential.
Numerous statements from senior officials in politics and
the military, as well as in media coverage, left no doubt
that Russia sought to prevent Georgia’s restoration of its
territorial integrity, humiliate President Mikheil
Saakashvili, intimidate the entire Georgian nation and
damage Georgia’s economy and civilian infrastructure,
thereby undermining its relevance as a gas and oil transit
country. Furthermore, Russia intended to send a strong
signal to the US, NATO and the EU with the subtext not to
“meddle in” regions belonging to the former Soviet Union,
because Moscow officially considers them as “zone of vital
interests”.
The August 2008 crisis in South Ossetia took many policymakers
and journalists from Western Europe and North America by
surprise. Obviously, many heard about this desolate and barely
populated area for the first time. In many cases, speculations,
assumptions and prejudices replaced well-substantiated
information regarding the background of the crisis. Many
politicians, media outlets and “experts” asked the question “who
started the war” – Russia or Georgia? Influential voices from
Western Europe and North America blamed both sides equally for
escalating the conflict and committing war crimes, whilst others
made “Saakashvili and his supporters in Washington” responsible
for the war.
At the same time, Russia’s military preparation over the last
few months did not receive much attention. The debate appears
even
more astonishing, considering the fact that
clearly Russia launched a military incursion into Georgian
territory, not vice versa.
Russian Preparations
On March 6, 2008 the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced its decision to
unilaterally withdraw from the economic sanctions imposed by the
presidents of the member states of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) against Abkhazia in 1996. However, this
was merely a symbolic action, since Moscow had never implemented
these sanctions. Abkhazia, in fact, was already economically
tied to Russia: its currency is the Russian Rouble, not the
Georgian Lari. On March 11, 2008 Kommersant, Russia’s
prominent daily newspaper not controlled by the Kremlin, said
that “the gradual recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is
being prepared in Moscow”.
Ten days later the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian
Parliament, overwhelmingly passed a resolution which, referring
to Kosovo and its secession from Serbia, asked the President and
the Government to “investigate the usefulness of the recognition
of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia”.
NATO, under pressure from Germany
and France, denied Georgia a Membership Action Plan (MAP) during
its summit in Bucharest at the beginning of April 2008. By this,
the Kremlin, according to the Russian journalist Yulia Latynina,
“understood of having received a blank cheque”.
On April 16 outgoing President Vladimir Putin advised the
government to strengthen Russia’s relations with Abkhazia and
South Ossetia in the realms of trade, social policy, science,
culture and information policy. Even though both separatist
regions, according to international law, are de jure part of
Georgia, they were elevated to almost the same status held by
Russia’s own regions. Kommersant commented that Putin
aims to annex Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
In its statement the
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed no concern at all
about Georgia’s rights and anxieties and justified Putin’s
actions on the grounds of “protecting the interests of the
Abkhaz and South Ossetian population and its Russian citizens”.
On April 20 a Russian
MiG-29 jet fighter
shot down an unarmed Georgian drone over Abkhazia.
The apparent aim of this operation was to prevent the
observation of Russia’s military preparations on the territory
of Abkhazia. Only a few days later, Moscow increased the number
of “CIS peacekeepers” in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone from
2,000 to 3,000 – without permission from Tbilisi, which
subsequently protested
but without any success.
The “peacekeepers” had been stationed in Abkhazia since 1994,
though without any UN mandate, and were comprised exclusively of
Russian troops. In fact, they had always acted as “border
troops” of “independent Abkhazia”. On May 31 Russia, again
without Tbilisi’s consent, sent railway troops into Abkhazia.
Officially, the 400 soldiers were on a “humanitarian mission”.
But much of the repaired infrastructure was subsequently used by
10,000 Russian soldiers during its invasion in western Georgia
in August.
In mid-July 2008 the Russian Armed
Forces launched the military exercise “Kavkaz-2008” near the
Georgian border. According to Russian media reports, 8,000
soldiers, 30 fixed-wing aircrafts and helicopters and 700
vehicles rehearsed “scenarios of a military operation in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia”
The main force involved was the 58th Army which also
played a key role during the Russian invasion into Georgia.
“Kavkaz-2008” officially ended on August 2, only a few days
before the outbreak of the war; yet the 58th Army
remained on high alert.
At the same time, the Railway Troops completed their work in
Abkhazia.
Since August 2,
pro-Russian South Ossetian separatist forces had been shelling
several ethnic Georgian villages inside South Ossetia. On August
5 a tripartite monitoring group, which included Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observers and
representatives of Russian peacekeeping forces in the region,
issued a report. This document, signed by the commander of the
Russian “peacekeepers” in the region General Marat Kulakhmetov,
stated that there was evidence of attacks against several ethnic
Georgian villages. It also claimed that South Ossetian
separatists were using heavy weapons against the Georgian
villages, which was prohibited by a 1992 ceasefire agreement.
On August 6 a pro-Kremlin Russian daily newspaper came out with
the headline: “Don Cossacks prepare to fight in South Ossetia”.
And the next day,
state-run (and de facto Kremlin-controlled) television channel
Rossiya showed Abkhaz separatist leader Sergei Bagapsh
stating at a meeting of the Abkhaz National Security Council: “I
have spoken to the President of South Ossetia. It [situation] has
more or less stabilized now. A battalion from the North Caucasus
District has entered the area.”
According to
official Russian statements, its Armed Forces merely launched
“counter-attacks” to “protect Russian citizens in South Ossetia”
on August 8. This, however, was challenged by reports in the
Russian newspaper Permskie novosti on August 15: it
interviewed soldiers from the 58th Army who served in
Georgia but were allowed to leave the war zone on August 10 at
the request of their parents. The newspaper quotes a young
soldier saying, “we have been [in South Ossetia] since August 7.
[…] Today we went from Tskhinvali to Vladikavkaz
to pick up weapons”. The article “Life will go on” in
Krasnaya zvezda (Red Star), the newspaper of the
Russian Ministry of Defence, was particularly traitorous. It
cited Captain Denis Sidristy (who was
decorated with the Russian Defense Ministry’s order of bravery
for his performance in the war against Georgia) saying
that “we were training near the capital of South Ossetia. [...]
On August 7 we received the order to advance on Tskhinvali. […]
We arrived, cantoned, and on August 8 the place was on fire and
many lost their heads.”
Evidently, Sidristy witnessed the Georgian shelling of
Tskhinvali on the night of August 8, which could happen only
from the Southern side of the Caucasian mountains i.e. already
on the territory of Georgia. As a result of the increased
interest in this article, the editorial staff of Krasnaya
zvezda removed it from its website,
and it did not reappear again.
Sidristy later had to deny his comments in Krasnaya zvezda
by claiming that his unit left for Tskhinvali “a little bit
later” than originally alleged.
Long-term Pre-planning
Even observers
unfamiliar with military affairs should comprehend that not even
the most effective military organisation is able to mobilise
25,000 soldiers, 1,200 tanks and dozens of aircrafts, and deploy
them in a mountainous region literally within a few hours. This
consideration leads one to the conclusion that Russia’s military
operation against Georgia had been carefully planned in advance.
Modest Kolerov, former head of the Department for
inter-regional and cultural ties with foreign countries of
the President’s Office in Moscow, admitted to a respectable
Russian newspaper that “the Kremlin had a clear plan of actions
in the case of a conflict. The expediency with which the
military operation was executed confirms that”.
Andrei Illarionov, former economic advisor to Putin and now one
of his most outspoken opponents, took the same line. According
to him, the Russian invasion of Georgia “had been long prepared
and successfully executed”. Even in Western Europe,
where most of the politicians were very careful “not to alienate
Russia,” this point did not go totally unnoticed. French Foreign
Minister Bernard Kouchner said in an interview with a
Moscow-based newspaper that “you [Russia] without question were
prepared. […] Russian troops, by some miracle, turned up on the
border at the right time”.
Finally, Putin,
Prime Minister since May 2008 and still Russia’s “strongman,”
“flubbed” when he told his audience at the Valdai Discussion
Club in September 2008 about his meeting with Chinese officials
on the day of the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games in
Beijing. In these talks, Putin “recognised China’s problem with
Taiwan and therefore did not press China to recognise the
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia”.
Hence, Putin admitted that he considered the possibility of
“recognising the independence” of Georgia’s separatist regions,
at the latest, on the day of the beginning of fighting in South
Ossetia and possibly already decided on it. On August 26 it was
announced by President Dmitri Medvedev.
According to
Moscow-based security analyst Pavel Felgenhauer, Russia
“…declared that it
was forced to go to battle by the initial Georgian attack in
South Ossetia. But there is sufficient evidence that this
massive invasion was pre-planned beforehand for August [2008].
The swiftness with which large Russian contingents were moved
into Georgia, the rapid deployment of a Black Sea naval task
force, the fact that large contingents of troops were sent to
Abkhazia where there was no Georgian attack all seem to indicate
a rigidly prepared battle plan. This war was not an improvised
reaction to a sudden Georgian military offensive in South
Ossetia, since masses of troops cannot be held for long in
24-hour battle readiness. The invasion was inevitable, no matter
what the Georgians did.”
Conclusion
Saakashvili is seen in Western
Europe as “pro-American,” and mainly due to America’s – and not
only former President George W. Bush’s – unpopularity this has
become a liability not only for him but for all of Georgia. It
is therefore, from a subjective point of view, traceable that
many European and North American media outlets (such as the
German weekly Der Spiegel) argued that Georgia was
responsible for the outbreak of the “five day war”. However,
they put the focus on the question of which state moved troops
into South Ossetia first, thereby ignoring Russia’s military
preparations since the beginning of 2008 as well as the pivotal
question: who deployed troops on whose territory? And it is
incontestable that Russia intervened on Georgian soil (and not
vice versa), which, according to international law, constitutes
an aggression. Little attention was paid to Russia’s recognition
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as “independent states” in the
West, albeit this amounted to a forceful alteration of Georgia’s
borders.
Responses from governments in Western Europe and North America
indicated that the relations with Russia are considered too
important as to risk a worsening relationship over “tiny and
insignificant” Georgia. One often hears the argument in Western
policymaking circles and the media that Russia “should not be
isolated” because without it, “international problems cannot be
solved.” The same voices, however, cannot name even a single
example of an international problem which has been jointly
solved by Russia and the West. Especially in the South Caucasian
separatist conflicts, Russia for two decades has been a huge
part of the problems – and not of the solutions. In most Western
capitals – and not only in Berlin which pursues a policy of
“rapprochement through entwinement” (“Annäherung durch
Verflechtung” in German) with Russia – policymakers
obstinately ignore this fact.
Zayavlenie Gosudarstvennoy Dumy No.245-5GD – O politike
Rossiyskoy Federacii v otnoshenii Abkhazii, Yuzhnoy
Osetii i Pridnestrovya [Declaration of the State Duma
No. 245-5GD – About the policy of the Russian Federation
vis-à-vis Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the
Dnestr region],
May 21, 2008,
http://www.pnp.ru/chapters/rights/rights_6094.html
(accessed April 14, 2009).
Vladimir Solovyovv, “Priznatelnye prikazaniya. Vladimir
Putin nametil kurs na integratsiyu Abkhazii i Yuzhnoy
Osetii v sostav Rossii.” [Thankful Orders. Vladimir
Putin Outlines a Track to the Integration of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia], Kommersant, April 17, 2008,
http://kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=883332
(accessed April 13, 2009).
Mariya Bondarenko, Ivan Sas, “Shashki nagolo. Donskie
kazaki gotovyatsya voevat v Yuzhnoy Osetii” [Draw the
Sword. The Don Cossacks Are Ready to Fight in South
Ossetia], Nezavizimaya gazeta, August 8, 2008,
http://www.ng.ru/regions/2008-08-06/1_kazaki.html
(accessed April 13, 2009).
As quoted in: Nikolaus von Twickel, “Moscow Claims Media
War Win,” The Moscow Times Online, November 17,
2008,
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/600/42/372391.htm
(accessed November 17, 2008).
“Soldaty govoryat, chto pribyli v Yuzhnuyu Osetiyu
eshche 7 avgusta” [The Soldiers Say That They Arrived in
South Ossetia already on August 7], Polit.ru,
September 10, 2008,
http://www.polit.ru/news/2008/09/10/seven.html
(accessed 14 April, 2009).
“S sayta ‘Krasnoy zvezdy’ udaleno intervyu kapitana
Sidristogo o vtorzhenii rossiyskikh voysk v YuO do
napadeniya Gruzii” [The Interview With Captain Sidristy
About the Intrusion of Russian Troops into South Ossetia
before the Georgian Attack was removed from the Site of
Krasnaya zvezda], NEWSru.com, September
15, 2008,
http://www.newsru.com/russia/15sep2008/udaleno_print.html
(accessed April 14, 2009).
Michail Tsygar, “Bernar Kushner: ya, navernoe, menee
diplomatichnyy i bolee chestnyy” [Bernard
Kouchner: I am, probably, less diplomatic and more
honest],
Kommersant Online, October 10, 2008,
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1048686
(accessed
October 30, 2008).
As quoted in: Andrei Kolesnikov, “Tak davayte zhe
dogovarivatsya. Vladimir Putin prodemonstriroval
voinstvuyushchiy patsifism” [‘So, Let’s Negotiate for
It!’ Vladimir Putin demonstrated belligerent pacifism],
Kommersant Online, September 12, 2009,
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1024665
(accessed April 14, 2009).
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