Abstract
This article analyses social capital
in Ukraine, using the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC) as
a case study. To understand how a multiethnic society like
Crimea can build and strengthen social capital in the face
of economic and political challenges, we focus on the
relationship between
global, regional and local politics; the subsequent impact
on people’s work and private lives; and the actions which
can be undertaken by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
international organizations and the state in order to avoid
the detrimental trends the region is currently experiencing.
Regarding social capital, Ukraine provides an enigmatic
example as the country has myriad civil society actors who
should,
theoretically, constitute the cornerstone of social capital
formation and interethnic cooperation.
Our findings
suggest, however, that there is still a long way to go
before trust and shared values become a basis for political
and economic growth in Ukraine.
An integral
element for improving public trust in Ukraine, specifically
in Crimea, can be found by examining the impact of global
and regional processes on interethnic cooperation within
local groups, their specific initiatives and the ways in
which they have developed mechanisms for avoiding unresolved
conflict.
Keywords: Ukraine,
social capital, civil society, Crimea, multiethnic societies
Introduction
This article focuses on social capital
formation in Ukraine with special attention given to the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC). We seek to understand
how a multiethnic society like Crimea can build and
strengthen social capital in the face of extraordinary
economic and political challenges. We focus on
the
relationship between global, regional and
local level politics, its impact on people’s work and
private lives, and actions which can be undertaken by
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international
organizations and the state in order to avoid the
detrimental trends the region is now experiencing.
In examining
social capital in Ukraine we are confronted by a puzzle.
Despite a plethora of diverse civil society actors, which
usually forms the
cornerstone of social capital formation and interethnic
cooperation,
our research results
suggest that there is still a long way to go before trust
and shared values become a foundation for political and
economic growth in Ukraine.
An integral element in improving public
trust in Ukraine, and specifically in Crimea, can be found
by closely examining the impact of global processes on
interethnic cooperation within local groups, their specific
initiatives and the ways in which they have developed
mechanisms for avoiding unresolved conflict.
Globalization is a double-edged sword. It
has, on the one hand, created opportunities for
transnational and local civil society networks to begin to
lay the foundation for interethnic cooperation throughout
the country. On the other hand, it has strengthened the
position of specific minority groups who see the erosion of
the state’s political and economic influence, and
independence, as an opportunity for consolidating their own
claims to autonomy and power. Thus, there are concomitant
and equally powerful tendencies towards regionalism and
localism. If globalization can be considered a process of
economic, political and technical integration, then
regionalism and localism play on specific spiritual,
cultural and nation-building strategies that can strengthen
ethnic group identities.
To be sure, there need not be a clash
between the two, as they work at different levels and indeed
they can be reinforcing.
When they conflict it is because under globalization there
is an erosion of the state as the primary and sole agent
involved in managing the economy, and a commensurate
increase in the liberal ideas of human rights and human
security. Like neo-liberal
international economic influences,
international legal norms also
contribute to the erosion of the state.
For example, human rights and minority
rights groups recognize
that the internationalization of
their demands can both simultaneously encourage internal
mobilization and weaken the saliency and effectiveness of
the state by creating international forums for sub-state
grievances. This legitimization process is supported by the
existence of supranational organizations and international
institutions which provide a forum
and focal point for sub-national claims
through normative, legal and political processes.
Specifically, international organizations
indirectly promote sub-state mobilization by
providing human rights recognition and support which
can in turn help to legitimize
self-determination claims of minority
ethnic groups.
For our purposes, an overarching and key
aspect of this process is the rapid expanse of
non-governmental civil society activities – political and
economic – in the traditional affairs of the Ukrainian
state. Through the rise in interest in the discourse of
human rights and human security, civil society has taken
root within Ukrainian politics and is coordinated by the
emergence of transnational linkages among various groups
including trade unions, human rights advocates,
environmentalists, women’s groups and religious
organizations, many of whom mobilize around the deleterious
effects associated with rapid market-oriented reforms.
In the first part of the article we
briefly examine theories of social capital formation. In the
second part of the article we identify impediments to social
capital formation in the context of Crimea’s unique and
contentious historical development. In the third part of the
article we assess the relationship between local and
regional political and economic dynamics in Crimea in an
effort to understand how regional forces have and can
contribute to social capital formation through legal
instruments This section also examines how international
actors have worked to assist multiethnic Crimea to generate
effective governance through projects based on interethnic
dialog. In the fourth section we assess current efforts to
decentralize political structures through financial reform
and local level economic development. The fifth and final
section concludes with some observations about the future
social capital in Crimea.
Social Capital Formation: Theoretical
Foundations
The rationale for a de-centered approach
focusing on non-state,
community level actors arises from the possibility that
political problems may be more easily addressed outside the
state-level government sector when trust in state
institutions is weak or in decline.
Investments in improving the capabilities of local-level
actors in this regard have the potential to accrue benefits
not only to the group in question but to society at large.
Theories of social capital argue that such investments have
the potential to generate positive norms of political and
economic change when a government is incapable of or
unwilling to transform the political and economic landscape.
Positive transformations can occur
through the development of norms of reciprocity such as
bargaining and compromise as well as tolerance for pluralism
that occur at the local level and spillover to political
interactions at the national and sub-national level. There
is,
in short, a possibility that civil society can mobilize
crucial support for problem solving and trust and thereby
become entrenched in more formal political institutions and
mechanisms.
The theoretical basis underpinning these
assumptions is varied and large,
but a number of key contributions can be highlighted. Robert
Putnam writing at the end of the 20th century, assessed
solidarity and trust problems in terms of social capital
development.
He argued that the decline of group solidarity could be
strengthened through communication and enhanced information
technologies. Related to this point, Coleman argued that it
is vital to treat local level actors as discrete and
independent decision makers guided by their own interests.
These local actors can be treated as both individuals and
collectivities. Communication among collectivities helps
create social capital and by virtue of this they are likely
to benefit to a greater degree, in social capital investment
than are individual actors.
Putnam's concept of social capital has
three components: moral obligations and norms, social values
(especially trust) and social networks (especially voluntary
associations). Putnam's central thesis is that if a region
has a well-functioning economic system and a high level of
political integration, these are the result of its
successful accumulation of social capital.
Accordingly, the overall objective
consists in the maximization of benefits for groups and the
formation of sequenced strategies to achieve specific goals.
Since actors directly engage in decision-making regarding the allocation
of their resources they have an interest in increasing their
share of control of how these resources are distributed
across a broader audience. In essence, social capital is the
volume of resources accessible to specific actors, their
social communication and the trust that arises from these
interactions. More formally, social capital is defined by
specific functions in which basic principles of economy and
resource allocation are imbedded within overlapping but
distinct social structures.
Under the right conditions and like other
types of capital, social capital can be very productive. The
important conditions for positive collective action arise
from acts of mutual aid and mutual benefit. When a group
looks to other institutions or actors, that group,
in return, accepts some obligations, favorable to the other
participating party. This form of “social contract” creates
a kind of “fund of obligations” to which “actor-creditors”
can seek assistance in times of need. The actor-creditor
relationship works to build trust and proceeds from the
expenses and benefits which both sides accrue over the long
run. Social capital is
defined here as a “social network”. This network is the
basis for several processes, including the development of
trust among peoples from different communities, lasting
functional relationships and the potential for mutual
economic and political development.
More detailed perspectives on social
capital in emerging democracies have picked up on the themes
of employment opportunities, education and communications
respectively. For example, Badescu
and Uslaner argue that social
capital generation is a
process by which “surplus value” is generated through
investment in social relations.
Lin reviews numerous studies showing that network diversity
leads to a more prestigious job, partly because those with
diverse networks get job-search help from contacts with
higher prestige.
Similarly, education is a series of
social settings in which people meet and impart a valued
social status and provide access to other forms of high
status, like better jobs. As such, Bekkers, Volker, van der
Gaag and Flap find that those with higher incomes have
higher social capital.
Furthermore, the rise of modern communication systems has
provided another form of inequality that shapes social
capital. For example, social capital is greater for those
more active in internet communities in Japan, and for more
active users of news articles, telephones and the internet.
Cote and Erickson find that the best predictor for the
development of social capital is the size of the social
networks rather than the diversity of the networks.
In essence, social capital is not a network concept per se
but is related to civil engagement, social participation,
trust and communication.
In brief, the
overall objective of building social capital consists in the
maximization of benefits for groups and the formation of
sequenced strategies by these groups to achieve specific
collective goals. Since individual actors directly engage in
decision-making regarding the allocation of resources they
have an interest in increasing their share of control of how
these resources are distributed across a broader audience.
Education, communication and capabilities all influence the
growth and success of social capital networks. Specificity
and reciprocity are also heavily influenced by the scope and
breadth of relations between actors.
Trust, Social Capital and
the Ethnic Dimension
In a multiethnic society with access to
modern communication systems, education and a varied media
such as Ukraine, civil society networks could be, in theory,
the basis for several functional processes including the
development of trust among different ethnic groups, forging
economic relations between peoples from different
communities, and in the long run sustained functional
relationships with the potential for mutual economic and
political development.
Indeed, measured in
terms of raw numbers one might be led to believe that social
capital is in abundance in Crimea. After all, NGOs and
political parties are believed to be highly
active in all aspects of civic engagement
in Ukraine. For example, there are over three thousand
active NGOs in Crimea alone and over eleven thousand party
offices located there. In Ukraine overall, since 2001,
political parties increased their number by one thousand per
cent and civic organizations by one hundred and sixty per
cent.
The biggest change has come through political party growth
which relates to the fact that political parties must, by
law, now have representation in all regions of Ukraine. A
second factor is that political issues are arguably now more
important in the eyes of most Ukrainians in comparison to
social or economic issues.
However, as Putnam and others note,
quality and not quantity is a good indicator of
effectiveness and in this regard the evidence is less
positive.
In reality, despite increasing
recognition from the international community, and despite
the huge growth in NGOs and political party representation
across the country, the perceived legitimacy of formal
Ukrainian political institutions is extremely low and is
declining. For example, a recent Pew Center poll showed that
most people believed they were better off under communist
rule than they are now. And to reinforce the point, a
2008 survey
asked “Can we trust people in general?” According to that
survey, 67 per cent of Ukrainians believe that trust is “not
necessary” for Ukrainian politics.
As another indicator of social
cohesion, the survey
results showed that most citizens do not even consider
themselves close to their neighbors within their own country
but they do feel closeness to people in neighboring states.
In Western Ukraine, people feel closer to Hungary and
Poland, but not neighboring regions within Ukraine. The same
tendency exists in the East, where people feel closer
to Russia and Belarus. In
short, despite the presumed linkages between an active civil
society and social capital development it would appear that
Ukrainians do not trust each other all that much and have
little faith in the current political system.
The absence of high quality civic
engagement can be partially traced to historical factors in
Ukraine and Crimea specifically. Crimea in particular is
host to a number of distinct groups including Crimean
Tatars, ethnic Russians, Ukrainian as well as a number of
smaller groups who are not particularly well integrated even
at the local level.
Crimean peninsula with a territory of 26,100 km2
is home to 1.9 million Ukrainian citizens, of which 63 per
cent are ethnic Russians, 25 per cent Ukrainians and 12 per
cent Crimean Tatars, with the rest being Armenians,
Bulgarians, Germans, Greeks,
Karaites, Krymchaks and other
ethnic minorities.
The ARC
(hereinafter used interchangeably with “Autonomous Republic
of Crimea”) also has a Constitution recognizing three
official languages. The primary language is Russian, but
Ukrainian and Tatar languages are also heard among the
people.
For the purposes of this study,
Crimean Tatar experience is particularly significant.
In 1944,
hundreds of thousands of Crimean people were deported
following a decision by Stalin, based on their assumed
collaboration with the German Wehrmacht.
In fact, the deported population from Crimea totalled
225,009 peoples, of which 183,155 were Crimean Tatars,
12,422 Bulgarians, 15,040 Greeks, 9,621 Armenians, 1,119
Germans and 3,652 foreigners (Otto Pohl). This total was
later revised upward to 228,392, with the addition of
several thousand additional non-Tatar exiles. The Soviet
Union’s People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD)
exiled 151,604 of the Tatars to Uzbekistan and 31,551 to
areas within Russia. The Soviet authorities dispersed the
Bulgarians, Greeks, Armenians and Germans across Russia and
to Kazakhstan. In essence, the NKVD completely cleansed
Crimean peninsula of its non-Slavic population.
Those non-Tatars who survived the
cleansing lived in exile until 1956, when they were allowed
to leave their place of deportation. However, Crimean Tatars
as a people were not allowed to return to their homeland and
were forced to live and settle anywhere but Crimea. In
1967, the Parliament of the Soviet
Union officially recognized the injustice of the deportation
of Crimean Tatars ordered by Stalin, but still prevented
Crimean Tatars from returning to their homeland.
Thirty-three years passed until the
declaration of the Supreme Soviet of November 14, 1989 (Recognition
as Illegal and Criminal, the Forced Deportation and
Repressive Measures Against Displaced Peoples and Provisions
for Their Rights), restored the rights of all deported
peoples. This declaration initiated the return of Crimean
Tatars to their homeland. Since then, there has been an
influx of more than 260,000 deportees, among whom about
250,000 are Crimean Tatars.
In addition, 12,000 representatives of other nationalities
have also arrived and settled in Crimea.
The number of returnees among Crimean
Tatar population in Crimea by
years is shown in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Returnees among Crimean
Tatar population in Crimea

To a large extent, the return of the
Tatars was swift, substantial and spontaneous. In 1991 an
unprepared government of the newly independent Ukraine
lacked the capacity to deal with the issue. Deportees who
were to be given reparations and reimbursement of damages,
due to economic privation had difficulties obtaining both
housing and jobs. High inflation reduced their savings and
the income which families received on the sale of their
previous residences. To complicate the matter, Crimea’s
production decreased rapidly, and the tourism industry,
which underpinned Crimean economy, declined when the borders
between the former republics of the Soviet Union were
established and ethnic conflicts transformed into open
warfare in the Caucasus. Difficulties in obtaining Ukrainian
citizenship
endangered the political and economic rights of the Tatars
in particular (e.g. the right to land, to vote and to
participate in privatization). While other diasporas in
Crimea (e.g. Armenian, Bulgarian, Greeks and Germans) relied
heavily on the support and assistance from their homelands,
Crimean Tatars as the indigenous peoples of Crimea, could
only expect support from each other or seek assistance from
the international community. As a result, the massive return
of the deported people weighed heavily on an economically
weak Crimea which was unprepared to handle such a
substantial and hurried migratory incursion.
Moreover, negative stereotypes and prejudices concerning
Crimean Tatars, artificially nurtured during Soviet times
over several generations, returned with a vengeance.
Crimea’s future looked bleak. On the one
hand, Khrushchev’s decision in 1954 to transfer
Crimea from the Russian Federation to Ukraine showed
serious effects only after the break up of the Soviet
Union, when Crimea with its Russian-dominated population
found itself in the newly independent Ukraine.
Many Crimeans considered themselves ethnic Russians not
Ukrainian and still do to this day. As a result,
Crimea tried to preserve as much autonomy as possible
from Ukraine. By the same token, Crimea’s ethnic
Russian majority was growing increasingly apprehensive about
the erosion of their own status as result
of not only their inclusion in Ukraine but because of the
influx of Tatars.
For its part, the Ukrainian government
was also burdened. The central government in Kiev had
entered into negotiations with Uzbekistan (where the
majority of the deported Tatars came from) to develop a
simplified procedure for the denunciation of Uzbek
citizenship and to reduce the burden of fees and custom
taxes at the border. They received little financial support
from Russia for doing so. Throughout the 1990s, the
Ukrainian government appealed to other CIS states who were
supposed to share the burden of repatriation and the
settlement of returnees but chose not to.
The most problematic issue remained the
unemployment rate among Crimean Tatars. In 2001 it was 49.6
per cent which was three times higher than the average for
all of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.
While the management of ethnic and other tensions in
Crimea has, on the whole,
been without major violence recent
incidences and trends give cause
for concern. These include violent
clashes between 1,000 persons near a local market in
Bakhchisaray
in August 2006; a tripling in land-squatting incidents over
the last several years (from 19 to 53 sites); confrontations
with religious overtones in Feodosia and Alushta; and
increasing numbers of people who, according to public
opinion polls, feel that interethnic relations are worsening
(64 per cent today compared with 21 per cent in 2002). These
changes underscore the depth of social cleavages and
perceived unresolved injustices in Crimea.
The disillusionment
among Crimean Tatars in a process of reconciliation and
political growth began with Yushchenko’s
ill-fated Orange
revolution and increased under the
subsequent governments of Tymoshenko and Yanukovych. Despite
the existence of nominal
power-sharing arrangements in the ARC,
there is now among moderate
Crimean Tatars an uneasiness with the
escalating influence of more radical groups of
different backgrounds
who proclaim that political dialogue has failed and
alternative strategies including threats
to use force are needed. Currently
the most significant threats to stability in Crimea
are continued, non-transparent
land allocation practices, restrictions
on minority language rights, and unequal
socio-economic development including
health and environmental issues. Many of these
problems are linked to perceptions of ethnic identities,
perceived inequality among groups and
a lack of progress on issues of
historical injustices.
In sum, there is little reason to believe social capital
formation, trust and consolidation have taken root in
Crimea. We have shown why this might be the case and have
provided empirical evidence in support of it.
Let us now turn to
the question of how regional and global forces might
contribute to an increase in social capital and cohesion in
Crimea.
Regional Forces and
International Dynamics
How might regional
forces contribute to social capital formation in Crimea? To
answer this question, we specifically draw on key structural
features including the
European legal system and its impact on Ukrainian notions of
self-government,
international actors’ support for social capital formation
in Crimea and financial reforms to decentralize the
political structure; Each is considered in turn.
In May, 1997, the Ukrainian Parliament
voted in a series of laws on local self-government including
its own interpretation of local self-government and that of
the European Charter. These laws have their support in
Article 7 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which legalizes
local self-government, by suggesting that this is the
natural law for local communities seeking self-government.
Nevertheless, there is still a problem with making
self-government at the local level work specifically in a
multiethnic environment like Crimea. As Ukrainian social
scientist Anna Shvachka has argued there is a discrepancy
between Ukraine’s interpretation of local self-government
and that of the European Charter with the first having a
strong Soviet influence, such as guaranteed support from the
state and the European charter stressing far more support
for disadvantaged groups.
The preamble of the European Charter of Local
Self-Government, Strasbourg (European Charter of Local
Self-Government) states, inter alia:
[T]he local authorities are one of the
main foundations of any democratic regime [...] the right of
citizens to participate in the conduct of public affairs is
one of the democratic principles that are shared by all
member States of the Council of Europe (Preamble).
Without prejudice to more general
statutory provisions, local authorities shall be able to
determine their own internal administrative structures in
order to adapt them to local needs and ensure effective
management. The conditions of service of local government
employees shall be such as to permit the recruitment of
high-quality staff on the basis of merit and competence; to
this end adequate training opportunities, remuneration and
career prospects shall be provided (Art. 6).
The protection of financially weaker
local authorities calls for the institution of financial
equalization procedures or equivalent measures which are
designed to correct the effects of the unequal distribution
of potential sources of finance and of the financial burden
they must support. Such procedures or measures shall not
diminish the discretion local authorities may exercise
within their own sphere of responsibility (Art. 9).
In essence, then, there is a fundamental
difference between how the Ukrainian government perceives
local self-government and how it is understood from outside
the country. This becomes clearer in the light of unresolved
tensions over land allocation.
For example, on December 13, 2006, the Ukrainian Parliament
amended the criminal code to prohibit the unauthorized
occupation of land, making land-squatting punishable by up
to six years imprisonment. As noted, land-squatting had
become been a key tool used by Crimean Tatars to draw
attention to their situation. In anticipation of this
criminalization, Crimean Tatars intensified their land
seizures, which now involve over 15,000 persons (up from
8,000 in April 2006).
According to pronouncements by some Tatar
groups, attempts to enforce the ban on land-squatting will
be opposed by “any available means”, including active
resistance, demonstrations and demands to legalize the
ownership of houses that have already been constructed on
these lands. Crimean Tatar leaders have also threatened to
escalate their demands to cover the restitution of all
property owned prior to their deportation, rather than
simply the right to return to areas where they used to live.
Their form of leadership is the Mejlis, an unofficial
representative structure of Crimean Tatars elected by the
Kurultay, the Assembly of Crimean Tatars. Thus far, the
Mejlis has limited its demands to “social justice” –
understood as equal opportunities for the deported people –
rather than full property restitution as would be consistent
with a European Charter interpretation. However, given the
absence of a fully functioning land registration system,
it is difficult to ascertain the actual number of Crimean
Tatars that do not have access to land.
The Tatars have seized upon the idea of
self-government consistent with ideas embodied in the
European Charter. In fact their notion of self-government
has gone further. For centuries, Crimean Tatar maintained a
traditional system of self-government called the Kurultay
(the National Assembly of Crimean Tatar people) which since
the repatriation started in the early 1990s, has convened
three times. The Kurultay elects the Mejlis as the executive
body of the Kurultay. Since 1991
when the Mejlis was founded and national sovereignty
declared, its leader has been the
well-known Soviet dissident Mustafa Djemilev.
Under his guidance, Crimean Tatar
population has been continually growing (3.7 children per
family, compared with 1.9 in a Slavic family) and the
economic and demographic situation in Crimea is
unquestionably changing as a result.
Beyond specific legal measures
recognizing self-government, it is important to consider
other rights-based processes that one might consider to be
significant. When the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian
Parliament) amended the law on Ukrainian Citizenship to
simplify the process of obtaining Ukrainian citizenship for
formerly deported individuals, several draft laws were
submitted for the consideration of parliament. Among them
was The Law on the Status of Crimean Tatar Peoples
and The Law on Rehabilitation and Provision of Rights of
National Minorities Who Were Discriminated Against and
Deported from the Territory of Ukraine. Several
institutions with the mandate to assist integration and
settlement were formed, including: the Verkhovna
Rada Committee on Human Rights of Minorities and
Interethnic Relation; the Council of Representatives of
Crimean Tatar People with the President of Ukraine;
the Commission on the Affairs of Individuals Deported on the
Grounds of Their Nationality; the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine; the State Committee for Nationalities and
Migration; the Division for the Issues of Citizenship and
Minorities with the Office of the President of Ukraine; and
the State Committee for Nationalities and Deported Peoples
within the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.
To some degree each
of these organizations or state bodies has a nominal role in
advancing a legal structure for local self-government in
Crimea. However, according to our analysis, there is limited
room for consequential policy deliberations beyond the
creation of legal frameworks. The absence of a coherent
policy process can be attributed to several factors.
First, very few regular polls
gauging public opinion are carried
out systematically and comprehensively.
The policy debate regarding local
self-government therefore lacks a
practical foundation and has little
basis in facts,
Indeed the process is extremely
partisan. Various interest groups, such as the community of
Crimean Tatars and Russians
advance their own “facts”, but
there is no systematic region wide
data collection organized in a reliable archive that would
allow the monitoring of any trends that
might suggest increasing social cohesion across the various
communities.. More worrisome is
the behaviour of elected officials who appear to have no
interest in policy analysis and process. Serving “the public
good” by making choices that transcend parochial and ethnic
self-interest is largely a foreign concept.
Second, there appears to be minimal room
for meaningful policy dialog and for assisting the
government in developing an
adequate policy response based on an ongoing monitoring of
social, political and economic conditions
in Crimea. The absence of a common policy for
addressing the complex situation in Crimea,
is a good indication that these
critical development challenges are not being effectively
addressed by existing institutions.
Third, there is little capacity for
cooperation on key issues between the ARC and the Mejlis.
The Mejlis in particular has significant constituency
issues. For example, while the Mejlis has thus far
been able to accommodate both radical and moderate factions,
recent developments point to growing popular support for
more radical alternatives. For example, only about one third
of Crimean Tatars followed the Mejlis’s voting
recommendations during the recent
elections in Ukraine.
Turning now to our second element we note
that the as a result of the intensifying interethnic
situation, Crimea is of specific interest for several key
organizations, including:
Crimea Integration and
Development Program of the UNDP;
The High Commissioner on
National Minorities of the OSCE,
the Turkish International
Cooperation Agency,
the Eurasia Foundation
(USAID), and
the Open Society Institute
(The Renaissance Foundation).
The relationship, roles and activities of these
international donors in Crimea are portrayed in Figure 2
below.
Figure 2: Project Funding from Donors in Crimea

Equally important players include
Crimea’s smaller NGOs who are obligatory actors and parties
to all activities funded by the donor community. As a
result, multiple actors have the opportunity to interact
both vertically and horizontally in the ARC. In the case of
Crimea specifically, these interactions are mainly based on
vertical linkages. The reasons for the lack of horizontal
integration are self-evident and mostly related to the
“pillarized” ethnically divided society that is Crimea (see
Figure 3).
Figure 3: The Pyramidal Structure of Civil Society
Activity in Crimea

Though some international programmes such
as the UNDP’s Program for the Integration of the Formerly
Deported Crimean Tatar People and Armenians, Bulgarians,
Greeks and Germans into Ukrainian Society have established
direct links with local NGOs and promote horizontal
cooperation, most donors do not encourage this kind of
“cross-ethnic” dialog. The implication is that horizontal
linkages need to be more firmly supported by the donor
community. One major exception is the UNDP’s
Human Security
Council operating under the aforementioned CIDP. The
Council was previously formalized as an Advisory Body under
the First Deputy Prime Minister of the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea. Recently, the Council was placed under the
Speaker of the Parliament giving it greater influence. The
CIDP’s closest partnerships have been with the Mejlis and
NGO research communities raising questions about its
impartiality but even these partnerships are wavering.
Indeed the authors had first hand experience where dialog
between Tatar and non- Tatar representatives on the Council
could only be facilitated through a third party
intermediary. This shift is reflective of the evolving power
structures in the Republic but more importantly is a
reflection of the hardening of the attitudes among ethnic
community leaders. The CIDP’s Human Security Council has yet
to find the right relationship for itself within Crimea’s
institutions.
In sum, despite anticipation that Ukraine
might move in the direction of a more “European” approach to
local self-government judging from the legal structures that
it has put in place since independence, there is little
reason to believe these structures are having a direct
influence on reducing tensions in Crimea or are generating
social capital for that matter. Further what appears to be
happening is in the absence of leadership from above, local
actors and international organizations are taking a greater
role in supporting dialog and development with a specific
focus on the Tatars. The experience of Crimean Tatars is
highlighted as a case in which they have developed their own
quasi independent political and economic machinery and have
been encouraged to do so by international actors in the hope
that it might lead to sustained interethnic dialogue.
Financial Reform and
Decentralization
Turning now to our third and final
element, we note that given Crimea’s political inertia and
the fact that international actors are for the most part
secondary players in Ukraine, the core problem of developing
effective local self-government may well be addressed
through a systematic, goal oriented strategic plan for
reforming financial governance. Indeed, the system of
financing local governments in many unitary European
countries is a crucial stabilizing factor that is vital in
providing an efficient collaboration between the state and
the private sector in relation to the provision of public
services to citizens. To be sure, Ukraine’s concomitant lack
of transparency in the budget process and a low level of
citizen participation in the electoral process are
contributing factors that will need to be concomitantly
addressed Yet there are reasons to be optimistic. For
example, increases in the volumes of financing for local
budgets in 2004, compared to previous periods, were positive
signs that the share of local budget revenues in the GDP
were increasing. In 2004, positive changes in the structure
of local budgets revenues occurred as a result of capital
investment, a growth in the share of local taxes and fees,
and growth in revenues from land use taxes.
Such diversification in Ukraine is
different from that of Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Denmark,
Portugal and France, all of which have levels of revenue
above 40 per cent. In Finland and Sweden it amounts to about
20 per cent of the total volume of revenues. Thus,
sub-regions in some EU countries such as Great Britain,
Italy and Portugal have a high dependence on revenues from
central government budgets and a high level of
centralization in public finance. The systems of financing
local self-government within these countries are
centralized, while in Sweden, Finland, Denmark and France,
where revenues to the budgets of local governments exceed 50
per cent, systems of financing local self-government can be
regarded as decentralized. The highest level of financial
dependency in transfers from the budgets of the central
government is in Albania (96 per cent of the total volume of
revenues in the budgets of local governments). By contrast,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia can be classified
as more financially autonomous countries (where the figure
is about 20 per cent).
For comparison it is useful to consider
the dynamics of transfer share to local government’s budget
revenues in unitary post-socialist European countries. From
1988 to 2001 there was a marked decrease in the dependence
on transfers in Romania, Slovenia, Hungary, Bulgaria and an
increase of transfer shares in Estonia, Czech Republic and
Ukraine. Taking into account the European integration
ambitions of Ukraine, a more thorough study of the positive
experiences of European countries is needed, especially
concerning the implementation of principles of the European
Charter of Local Self-government. Until the recession in
2008–9 many east European countries were showing success in
addressing problems in raising the efficiency of local
self-governments. Their strategy has been as follows. First,
the basic sources of revenues in the budgets of different
levels of local self-government are clearly defined.
Second, revenues from local self-government budgets are
clearly dissociated from state budget revenues. Third, and
related to the second point, there is the introduction of
models of financial equalization and clear budgetary
procedures and political mechanisms established by the
state-center and strictly adhered to by municipalities and
state governments. Fourth, after the introduction of
national measures to strengthen the revenue base of local
self-government budgets, autonomous mechanisms to mobilize
additional sources of revenues in local budgets are widely
deployed. Fifth, and finally, greater attention is given by
finance officers to more effectively use internal reserves
through rigorous and coherent policy planning procedures.
As a result, a system of financing local
government has been implemented successfully by several
former eastern bloc countries, with due credit being given
to the social significance and the nature of public sector
of local economies. The key feature of these systems is a
decision-making process covering the key functions and
authorities between central and local self-government, and
these systems are built around a clearly defined system of
public services.
Today, in a time of transformation and
radical change, traditional governance often faces crises.
Community foundations to promote local development, credit
unions to facilitate entrepreneurship and businesses are
thought to be the answers to the insufficient funding of
municipal programmes by a weak central government. In so
doing, public works for community development will reduce
unemployment and a mixed-property approach (with community
members as shareholders) with local management of the sewage
and water supply system could speed up an improvement in
living standards.
For a multiethnic Crimean, however, such
lofty goals are difficult to achieve. Some solutions may
come through community governance. Indeed the premise of
this article is that as Putnam argues, “communities are part
of good governance because they address certain problems
that cannot be handled either by individuals acting alone or
by markets and governments.”
Thus the way forward, according to Putnam, is grounded in
social capital (skills, aspirations, beliefs, ability to
associate, network and interact for the benefit of the
community), in which community governance can be understood
as an accumulations of skills and collective action for
problem solving. Community governance is ultimately based on
sharing information, equipment and skills with the members
of the community, as well as individual motivation and peer
monitoring.
In theory, community governance based on
regular and frequent interactions allows for adjustments and
“soft” mechanisms of coordination pertaining to a “new
paradigm” of regional development programmes. The key
instruments for community governance and new regional
development paradigms include:
-
decentralization and devolution;
-
strong local governments;
-
new patterns of management and
organizational behaviour;
-
empowered local NGOs and community
base organizations;
-
growth of interest and advocacy
groups;
-
co-operative financial services (e.g.
community credit unions, community foundations);
-
co-operative ventures and mixed
property enterprises (community utility company); and
-
programmes supporting
entrepreneurship and small-business development.
Is there a potential for community
governance in a multiethnic Crimean? The answer is mixed.
Based on the statistics we have analysed, we can say for all
populations of Crimea, the main problems are truly economic,
including low salaries and pensions (66.8 per cent) combined
with high prices for main products (65.4 per cent).
But it is not just economic problems that are shared across
Crimean population; there is also evidence that trust and
solidarity – key requirements for community governance – are
in short supply in Crimea. To be sure, some of the Tatar
returnees live in newly raised compact settlements (partly
as a means to preserve, or restore, language, culture and
traditional modes of living; partly because only the
undeveloped land plots were available for settlement, partly
due to land-squatting). But many others live in towns and
cities side by side with a local and largely ethnically
diverse population. A friendly environment in the latter
communities could be favorable for the mobilization of
mutually beneficial activities.
Thus, there is an
opportunity as well as the need to transfer community space
from the rural to urban areas. Community level dialogue
would have to aim at addressing complex problems that are
not being adequately addressed by existing institutions and
this is where the international community could come into
play.
Conclusion
We began this article by arguing that an
increase in social capital could arise from a de-centered
approach focusing on non-state actors, specifically
communities. Global and regional forces have served a mixed
role both pulling the region (and country) apart but also
attempting to keep it together. We surmised that political
problems may be more easily addressed outside the government
sector when trust in government institutions is in decline
and that regional decentralization may help in this regard.
We evaluated the efforts to decentralize government and
create legal structures under the assumption that these
efforts should lend themselves to increased social capital
formation in Crimea. Our analysis does not support that
claim however that trust building, an important perquisite
to social capital formation and local self-government in a
multiethnic environment, has taken place in Crimea despite
the efforts of international actors to help in this process.
The theory that investment in improving the capabilities of
local-level actors can accrue benefits not only to the group
in question but to society at large is a sound one. In
practice the situation in Crimea does not yet lend itself to
such a conclusion. To some extent, international efforts
such as the UNDP’s CIDP initiative have helped generate
positive norms of social change among the elites but these
have not necessarily trickled down to the individual.
Positive social changes are likely to
occur only after a long time, perhaps only after a
generation of returnees is replaced by a younger generation
born in Crimea. The government will need to show greater
interest in serving the public good and will need to adopt
sound public decentralized administration models base on
core needs such as analysis and policy processes and funding
mechanism that engage civil society and the private sector.
In the mean time, the government could do more to support a
positive transformation by showing support for, and
tolerance of, pluralism and by making meaningful local level
investments that can mobilize crucial support for problem
solving and trust among individuals and civil society.
Perhaps over time that local level trust will be entrenched
in more formal political institutions and mechanisms that
will in turn strengthen Crimea’s and Ukraine’s overall
political and economic development.