Abstract
This
article argues that clan conflicts can be addressed
through the extension of existing alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms. Clan disputes and conflicts are
interdependent of other violent conflicts. Through the
expansion of existing informal justice mechanisms, the
republics of the North Caucasus as well as the Russian
Federation can improve the rule of law and reduce the
incidents of violence. Recognizing and utilizing local
indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms will also
empower those populations, facilitating greater active
participation in society.
Keywords:
clan feuds, alternative dispute resolution, rule of law,
stability
Introduction
This
article**
will argue that grassroots violence can be and is addressed
in some circumstances by informal conflict resolution mechanisms,
namely the use of customary mediation and conflict resolution
mechanisms present in clan societies. While this violence is
not directly pertinent to the separatist wars or the position
of terrorist groups in the North Caucasus, should those conflicts
be resolved, this low-level violence will remain. Addressing
that specific low-level violence in both war and post-war settings
is crucial to ensuring a lasting peace.
This type of
violence is systemic in clan-based societies. Two rival
clans which engage in a feud may escalate the violence
to a point where the peace agreement is jeopardized.
Recognizing, monitoring and utilizing informal conflict
resolution mechanisms will be required for effective,
and durable state-building. The Russian Federation
already has alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
mechanisms for the settling economic and family
disputes. In some cases, individuals accused of a crime
are able to access these alternative dispute resolution
processes. This article argues that these mechanisms can
and should be expanded to include clan-based conflicts.
There are several conflicts in
the North Caucasus. Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia
are being destabilized by insurgency, criminal and terrorist
organizations and an ever-present Chechen separatist
movement.
There remain several unresolved border disputes between the
republics that strain already tense inter-ethnic relations.
There is also another level of violence in the North
Caucasus that stems from clan feuds. Clan feuds are
interdependent of larger issues. Clan feuds can develop from
the perception of being dishonored, a disagreement between
clans which escalates to violence and an assortment of other
political and non-political reasons.
There are currently several
simultaneous, and sometimes interdependent, layers of
conflict in the North Caucasus. Although the war in Chechnya
has officially been declared over, there remains some
troubling evidence to suggest that there is a growing
insurgency. Separatist groups, such as the one led by Dokku
Umarov, remain intact and continue to have the capability to
wage war.
There are also other groups which fight for the independence
of the whole of the North Caucasus and they are willing to
use terrorist methods in order to achieve it. Police
officers, government officials and security personnel are
increasingly being targeted and attacked, and high level of
corruption, unemployment and general economic stagnation
remain some of the biggest problems in the region. For some
groups, the government's inability to prevent crime and
prosecute criminals, which has generated so much
frustration, has in some instances called the legitimacy of
the government into question.
The current paper
does not address the causes of the violent conflicts, the
motivations for the Chechen separatist movement, for
insurgency throughout the North Caucasus, or for terrorist
groups. The article argues that there are other conflicts
throughout the North Caucasus which pose a systematic threat
to the stability of the region. These conflicts are often
left unaddressed by official state institutions, yet they
have the potential to destabilize many local governments and
can cause a lapse or a relapse into war. These conflicts are
the clan disputes which can easily escalate into violent
clan conflicts.
ADR Mechanisms
Alternative
dispute resolution can be formal or informal, meaning it can
be an official part of any official legal proceeding, or it
can be made available to parties to a conflict without the
supervision of a court. Alternative dispute resolution is a
way for the parties to negotiate their own settlement. The
settlement can be legally binding. Alternative dispute
resolution also tends to focus more on the interests
of the parties as opposed to a legal hearing in which the
only things considered are the rights of the parties
and the law.
There are some cultural
differences in terms of justice (punish the individual
versus restoring social equilibrium). These cultural
differences in justice have prompted different countries to
develop their alternative dispute resolution systems. For
example, Canada has instituted a similar mechanism for
addressing some criminal offences committed in aboriginal
(First Nations) communities.
Broadly speaking, the Canadian judicial system is primarily
concerned with upholding the rights of individuals than with
restoring social relationships. This is not the case in
First Nation cultures, in which, restoring the wider social
relations after a crime is, generally, more important than
reasserting the rights of individuals.
When an individual has
committed a crime in First Nation cultures, the broader
community is involved in determining responsibility, and in
restoring the relationship between the victim and the
perpetrator, as well as the perpetrator and the broader
community. The differences in cultural approaches to justice
have led to some conflicts between the two communities
(First Nations and broader Canadian society). In an effort
to reduce this conflict and to maintain respect for First
Nations cultures and traditions, an alternative dispute
resolution system was created. Healing circles, among other
reconciliation processes, allow “for a stay of criminal
prosecutions while the accused follows through with an
approved alternative process.”
The incorporation of reconciliatory justice within the
broader framework of rights-based and constitutionally-based
justice has given First Nation communities greater say in
how they are governed. It has placed greater emphasis on
local actors actively participating in their communities for
the purposes of empowerment and local ownership of concerns,
issues and problems. Given the nature of social relations in
the North Caucasus, it would be beneficial to expand
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms specifically for
clan disputes.
The Russian Federation has in
place alternative dispute mechanisms for certain types of
economic disputes. These alternative dispute resolution
arbitration courts are called “arbitrazhnye sudy”
(arbitration courts).
Moreover, the Russian Federation's judicial system does
allow for mediation and alternative dispute resolution in
family cases, civil and commercial cases and in some
instances, for criminal matters. In specific relation to
judicial-related matters in the Russian Federation, the
court may decide to appoint a mediator. Also, the parties to
the conflict may decide to hire a private-sector mediator.
ADR Mechanisms
in the North Caucasus
The range of
situations in which alternative dispute resolution are used
has broadened. Realizing that a formal court hearing is
costly as well as lengthy, alternative dispute resolution
permits the parties to a dispute or conflict to negotiate a
mutually agreeable settlement. The use of alternative
dispute resolution can be encouraged in the North Caucasus,
as a way of relieving some of the underlying tensions in the
region.
There are several
outstanding land claim issues in the North Caucasus. These
grievances pertain to the way in which the republics were
divided, effectively splitting an ethnic group into two or
more jurisdictions. One cause of the land claims was the
deportation of the Circassians in the 1880s. Another source
of land claim concerns is the Deportation of 1944, in which
the Chechens and the Ingush peoples were sent to Central
Asia by Stalin. These two deportations created lasting
tensions. Successfully resolving land claims in ways that
are acceptable for all parties will reduce tensions between
ethnic groups and may help to assuage some fears within the
smaller ethnic groups of assimilation and subsequent loss of
culture.
In April 1991, the Russian
Soviet Federal Social Republic's Supreme Soviet passed the
law “On the Rehabilitation of the Oppressed Peoples”. This
law was intended to restore territories to their boundaries
before the 1944 Deportation.
However, there remain many disputed territories within the
North Caucasus as the afore-mentioned law prompted the
migration towards historical homelands. Many of those
historical homelands were inhabited by other groups shortly
after the Deportation. Many of those other groups continue
to inhabit those lands and this places additional strains on
existing clan relations that are sometimes already tense.
For example, the Sunzhensky district and the Prigorodnyi
region remain contested territories between Chechnya and
Ingushetia. Former President of Ingushetia Murat Zyazikov
rejected negotiations with local clans over territorial and
economic issues. In turn, this failure to negotiate with the
clans has increased popular discontent with the government. Furthermore, the Laks -
who are ethnic Chechens living in Dagestan - have an
unresolved territorial dispute in the Kazbegovsky District.
This dispute is between the Laks and Avars in Dagestan.
While the struggle is inter-ethnic, and stems from
population movements as a result of the 1944 Deportation,
much of the struggle is fought on a clan basis.
The afore-mentioned law of the Russian Federation, in
attempting to redress historical injustices arising from the
1944 Deportation, created new conflicts over disputed
territories. In turn, this drew in additional clans who
contested for control over these territories.
A dispute between
two individuals can escalate to the level of the clan.
Escalation to the clan level may start a clan feud. Once the
conflict has escalated to the clan level, there exists a
real possibility of violence. This violence may be focused
on rival clan members. Some clan members or clans may be
involved in organised crime. Some organised crime groups, in
turn, do business with some terrorist or separatist groups.
This is not to suggest a “domino theory” in which violence
against one person automatically escalates into wider
violence. This is to illustrate that there are several
layers of complex relationships within the North Caucasus.
Those networks, familial, personal, economical and
political, may have broader impacts, especially in terms of
violence. Successfully mediating a resolution to a violent
dispute between two clans will not resolve the deeper
conflict of separatism, land claims, and terrorist
organisations. However, in many instances, the successful
resolution of a clan dispute will reduce the overall levels
of violence in the North Caucasus.
Clans and
Challenges to Clans as Social Structures
The
Russian Federation's constitution is meant to be the supreme
law throughout its entire territory. As it is a federated
state, each constituent member is able to enact its own laws
within its jurisdiction, so long as they are in keeping with
the Russian Federation's constitution. In addition to these
formal laws (federal and republic-level), many ethnic groups
have their own historical customary laws. For the Chechens,
this is the adat.
It is the social code which dictates which behaviors are
acceptable and which are not. Variations of the adat
are practiced by Chechens, the Karachay, the Adygay, and the
Kabardins.
The practice of adat
has been weakening in recent years, due to several factors.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, religion in general,
Islam in particular, has increased in importance. While many
of the peoples of the North Caucasus have historically been
Muslim, they tended to practice a form of Islam which
conformed to the adat. Over the past twenty
years, the local adats have been changed to better
conform to more mainstream Islamic teachings.
The North Caucasus has had greater contact with other
sources of religious teachings in recent years as well. This
led to an increase in the practice of Arab-influenced
Wahhabism in the North Caucasus throughout the 1990s and
into the 2000s. The introduction of a stricter form of Islam
into the region placed additional strains on the historical
form of Islam practiced in the North Caucasus.
Traditionally, it was the clan elders who mediated disputes
but their significance was diminished as different religious
practices were introduced. Wahhabism placed prohibitions on
alcohol, for instance. The hierarchal nature of Wahhabi
Islam goes against the strongly egalitarian nature of the
indigenous cultures in the North Caucasus.
Also, with the introduction of
Wahhabism in the region came linkages with the Middle East
and the opportunity for many young Chechen men to study
abroad. While studying abroad, these young men learned the
importance of religious teachings, and the relatively low
importance of clan affiliations. This further weakened the
opportunities for clan elders to mediate or negotiate
settlements to disputes and conflicts.
In addition, there has been an influx of foreign Imams into
the North Caucasus, who taught that it was of more
importance to follow Islam and its religious laws, than to
follow the laws of the adat. Again, this too has
weakened traditional conflict resolution mechanisms between
the clans. Moreover, with the rise of Wahhabi Islam in
Chechnya, it began to centralize power in religious
institutions. This was in opposition to the traditional
Chechen governance system of Mehk-Khel or council of
elders.
While
the significant displacement of Chechens because of the two
wars in the 1990s has created social rifts, and perhaps
weakened some informal institutions such as clans, clans as
social actors remain important in Chechnya and for Chechens.
This can be demonstrated in the power struggle between
Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov's clan and Ruslan
Yamadayev's clan. Ruslan Yamadayev was killed in suspicious
circumstances in September 2008, and his brother Sulim was
shot in Dubai, in March 2009.
In Ingushetia, Chechnya and
Dagestan, clan allegiance and affiliation play an important
role when it comes to voting patterns, as well as general
impressions of government.
Blood feuds are still common throughout the North Caucasus
in specific population sections.
While blood feuds are not common in the ethnic Russian
population, they remain a factor in Chechen, Ingush and
Dagestani life. Opposition to government, because of the
perceived and real levels of corruption, is often organized
according to clan allegiance and alliances.
Clan-based
disputes pose several challenges to state building. The
strong adherence to a set of laws, in this case adat
in Chechnya, and other customary laws in the North Caucasus,
sometimes challenges the Russian Federation's constitution.
The Russian Federation's constitution guarantees the right
to every person to a fair and transparent trial before any
punishment is issued. This is not the case in clan disputes.
The “verdict” of guilty is issued by a non-state actor, the
other clan. Also, there is no fair and transparent trial in
such cases. Consequently, there is no fair and transparent
appeal process. The punishment for a real or perceived
offense is also carried out by a non-state actor, the other
clan. Historically, clan elders were the judges or mediators
in disputes, introducing additional non-state actors in
justice and reconciliation processes.
Moreover, it is
often the case that the state is unaware of the conflict, as
no official police report was filed, leaving many state
officials unaware of the situation. As no state official is
aware of the carrying out of “private justice”, individuals
and clans, in this instance, are posing a direct challenge
to the state's ability to project authority and force
throughout the totality of its territory. Another challenge
to both the Russian Federation's constitution as well as the
republic's legal order is that the punishment for alleged
clan disputes may not be in keeping with existing laws. When
there is an ongoing dispute, the practice of blood feuds is
common. A blood feud often leads to violence resulting in
bodily harm, and sometimes death.
Clan feuds remain an active
part of Chechen life. The Kadyrov clan recruits individuals
into their militias. In turn, rival factions recruit into
their militias. As they violently contest for control, there
are deaths. These deaths then become “blood obligations”
that the militiamen must avenge. The cycle of violence is
then continued, drawing in more militiamen into the “blood
debt”.
Moreover, the
ethnic boundaries, and subsequently the clan boundaries in
the North Caucasus, are fluid. Ethnic groups are often
divided between two or more administrative units. As such,
the clan feuds impact several jurisdictions simultaneously.
The reason for the dispute may not have anything to do with
the grievances which motivate some groups for war. A clan
dispute can start for the perceived slight against one's
honor or a miscommunication between two members from two
different clans.
However, clan
disputes can and do have linkages to the overall violent
conflicts in the North Caucasus. One clan may support the
Chechen separatist movement while another opposing clan,
does not. A dispute between two such clans can further
destabilize the republic(s) as the grievance “escalates to
another level of conflict”. While the conflict may originate
in an interpersonal conflict between two clan members, it
can escalate to involve other clans concerned with larger
issues, such as separatism. Clan feuds can also escalate to
other levels of violence, including support for or against
terrorist groups, or groups which support the creation of a
Pan-Caucasus caliphate.
The two types of justice
systems, formal justice as dispensed by the state and
informal as dispensed by clans, need not be in conflict with
one another. Currently, the two systems are often in
conflict, as they do not always share the same view on a
matter. State justice, that is formal justice which is in
keeping with the Russian Federation's constitution, is there
to protect an individual and prosecute an individual.
Informal justice mechanisms, as used by the clans, are
primarily concerned with achieving justice for the group,
sometimes at the expense of the individual's personal rights
and freedoms.
Moreover, informal justice mechanisms used by clans place a
strong emphasis on maintaining a balance between the
relative powers of clans. No such stipulation exists within
the formal justice system in the Russian Federation.
Disputes and
conflicts between clans will not go away once all of the
grievances that could motivate people to go to war have been
resolved. The possibility of dishonor or perception of
offence will continue to be part of the social fabric of
Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia as well as in general
throughout the North Caucasus. Attempts to forcibly break
the social power of clans have failed and will continue to
fail. Instead of creating a confrontational relationship, or
one which intentionally ignores the presence of clans
despite their consequences, their informal conflict
resolution system can be incorporated into larger state
structures in efforts to reduce the level of violence and
social strife.
While the Russian Federation
does incorporate mediation and alternative dispute
resolution into its judicial practices, including the
mediation of family, contract and economic disputes, as well
as the mediation of certain types of crimes, there are
specific factors to the North Caucasus which need to be
taken into consideration when addressing mediation practices
in the North Caucasus. Many of the clan-based indigenous
peoples of the North Caucasus have a rich history of
informal conflict resolution. The type of mediation, the
skills of the mediator, and the overall style of
negotiation, needs to be taken into consideration.
Negotiations involving clans tend to be cyclical, not
linear, meaning that the parties involved in the conflict,
including the mediator, must expect that issues will be
revisited several times before they are considered
“addressed in a satisfactory manner”.
There are
indigenous conflict resolution capacities throughout the
North Caucasus. Incorporating clan based conflict resolution
mechanisms into informal justice mechanisms, such as the use
of alternative dispute resolution under the supervision of
the Russian Federation's courts, will do two very important
things: i) it will reduce the incidents of clan-based
violence as parties to a dispute have greater access to
justice mechanisms, and ii) it will improve local ownership
of disputes and their successful, peaceful resolution, as
the method used for reconciliation is in keeping with local
traditions and practices. Incorporating clan-based dispute
mechanisms into the overall structure of alternative dispute
resolution in the Russian Federation may also increase
resources with which to reconcile and address these
disputes. It will also assist state authorities in
monitoring clan disputes, which in turn can provide state
officials with sufficient warning about a tense situation.
As argued, clan disputes can and do escalate to violence,
sometimes resulting in death (blood feuds). Early detection
and intervention by the state, in the form of clan-based
conflict resolution, will assist state and civil society
actors in monitoring and reducing the levels of violence in
the North Caucasus.
Incorporating
clan-based conflict resolution mechanisms into state
practices provides several types of justice (formal and
informal) to the population, while maintaining a sensitivity
for cultural preferences (individual rights versus restoring
social relations). It also recognizes that clans are part of
the social fabric of the North Caucasus and can play a vital
role in stabilizing the region. This is not to say that all
clan disputes can be resolved in a manner that is in keeping
with the Russian Federation's constitution. However,
incorporating clan-based resolution options into the
framework of judicial oversight can reduce these
infringements of constitutional rights. Right now, these
informal clan-based conflict resolution mechanisms are
outside the purview of the state. Allowing for their use,
under the supervision of the Russian Federation's courts,
will make the state aware of such disputes and will provide
greater opportunities for mutual collaboration between
formal and informal justice mechanisms. It will also
strengthen state institutions as access to broad justice is
widened to include some aspects of clan-based conflict
resolution. The clan-based mediators and dispute
practitioners can be trained in the Russian Federation's
constitution, and on the type of settlements that are in
conformity with Russian law. At the same time, aspects of
clan-based conflict resolution which are constitutional can
be strengthened, developed and promoted. This further
strengthens the rule of law throughout the North Caucasus.
The Russian
Federation does allow for alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms to be used in other types of disputes. If the
Russian Federation can expand the list of eligible disputes
and conflicts to be resolved through alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms, it would then facilitate local
ownership for the identification, negotiation and
implementation of a mutually agreed upon solutions.
Moreover, it would encourage more active citizen
participation in the region as these mechanisms for justice
and reconciliation conform more to the indigenous cultures.
Conclusion
Recognizing and incorporating
indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms into more formal
state processes will help strengthen state structures as the
state takes a more active role in conflict resolution
through means other than the use of force. Clan feuds can
also be inter-generational, meaning that the dispute remains
unresolved and often bloody for generations. One of the
longest recorded clan feuds lasted for two hundred and sixty
years.
Stability in Chechnya, and the North Caucasus overall, will
not be achieved until clan conflicts are acknowledged as a
part of the social make-up. Reconciling and addressing those
clan-based conflicts must be incorporated into more formal
processes. Acknowledging and employing local customs for the
resolution of conflict, also sends an important message to
the peoples in the North Caucasus: that their cultures are
valued and have a place within the Russian Federation. In so
doing, this may reduce some inter-ethnic tensions in other
areas as well as work towards empowering the peoples of the
North Caucasus.