From
Vol. 2 (3) – Summer 2008
IDENTITIES, INTERESTS AND THE RESOLUTION OF THE ABKHAZ CONFLICT
|
Ondrej Ditrych is a Ph.D. candidate in international
relations at Institute of Political Studies at Charles
University in Prague. This article was written during his
Fulbright research fellowship at Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard University. |
Abstract
The recent crisis in Abkhazia reveals a fundamental qualitative
change in the conflict in which the balance among three main
actors is shifting, and increasingly the conflict plays a more
important role in the triangular relations between Georgia,
Russia and the West. The search for a new equilibrium in the
conflict, one that would be an optimal outcome for the actors
involved, will require rethinking the mutually constitutive
roles (identities) and interests they want to assume with
respect to the conflict and the entire South Caucasus. This is
argued to be a matter of the ‘first order’ with respect to
conflict resolution in Abkhazia, with confidence-building
measures and political status questions representing only a
‘second order’. For Tbilisi and Sukhumi, such a process may
involve resigning the discourse of sovereignty; for Russia,
pondering the costs and benefits of the current ‘hard power’
approach; and for Western actors, delimiting their interests
towards the region and recognizing the power they possess
vis-a-vis Russia’s current weakness.
Keywords: Abkhazia,
Georgia, Russia, identity, interests, narratives.
Introduction
It seems to have become a commonplace in Western scholarship to
start any study about the conflicts in the North and South
Caucasus with the mythopoetical narrative of the dissolution of
the USSR, accompanied by the emergence of ethnic nationalism
founded on ancient hatreds, Soviet policy of nacionalnost,
and/or economic and political grievances imposed by the dominant
groups. As the linear antecedents in the narrative, they are
inevitably rendered as causes of the consequent ethnopolitical
conflicts, or its most contemporary manifestation in the long
durée of struggle for the survival of minorities. As the
narrative unreels, they are then succeeded by an essentially
sanitized ("scientific") account of the ensuing violence citing
statistics of dead, dispossesed and displaced, and the
subsequent – in the case of South Caucasus – "freezing" of the
conflicts, the development of contested state sovereignty due to
the presence of three quasistates, and resulting instability
fomented by the malignant Kremlin. The ancient history of the
region underlining its unique position between the East and the
West (asserting its geopolitical importance), records of
shifting political allegiances to ephemeral local political
units (underlining the ancient character of the indigenous
ethnic rivalry), and the infamous list of foreign
conquistadors including Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs,
Tatars, Persians, and finally Russians (again, emphasizing the
region’s importance, and eternalizing the great power struggle
over the precious piece of geopolitical chessboard) is perhaps
mentioned too.
The point is not that
these myths are false. Myths, at least as conceived by
Poststructuralist theory, escape the criterion of truth as the
correspondence to reality while bearing immense importance for
producing and reproducing identity, collective psychological
(pathological, as may be) states, and dominant theoretical
paradigms (e.g. Realism in IR Theory). Instead of perhaps a more
typical introduction, the aim of the previous lines is to point
to the serialized and standardized character of many academic
and journalistic narratives related to the conflict in the South
Caucasus, including that of Abkhazia,
which is the proper subject of this article, and suggest that by
– consciously or inadvertently – reifying a certain version of
the past and thus producing and reproducing structures of
knowledge, alternatives for the present and the future may be
severely limited.
More specifically,
the limits contained in the structural narratives of ethnic
security dilemmas, associated with the imperial decay,
occurence of violence in the conditions of anarchy,
or in the grand narratives of geopolitical conflict over the
Caucasus
– all reminiscent of the eternal and unchangeable laws of
history – reduce human (individual and collective) agency to the
role of mere spectator to historical processes that transcend
it. Whereas the conflicts may have arisen precisely as a result
of the action of an emerging or incumbent political elite, one
reflecting constraining structural conditions and existing
ethnosymbolic narratives, yet also one acting freely and
rationally to gain, sustain and expand political power through
mass mobilization against the external enemy by employing
discourses of danger and Utopian "normal states" (e.g. of
independence in quasistates, "restored sovereignty over the
occupited territory" for the newly independent republics, and
erstwhile political influence in the Caucasus for Russia) that
serve to discipline the populaces.
This article aims at a critical analysis of the recent political
development related, yet not spatially delimited to, Abkhazia.
This development may be termed "escalation" of the conflict with
Georgia, but for reasons detailed below I will rather speak of
"crisis". Therefore, I intend not to provide the archaeology of
the present myths suggested and criticized above; neither do I,
however, intend to harness and present new facts about the
conflict and the present situation on which considerable amount
of ink has been spilled. Rather, this article aims to provide a
more "abstract" critical perspective in reflecting the recent
events and thus aspire at contributing to the current debate on
the issue.
The Present Crisis: Overview
A cursory review of
the events that caused an intensification of hostile relations
between the major actors involved in the Abkhaz conflict is
presented prior to their analysis. The key events in this
development have been the declaration of independence by Kosovo
on February 17, 2008 and its international ramifications,
Russia’s decision to suspend sanctions against the Abkhaz
Republic
imposed by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the
establishment of formal relations between Russia and the Abkhaz
‘Republic’, reinforcements of the formally CIS peacekeeping
mission in Abkhazia, and escalation of the military tension
between the Abkhaz ‘Republic’ and Georgia.
Russia declared not
to abide by the sanctions imposed on Sukhumi in 1996 by CIS
Heads of State,
which forbid economic and military cooperation and establishment
of formal relations with the de facto government, on
March 6, following the Russia’s presidential election in which
Dmitri Medvedev received ca. 90% of votes by participating
citizens of the separatist republics with Russian passports.
(The decision, which to great extent represented only a formal
confirmation of the status quo, paralleled – and possibly
halted – Tbilisi’s overtures to ease the trade blockade of
Abkhazia.) The next day, both de facto governments (in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia) pleaded to the Russian Duma to
recognize their independence in view of the "Kosovo precedent".
During NATO‘s
Bucharest summit on April 2-4, Ukraine and Georgia were not, as
had been expected for some time due to Russian pressure and
consequent reluctance of some member states, awarded Membership
Action Plans (MAPs). Instead, the final declaration read that
the two countries, now enjoying Intensified Dialogue with NATO,
"will [eventually] become members."
While Georgia’s government tried to recast the failure into a
diplomatic victory, it was the Kremlin, who warned that the
membership for the two countries could "jeopardise European
security" (Medvedev) and "threaten democracy" (Putin),
that could be content with the lack of NATO consensus.
Prior to the summit,
Mikheil Saakashvili’s government presented a peace proposal to
the de facto Abkhaz authorities (who refused its delivery
from the hands of UNOMIG (the United Nations Mission in
Georgia), denouncing it as a shallow rhetoric), including
articles on broad autonomy, free economic zones, representation
for the republic at governmental level, veto power of the
autonomous government on key issues related to the autonomy, and
the position of the Vice-President to be established and held by
an ethnic Abkhaz.
The two parties later exchanged notes on the proposal; on May
12, Georgia’s Ambassador to the UN (and former chief negotiator
with Abkhazia) Irakli Alasania visited Sukhumi; and finally,
news of the talks between Abkhazia and Georgia in Sweden on June
15-17, 2008 were announced by EU foreign policy chief Javier
Solana.
However, there was a fundamental incompatibility on which
confidence building measures (CBMs) were obtained. Georgia
focused mainly on the return of IDPs, while Abkhazia stressed
(international) security guarantees, demilitarization of the
Kodori Gorge, and the establishment of a sea and train
connection with Turkey. Moreover, the relations between Georgia
and Abkhazia/Russia had undergone a severe crisis by that time.
The UN Secretary
General report presented to the UN Security Council before the
semi-annual resolution on the status of the conflict in Abkhazia
and extension of the UNOMIG monitoring mission status at the
beginning of April still evaluated the situation as "generally
calm."
Yet by the middle of the month, it sharply deteriorated after
Russia’s decision to establish legal relations with Abkhazian
authorities through Russia’s government representation in
Sukhumi,
a decision criticized by the U.S., NATO and European Union (EU).
Furthermore, it was
immediately followed by Abkhazia‘s accusations of Georgia’s
military maneuvres along the ceasefire line and the destruction
of a Georgian aerial surveillance vehicle flying over Abkhazia
(April 20, 2008). While the Abkhazia initially claimed that it
was shot down by its 9K37-Buk missile (or alternatively, an
armed version of its L-39 Albatros) – and that in fact it was
already a second eliminated vehicle of the kind (it would later
claim at least six others) – the incident caused a diplomatic
confrontation between Georgia and Russia, as the former released
video footage and radar records allegedly confirming that the
vehicle was destroyed by a MiG-29 fighter which took off from
the Gudauta base in Abkhazia, formally stationed by the CIS
peacekeeping force, and following the incident retired to
Russia. This was later confirmed by a UNOMIG report that however
stated that Georgian surveillance flights constituted "military
activities" which contradicted the Moscow Agreement (1994) and
may have been interpreted by the other party as a prelude to
invasion.
Russia denied any involvement, and interestingly, Russian
Ambassador to NATO Dmitri Rogozin suggested that the incident
could have been staged by Tbilisi in cooperation with a NATO
member in possession of MiG-29s, which pointed in the direction
of either Lithuania or Poland, the most vocal critics of recent
Russian policies in the South Caucasus and elsewhere.
On April 29, Moscow
reported it was enforcing the peacekeeping regiment in Abkhazia
– citing the deployment of 1,500 Georgian army troops in Kodori
(not confirmed by UNOMIG report released on May 8, 2008)
in preparation of an armed offensive – again instigating
international criticism for increasing tension in the conflict
zone. The Russian government denied the claims and maintained
that the number of troops was still below the CIS agreed levels.
It was later detailed that 400 paratroopers, 30 BMD-2 armed
vehicles deployable from air, aerial defense systems and
artillery units were included in the transfer, and among the
units were possibly Russian special forces composed of Chechen
troops (the Chechen "Abkhaz Battalion", led by the Chechen
warlord Shamil Basayev, is remembered among Georgians for its
brutality unleashed against the Mingrelian civilian population,
which added symbolic power to the news). President Saakashvili
related this to Russian efforts to "change the world order" and
the conquest of the then independent Georgia by the Bolshevik
Russia in 1921, "followed by the invasion of Poland, occupation
of the Baltic countries and the bloody war in Finland."
As the tension mounted and Russian and Abkhaz media speculated
about the possibility of Georgia’s offensive, Abkhazia proposed
to Moscow that it would host Russian troops in exchange for
security guarantees (an unidentified number of Russia’s
"advisers" that are not elements of the CIS operation already
operate in Abkhazia).
On May 15, 2008, the
UN General Assembly passed a resolution (although a great
majority of the member states abstained), proposed by Georgia,
that recognized the right of Mingrelian IDPs to return to
Abkhazia and condemned the acquisition of property in Abkhazia
by foreign (implicitly Russian) persons.
The next day, Georgia’s forces detained several Russian
peacekeepers in the border town of Zugdidi, producing a fierce
response from Russia. Georgia also protested against the
deployment of unarmed Russian Railway Troops from Russia
(reported by Russian Ministry of Defense on May 31, 2008) which
the latter claimed to be a humanitarian enterprise to rebuild
Abkhaz infrastructure destroyed in the 1990s,
while the former interpreted it as a reinforcement of the
opposing party and preparation for an armed invasion; the
presence of units in Abkhazia (and not a formal part of the CIS
peacekeeping contingent) was criticized by NATO Secretary
General as an infringement upon Georgia’s sovereignty.
In June, the tension
among the political representatives decreased somewhat; however
often manipulative broadcasting spreading fear of the enemy’s
invasion (Abkhazia) or Russia’s annexation of Abkhazia (Georgia)
continued. Interestingly, Kommersant reported on June 27,
2008 that a deal was a matter of negotiations between Russia and
Georgia under whose provisions Tbilisi’s sovereignty would be
restored in the whole of Abkhazia, while the region would be
divided into "spheres of influence". Both parties immediately
refused to have engaged in discussing such a scenario. The
hostile rhetoric finally intensified at the end of the month
after a series of four explosions in Sukhumi and Gagra on June
29-30, 2008 as Abkhazia blamed the "terrorist acts" on Tbilisi,
allegedly trying to sabotage the local tourist industry.
In response, it restricted the movement of persons across the
Inguri river between Gali and Samegrelo. (Georgia’s government
suggested, in turn, that the explosions were the result of a
power struggle amongst Abkhaz organized crime structures.)
The Present Crisis: Analysis
I suggested in the
introduction that instead of speaking of "escalation" of the
conflict, it may be more useful to frame recent events as
"crisis". The reason why the concept of escalation is
ill-fitting is that it assumes a linear perspective of the
conflict, an increase in relevant quantifiable variables such as
"tension" (however hard it may be to define) or violence. Even
if this perspective is retained, the recent development is at
best only a continuation of a "grand escalation" that started in
2006 with Georgia’s "police operation" to eliminate the fiefdom
of Emzar Kvitsiani and his militia Monadire in the Kodori
Gorge, which resulted in breaking the negotiations on the Key
to the Future peace plan proposed by Tbilisi (a plan not
dissimilar to the one presented by Saakashvili in March 2008).
More significantly, since "escalation" indicates a change in
quantity, it may not capture the dynamic of the conflict,
which, as it is suggested, has come to change in quality.
And while the end of this transformation is yet to be seen, the
term "crisis" (κρίσις)
seems more productive in relation to its original Greek meaning
as a decisive moment in the history of disease.
The recent
development in the conflict indicates changing balances in the
relationship between three main actors (Georgia, Abkhazia, and
Russia); a consequent "revolutionary" move to change the nature
of their relationship by Georgia; and increasingly also
involvement – albeit to some extent involuntary – of the
European Union, NATO and the U.S., actors which may with some
degree of simplification be subsumed under the term the "West".
The triangular relations between Georgia, Russia and the West
play an increasingly dominant role in the conflict; a point that
seems to have escaped Mr. Solana who in a recent statement in
Tbilisi expressed the opinion that "this conflict should be
solved fundamentally by the two sides [Georgia and Abkhazia]."
The importance of the
Russia-West relationship for the developments in Abkhazia is
illustrated by the impact that Kosovo‘s independence, sponsored
by major Western powers, has had on the conflict.
Both Russia’s rhetoric before and after the event, and Russia’s
policy (establishment of formal links) related to Abkhazia not
only sought legitimacy, but arguably also were caused to some
extent by the position of the Kremlin vis-a-vis the West.
In other words, more global factors than the one spatially
delimited to the South Caucasus has likely been behind recent
Russian policy of increasing pressure on Georgia through
Abkhazia. This has been facilitated by the identity of Georgia’s
current regime as allied with the "West" (standing predominantly
for NATO and the U.S.). Interestingly, in the last report on
Abkhazia, International Crisis Group (ICG) interpreted this
pressure as the result of the loss Russia suffered at the
Bucharest summit.
Given that the Kremlin’s tactic has been to prevent Georgia and
Ukraine’s membership in NATO
it is hard to read the results otherwise than as Russia’s
geopolitical victory and NATO’s yielding to her demands, which
in turn may have incited more assertive actions by Moscow at a
vulnerable spot, such as Abkhazia.
It is rather a
radical shift in the identity of Georgia’s regime, now embracing
a Utopian vision of a Western liberal state and seeking
integration into NATO, that may be identified as a factor behind
more assertive Russian policy in the South Caucasus in general,
and Abkhazia in particular. The renewed imperial ambitions have
finally been coupled with sufficient strength to restore the
former sphere of influence penetrated by the "West", Russia’s
geopoliticians and critical Western academics often claim. Yet
it is worth asking whether this recent assertive policy is not
instead a sign of weakness, rather than strength. Russia
notoriously lacks "soft power" beyond its borders (despite the
unifying cultural affinity of the former Soyuz) and thus
may strive to retain, rather than expand, its faltering
influence in the South Caucasus only by blackmail, subversion
and the rhetoric of threat, which is however a rhetoric of
despair.
This is an alternative reading – aside from the residual
"cold-war thinking" – to former President Putin’s assertion that
"the appearance of a powerful military bloc [NATO] along our
borders would be taken in Russia as a direct threat to the
security of my country."
The claim that NATO would exacerbate the explosive situation in
the North Caucasus is not very credible; nor is the notion that
Georgia in NATO would contribute to Russia’s "encirclement",
although this indeed may be a geopolitical view of some
conservative siloviki. Russia offers nothing but
pressure, extortion and "hard power" threats to merely preserve
some influence in the former Soviet lands and not to concede
defeat to a more "attractive" NATO, EU and the U.S. If this
suggestion is true, then it must be noted that the first two
miscalculate their potential, while the third is presently
unable to effectively spread its influence unilaterally due to
the crisis of legitimacy (partly as a result of Iraq war).
Together with the change of
identity, Georgia under Saakashvili, while not necessarily
advanced in the realization of the vision of a liberal state as
far as it claims, or as Tbilisi’s friends wish, strengthened its
position in the conundrum of the Abkhaz conflict. This may be
interpreted as the result of a comprehensive – if undeclared –
strategy which according to Ośrodek Studióv Wschodniv’s analysis
includes internationalization of the conflict (i.e. the endeavor
of Tbilisi to release itself from the current structural
constraints of the peace process by more actively involving the
West and persuading the international audience about the
dishonest role of Russia in mediating and facilitating conflict
resolution);
constructive measures towards the
de facto sparatist governments (these, however, are more
salient in South Ossetia);
founding of alternative centers of power (in a contest for
legitimacy of power over the separatist territories); and
building a more capable military.
While success in the
first three goals has been limited, it is in the fourth that
Georgia’s strategy may have succeeded in changing the "frozen"
balance. This has been the result of an astronomical increase in
defence expenditure, reaching $906 million in 2007 (7.5% GDP),
as compared to $19 million in 2002.
It has made efforts in meeting NATO standards and capability to
contribute to the alliance operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
but it has arguably also substantially increased Georgia’s both
defensive and offensive potential. In the latest report, ICG
even pondered over increasing possibility of a Georgian strike
from Kodori to the Abkhaz lowlands in order to secure and hold
at least part of Abkhazia’s territory and further improve
Tbilisi’s negotiating position.
However, such a move would likely cause Russian retaliation in
Abkhazia, which even Georgia’s modernized military would not be
able to withstand. Moreover, it would invite widespread
international condemnation and delegitimization of Tbilisi’s
position in the conflict, and of Saakashvili’s regime as such.
In effect, it would likely turn into the regime’s suicide. Thus,
the "offense-defence balance"
seems inclined toward the latter, and any invasion scenario,
while not unfathomable, would be the product of irrational
decision. The increase of defensive capability, at the same
time, may however function as a deterrent for lower-intensity
violent conflict scenarios – most likely under the present
conditions as Russia also may want to avoid becoming involved in
a full-scale war – and thus effectively improve Georgia’s
position.
Tbilisi has utilized
this new position, together with increased legitimacy of the
regime in Europe and the U.S., mainly for changing the format of
the peace process. Therefore, it acts as a "revolutionary" actor
which attempts to alter the structural conditions which were the
product of the situation after the war in 1992-1993, and thus
confirm its strengthened position. At its conception, this
structure reflected the interests of each of the (then) main
actors – while Georgia conceded to de facto sovereignty
of Abhazia when consumed by internal stasis (and thus
retained at least sovereignty de iure), Abkhazia gained
substantial effective self-determination, and Russia retained,
through pressure that could be exerted against the newly
independent states through the separatist republics (including
Nagorno Karabakh), at least some of its former influence in the
South Caucasus.
For each side, however, this was not an optimal outcome of the
game. Now it is Georgia that tries to change the equilibrium.
Although it has not yet succeeded in modifying the peace process
format by including other actors in the peacekeeping operations
or negotiations, it has however effectively contributed to the
existing impasse, as Tbilisi’s only interest in this area
seems to be to change the structure, rather than to work on a
peaceful settlement within its frame.
Abkhazia is excluded from the scheme of triangular relations
which are suggested as presently defining the conflict. The
Abkhaz seem increasingly aware of the situation in which their
de facto government continues to be supported by Moscow,
yet the Kremlin seems unlikely to bring forward the optimal
outcome, i.e. recognize their independence. Instead, they are
being used by Russia in a global game that transcends their
limited, telluric interests (striving for recognition of their
independence), while Russian capital has been devouring
attractive Abkhaz assets. Moreover, the likelihood of renewed
violent conflict on the territory of Abkhazia grows as the
crisis deepens. On the micro level, their situation can be
compared to Mingrelians who returned to Gali and now suffer from
the irreconcilable demands by the de facto Abkhaz
authorities which exert control over the territory and Georgia’s
authorities which require their continuous allegiance.
Identities, Interests and Alternatives
The recent reports by ICG and
Ośrodek Studióv Wschodniv propose
a variety of measures for facilitating a future conflict
resolution. They encompass refraining from hostilities, endemic
rhetoric and undermining Georgia’s sovereignty, enactment of
CBMs, easing the blockade of Abkhazia and employing the
NATO-Russia Council to mitigate Russia’s concerns about NATO
expansion;
or focusing on the peace process instead of Georgia’s NATO
membership aspirations.
While not contesting the sensibility of these recommendations, I
suggest that these represent measures of the
"second order". At the crossroads where the conflict in Abkhazia
now stands, the questions of the "first order" are those of
identities and interests of the four major actors – Abkhazia,
Georgia, Russia and the "West" represented mainly by EU, NATO
and the U.S.
Two of these actors
(Georgia and Abkhazia) are presently not content with the game
outcome. Tbilisi actively attempts to establish a new one. The
interests of the third actor, Russia, to preserve influence in
the South Caucasus, are arguably founded on an unstable basis,
given the lack of her "soft power" and consequent reliance on
threats, blackmail and regime subversion. The interests of the
fourth remained peripheral (U.S.) or undefined (EU), with a most
obvious lack of consensus among the Western states on the role
(identity) they should assume in the South Caucasus, and
consequently poorly defined interests.
That said, the "West" – willingly or not – is part of the
equation by virtue of its relations with Georgia on the regional
level, and Russia on the global one.
The search for a new
equilibrium in the Abkhazia conflict, one that would be an
optimal outcome for the involved actors, will require rethinking
the mutually constitutive roles (identities) and interests they
want to assume with respect to the conflict, or the entire South
Caucasus. For Georgia and Abkhazia, this may involve resigning
the discourse of sovereignty that has proven thoroughly
detrimental and weakened them in respect to an external power
(Russia), as much as the dissemination of the discourses of
danger and dehumanizing narratives of the Other. The political
elites could find (and they partially do, as Saakashvili’s
administration shows) the elimination of the corrupt
“pathological state” with its networks of organised crime and
state weakness as a way to harness popular support, instead of
the symbolic discourses of "independence" and "restoring
territorial integrity" and point the vision of their populaces
to the positive "normal states" of a liberal state, prosperity
and regional integration to face the challenges of the global
economy.
For Russia, it may mean pondering whether "soft power" and
consent are not more effective founding stones of lasting
influence, and whether a continuation of the current policy may
ultimately not lead to the loss of control even, for example, in
a substantial part of the North Caucasus. Finally, for NATO, EU
and the U.S. after the Presidential election in November, it
should involve first and foremost the very definition of their
interests in the region (perhaps defined by energy security
concerns and framed by the vision of limited rivalry instead of
the Utopian project of a global security community) in whose
fate they are – some without realizing it – implicated, and
recognize their "soft power" potential.
The challenges of
establishing this new equilibrium are immense. Identities and
consequently interests, albeit "mere" ideas, prove very durable
and unmalleable,
and the problem of consensus does not obtain only in the EU and
NATO, but also in the Kremlin corridors, among the ruling elite
in Tbilisi and in Abkhazia, where the Abkhaz negotiate from the
position of mere plurality.
Yet it remains to hope that the only peace is not the "perpetual
" (i.e. eternal) one described, with the seed of – often
unrecognized or disregarded – irony, by Immanuel Kant.
An alternative to the redefinition of identities of the main
actors, as the fundamental condition of establishing a new
equilibrium in the conflict, is the Neofunctionalist formula of
proceeding from below instead. The spillover of common interests
at the non-governmental "bottom" has indeed proven an effective
mechanism of identity transformation in post-WWII Europe. Yet it
is a subject to debate whether this liberal project can flourish
in an environment deeply penetrated by the essentially realist
discourses of sovereignty, state, danger and power which the
South Caucasus presently is. Identities and interests are
mutually constitutive, and this venue of transformation should
not be neglected. But at the present point, the fundamental
change in identity may have to come from above, from the
political elites reacting to domestic and international
incitements and pressures.
Conclusion
The present crisis in the relations between major actors
involved in the Abkhazia conflict demonstrates the need to
search for a new equilibrium. This equilibrium may be found only
by answering "first order" questions by the actors of their
identity and interests. It remains to be seen whether at the end
of the journey to the heart of darkness there is Conrad’s "The
horror! The horror!", or instead a "new thinking".
Dissenting narratives do exist, disseminated e.g. by
prof. George Hewitt. His plain bias towards the Abkhaz
side of the conflict, of whose language he is an
imminent Western scholar – for example, he described the
situation before the outbreak of the war in the early
1990s in the following emotive terms: "Yet another
sacrifice on the depressing altar known as the
territorial integrity of states was in line for the
sacrificial dagger" (B.G. Hewitt, „Abkhazia: A Problem
of Identity and Ownership,“ in John F.R. Wright et al.,
Eds., „Transcaucasian Boundaries“, London: UCL Press,
1996, p. 216) – is however likely attributable to what
Valey Tishkov (paraphrasing Fredrik Barth) called the
"problem of sympathetic anthropology" (Tishkov, Valery,
"Ethnic Conflicts in the Former USSR: The Use and Misuse
of Typologies and Data," Journal of Peace Research,
vol. 36, no. 5, Sept. 1999, pp. 571-591). For a recent
article by Hewitt on political issues in Abkhazia, see
"Abkhazia: Land in Limbo," Opendemocracy.net, 10
Sept. 2006,
http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-caucasus/abkhazia_future_3983.jsp.
Posen, Barry, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic
Conflict," Survival, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 27-47
(1993).
Waltz, Kenneth, „Theory of International Politics“, New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1979, p. 102; or in more recent
formulation, Mearsheimer, John, „The Tragedy of Great
Power Politics“, New York: W.W. Norton, 2001.
E.g. in one of the most comprehensive and meticulous
recent Western studies on the subject, Cornell, Svante,
„Small Nations and Great Powers“, London, 2003.
Campbell, David, „Writing Security“, Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1999; Constantinou,
Costas, „States of Political Discourse“ in: „Words,
Regimes, Seditions“, London, 2004
Referring to "Abkhaz Republic" in this article is not
intended to implicitly acknowledge legitimacy of the
separatist de facto government. Also, a
distinction is maintained between Abkhaz Republic (de
facto administration of the territory of the former
Abkhaz SSR with the exception of Upper Kodori) and
Abkhazia as a strictly geographical referent.
The CIS Head of State Declaration (19 Jan. 1996)
cited "Abkhazia’s destructive behavior" as the reason
for imposing the sanctions, mainly as related to the
(then) absence of conditions for the return of
Mingrelian IDPs. Cf.
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=17293.
An estimated 80% Abkhaz citizens hold also Russian
passports, as compared to 85-90% South Ossetians.
The Duma then recommended to the Russian government to
ensure protection of Russian citizens inhabiting the
separatist territories, including by reinforcement of
the peacekeeping contingents. It also proposed opening
representations with the de facto governments to
strengthen economic relations (RIA Novosti, 21
March 2008). As the account of following events shows,
the Kremlin followed recommendations of this non-binding
resolution very closely.
„Putin in NATO Summit Spotlight“, BBC News, 2 Apr. 2008.
It is difficult to comprehend how could the declaration
be interpreted by International Crisis Group as
"arguably a stronger political message than inclusion in
MAP would have been." „Georgia and Russia: Clashing over
Abkhazia“, Europe Report No. 193, Brussels:
International Crisis Group, 2008, pp. 14-15.
The proposal reflected to a considerable degree the
criteria of consociational democracy set by Arend
Lijphart – segmental autonomy, segmental veto power,
executive coalition on the state level and proportional
representation in the state institutions. See Lijphart,
Arend, „Democracy in Plural Societies“, New Haven, Yale
University Press, 1977.
Eastweek, no. 131, 25 June 2008.
In retaliation to what it interpreted as hostile
Russia’s moves, Georgia inter alia suspended
bilateral talks about Russia’s WTO membership. Yet it is
worth mentioning that amidst the crisis in Abkhazia,
both countries resumed air and sea transport service
between the both countries on March 25, 2008 (after a 1
˝ year break enforced by Russia following an "espionage
affair" of her diplomats stationed in Tbilisi).
The representation (identical to one opened in
Tskhinvali) also started providing consular services.
The decision took the form of Vladimir Putin’s executive
decree, which moreover commanded the government to
compile a list of legal documents issued by Abkhazia
that Russia would consider valid. Furthermore, legal
persons registered with the de facto governments in
Sukhumi and Tskhinvali would now be recognized as such
also in Russian Federation.
Quoted by Lenta.ru, 30 Apr. 2008.
Specifically, this included the railroad track between
Sukhumi and Ochamchire, and two bridges across Mokva and
Kodori rivers. See Eastweek, no. 128, 4 June
2008.
Kvitsiani fled to Abkhazia, suggesting that his
allegiances had been divided at best. Beside personal
economic gains from illicit trade, there may have been
an ethnic explanation to this as Kodori is inhabited
primarily by Svans, a people historically not keen to
ackowledge Tbilisi’s sovereignty. Following the events,
"Abkhaz government in exile", previously located in
Tbilisi, was moved to a village of Chkalta in Kodori as
part of Georgia’s strategy to increase legitimacy of its
position by creating an alternative center of power in
Abkhazia (see below). In 2007, two serious military
incidents took place to aggrevate the tension – on March
11 unmarked helicopters, likely of Russia’s army,
targeted Kodori with missile fire; on September 20, a
skirmish took place between Georgia’s and Abkhazia’s
troops, leaving several dead and injured. UNOMIG
reported that the battle occured most likely on the
territory controlled by Abkhazia.
Quoted by Civil.ge, 6 June 2008.
„Georgia
and Abkhazia“, op.cit. 2.
In both cases it has employed a number of strategies to
reach this goal, ranging from fomenting separatism (in
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea) to supporting
radical political opposition and internal unrest to
direct verbal threats of an undefined retaliatory
actions aimed at the entire Alliance.
Moscow has employed the tactic of blackmail also
vis-a-vis her allies in the South Caucasus –
Armenia, and notably also Abkhazia, where e.g. by
imposing a land and sea blockade on Abkhazia it forced
annulling the result of the presidential election in
2004 and their repetition with Kremlin-favoured
candidate Raul Khajimba, who lost in the first election
to Sergei Bagapsh, running in the second election as
Bagapsh’s Vice-President.
Quoted by Xinxua, 4 Apr. 2008.
Strachota, Krzysztof and Bartuzi, Wojciech,
„Reintegration or Conquest“, Warsaw, Centre for Eastern
Studies, 2008, pp. 58-81.
For example, Georgia’s Minister for Reintegration (the
change of the ministry’s name from Ministry for Conflict
Resolution in 2008 caused substantial protests by the
de facto governments) Temuri Yakobashvili claimed on
May 28, 2008 that Tbilisi would favour a joint police
operation of Georgian and Abkhaz units "trained and
managed by an international police force" composed of
European states (Civil.ge, 28 May 2008). While Russia
securitizes the situation in which CIS peacekeeping
contingent leaves Abkhazia, as when the Russian Foreign
Ministry warned that withdrawal of the CIS peacekeeping
mission in Abkhazia would result in "defrosting the
conflict" and spillover of violence around the South
Caucasus (Quoted by Kavkaz-uzel.ru, 17 June 2008,
http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/engnews/id/1223404.html),
it is increasingly the opinion of other actors that the
mission’s contribution is questionable.
However, the post-conflict reconstruction activities are
advanced by Georgia and Russia to support their
respective agents, i.e. administrations competing for
power and legitimacy in South Ossetia.
Strachota and Bartuzi, op.cit. 80.
„Georgia and Abkhazia“, op.cit. 8-9.
Cf. Van Evera, Stephen, "Offense, Defense, and the
causes of war“, in: International Security, vol.
22, Spring 1998, pp. 5-43.
„Strachota and Bartuzi“, op.cit. 53.
„Georgia and Abkhazia“, executive summary.
„Strachota and Bartuzi“, op.cit. 83.
This is not to say that EU or NATO are absent from the
South Caucasus, or that they, at least on the rhetorical
level, do not show interest in it (cf. the latest
U.S.-EU Summit Declaration, 10 June 2008, (http://www.eu2008.si/en/News_and_Documents/Press_Releases/June/0610EU_USA_Declaration.html
. For example, EU signed Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement with Georgia in 1999, and later hesitantly
included the newly independent countries of the South
Caucasus into the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004),
utilizing since then ENPI instrument to channel
assistance to them. Yet, it has been accused of working
"around the conflicts" and apparent lack of consensus
obtains there, as much as in NATO, with some member
countries (Lithuania, Poland, Sweden) more sincerely
interested in the region, as manifested e.g. by the
proposed project of EU Eastern Partnership, than others.
The EU’s policy towards Georgia is summarized at
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/georgia/eu_georgia_summary/index_en.htm
Cf. Friedman, Thomas, „The Lexus and the Olive Tree“,
New York, 2000.
Cf. Wendt, Alexander, „Social Theory of International
Politics“, Cambridge, 1999
Identity, Campbell claims, is after all "a negation of
multiplicity." Campbell, David, „National
Deconstruction“, Minneapolis, 1999, p. 20.
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