Conducted by Jesse Tatum, Interview
Editor of CRIA
CRIA: Can you contextualize the recent
surge in violence in the North Caucasus, especially in
Daghestan and Ingushetia.
Souleimanov: In my understanding, the
ongoing violence in the North Caucasus can be understood as
an outcome of the continuous intermingling of ethnic
nationalism, religious fundamentalism (some call it
“Jihadism” and militant Islam) and customary law of the
mountainous Caucasus.
In other words, some North Caucasians found
themselves in the resistance movement because of their
ethno-separatist aspirations – their desire to free their
homeland, to make it independent on Moscow, to establish
nation states. This was especially the case in Chechnya in
the last decade.
Then, after the interwar period in Chechnya,
a new phase emerged in which religious identification
started playing an increasingly crucial role – and the North
Caucasus resistance began associating itself with the local
(North Caucasian), to some extent also global, jihadist
movement rather than with ethno-nationalist separatism.
Hence the ethno-nationalist identity declined in importance
as the Chechen battlefield transformed over the years into a
North Caucasian or rather North-East Caucasian one;
Chechens, Daghestanis, Ingush and others became increasingly
aware of their common Islamic heritage, as well as local
(North Caucasian, or highlander) identity, which was to
cement their sense of solidarity in an attempt to gain
independence from Moscow and eventually establish some sort
of supranational Islamic state (thus reviving the tradition
of Imam Shamil’s imamate) in the region.
Besides that, rules of traditional customary
law (adat) still play a crucial role in the North-East
Caucasus – in contrast to the North-West Caucasus, which is
much more Russified and Westernized – as does the blood
feud; and the archaic concept of honor is still intact in
the traditionalist eastern parts of the Caucasus, which
explains why the level of violence is so high in Chechnya,
Ingushetia and Daghestan. To put it in other words: if you
offend me or offend, kill or lethally injure a relative of
mine, I shall do my best to retaliate – regardless of what
my political persuasion actually is – I shall take revenge
by killing the offender or, if I fail to do so, his closest
male relative, be he a soldier, police officer or anyone
else. So if the police kidnap a relative of mine or me on
the suspicion that we are a “Wahhabi,” or just in the hope
to make some ransom money, or any other reason, beats me/him
or humiliates me/him, I will have to take revenge, whatever
the price of such retaliation. Because I am alone and the
state authorities are strong and corrupt, I need some
backing, whether organizational or financial – to achieve my
goal – and that is why I am very likely to join resistance
fighters up in the mountains. In doing so, I will be very
likely to adapt to their way of thinking, which is now
dominated by some sort of Jihadism, as do youngsters from
across the North Caucasus who join the resistance movement
because of their strong ideological persuasion, since they
blame the pro-Moscow local authorities of all deadly sins.
Now we are facing a new wave of violence in Daghestan,
Ingushetia and Chechnya in which a local mixture of the
blood feud and regional separatism cloaked in Jihadism plays
an increasingly significant role.
I have explained this process in a detailed
way in my recent book, An Endless War (2007).
CRIA: Ingushetia's president Yunus-Bek
Yevkurov blamed corruption as the main factor behind ongoing
violence and banditry (RFE/RL, Nov. 23, 2009). How accurate
is this claim? What is the next step for the president in
tackling the issue?
Souleimanov: Corruption as such is
very unlikely to force people into killing others, although
it is extremely instrumental in alienating the population
from local governments, not only in Ingushetia but also
across the North Caucasus republics. As I have mentioned
above, one of the major reasons explaining the ongoing
violence in the region is the ruthless behavior of the local
police and the military authorities in fighting the real or
alleged “Wahhabis” or in just making some money, combined
with the typical North Caucasian nepotism where all
profitable businesses, offices and, in some cases, even
organized crime across the region, especially in Ingushetia,
have been held by the relatives and close friends of the
political elite, which Moscow has quietly accepted due to
its specific political interests. If Yevkurov succeeds in
breaking this circle and still remains alive, it will be his
– and the entire region’s – major accomplishment within the
recent decade. Nevertheless, I am rather skeptical regarding
whether he succeeds in his manifested endeavor.
CRIA: Can you summarize Moscow's
current role in this milieu? How has it changed over the
last ten to fifteen years?
Souleimanov: Moscow’s main goal since
1991 has been to make sure the North Caucasus remains under
its strict control. However, as we may look at it in a
long-term perspective, its actions, as well as the actions
of the local governments, have contributed to quite an
opposite outcome: with the exception of North Ossetia, the
North Caucasus, especially its eastern part, have never
since the First Chechen War (1994-1996) been so alienated by
Moscow and local governments. The current trend of the
Kremlin is to rather formally distance itself from the
region and have its will carried out by the local
governments, giving them carte blanche for their problematic
economic activities as has been the broadly discussed case
of Ingushetia.
CRIA: Will Medvedev's idea of placing a
federal-level leader in charge of the entire North Caucasus
improve the situation? Would Ramzan Kadyrov – reportedly the
leading candidate for such a position – be suitable?
Souleimanov: No federal-level leaders
will ever help improve the situation in the North Caucasus
in any substantial way unless there is a clear political
will in Moscow that this is to be done; however, such an
initiative would mean a drastic shift in the Kremlin’s
policies toward the region, which is quite unlikely to
happen in these days, given Russia’s attitude toward the
region. If put in such a position, Ramzan Kadyrov, given his
character, previous position as autocratic leader of
Chechnya and quite troublesome relationship with the
Daghestani and current Ingushetia authorities, would only
aggravate the overall situation in the North Caucasus rather
than improve it.
CRIA: What are your thoughts on the
potential for increased levels of inter-republic tension?
Souleimanov: Relations between the
Turkic (Karachay, Balkar) and Adyge (Cherkes, Kabardey)
populations of the North-West Caucasus have traditionally
been uneasy, as are the relations between the various ethnic
groups in the multiethnic republic of Daghestan. The
tensions between the Ingush and North Ossetians are still
high, albeit latent, after the bloody events of 1992 in the
Prigorodniy district; a specific exception being the rather
historically positive relations between the Muslim North
Ossetians and the Ingush. The ongoing violence in the North
Caucasus helps boost the sense of supranational (religious,
regional, cultural) solidarity of North Caucasians, as
ethnic identity plays a rather minor role in the resistance
movement. However, it is a fact that, for instance, rural
and, on average, more traditionliast Avars are more active
in the resistance movement than the urban Kumyks, which then
contributes to a relatively high level of mutual distrust
amongst various ethnic groups in Daghestan. At the same
time, as far as tensions between particular republics is
concerned, the main source of instability has so far been
the troublesome behavior of Ramzan Kadyrov’s forces
vis-ŕ-vis Chechnya’s neighbors to the west and east.
CRIA: Do unstable borders have any
particular implications for Azerbaijan and Georgia, or for
further north of the North Caucasus republics themselves –
in Moscow, for example?
Souleimanov: Baku is traditionally
suspicious of the activities of different religious and
ethno-religious groups based on the country’s north. These
mountainous areas, inhabited mostly by Sunnis either of
Azerbaijani, Avar, Lezgin or other North Caucasian
populations, have historically been closely connected to
Daghestan. Increased tensions in Daghestan are very likely
to have a direct impact on Azerbaijan’s rather
traditionalist North. Islam also plays significant role, and
the level of social mobilization is thus considerably higher
than in some other areas of Azerbaijan. This is especially
true for the country’s Lezgin and Avar communities, which
associate themselves with their ethnic brethren based in
Daghestan as least as much as with the idea of Azerbaijani
statehood.
As for Georgia, the northern areas of this
South Caucasian country bordering Chechnya, inhabited by the
Kists (ethnic Chechens, part of whom were evangelized and
then Georgianized centuries ago), as well as by the Chechen
refugees from the First and Second Chechen Wars, may be of
concern to Tbilisi. Because of the smaller numbers of Kists
and Chechens inhabiting Georgia’s north than that of Avars,
Lezgis and Sunni Azerbaijanis inhabiting Azerbaijan’s north,
and because of the fact that the Chechen/Kist community is
rather isolated in Georgia in both political and geographic
terms, the implications for Azerbaijan are more likely to be
serious should the situation in Daghestan further
deteriorate.