Abstract
This paper deals
with the experience gained in the area of poverty reduction
and private sector development in Georgia. The Economic
Development and Poverty
reduction
Programme approved by the President of Georgia in 2003 has
never been implemented because the Georgian Government had
neither the will nor the ability to launch its
implementation. During the Presidential and Parliamentary
elections in 2008, the Government’s electoral slogan was “An
Integrated Georgia Without Poverty!” Unfortunately,
however, even this slogan did not prepare the grounds for
the Government to develop a more-or-less complete poverty
reduction programme. The post-revolution Government was not
always consistent in its endeavours to support private
sector employment programmes. Very often its steps were
populist rather than practical. Poverty reduction may be
achieved as a result of co-ordinated efforts of the
government and the private sector: however, this kind of
co-ordination requires the active involvement of trade
unions and civil society.
Keywords:
Georgia, Rose Revolution, poverty reduction, private sector
development, UNDP, The IMF, The World Bank
Introduction:
Problem statement
Ten years
have passed from the time when poverty reduction became a
global objective.
It is understandable, given the fact that poverty has become
a problem affecting more and more people worldwide over the
last decades. At the end of the 20th century, it
became clear that the world could not have survived without
developing some special poverty reduction programmes. The
UNDP and the World Bank have worked together extensively to
initiate such programmes and to develop some integrated
conceptual schemes. Eradication of extreme poverty and
hunger is one of the key UN millennium development goals.
Poverty reduction
must be achieved not by the redistribution of incomes but,
rather, through a country’s economic development. Under the
conditions of a market economy, a country’s economic development
is unthinkable without the proper development of a private
sector. It is private sector development which entails the
enhancement of employment and the growth of employees’ incomes
which, eventually, pave the way for poverty reduction.
In this
context, one needs to consider a “pro-poor
growth” approach,
which has won much popularity amongst economic experts recently.
Under this approach, any pro-poor growth may have two meanings;
absolute and relative. Whilst the incomes of the
poor must grow according to the former meaning, their incomes
must grow more quickly than the average incomes according to the
latter meaning. Such growth may be achieved by the development
of a private sector which means that greater numbers of the
poorer population will be employed and, thereby, will be given
opportunities to improve – with their own hands – their living
conditions and those of their families.
For Georgia,
like for the rest of the world, poverty reduction always was
and remains one of the biggest problems facing the country.
Although it has already gained some experience in how to address
the challenges, it is unfortunately difficult to argue that the
Government has completely realised the essence of the problem
and has taken any decisive steps to solve it.
The Current
Situation
In late 2000,
with a joint initiative of the World Bank and the UNDP, the
Georgian Government started working on a poverty reduction
programme, with some independent experts and NGOs invited to
take part in the development of the programme. As a result, a
more-or-less complete draft of the work plan was outlined.
Then, with the help of some external experts from a number of
international organisations, a final version of the document was
put on the table. In June 2003, President Shevardnadze approved
the Economic Development and Poverty
reduction
Programme (EDPRP) of Georgia.
It must be underlined that the programme was immediately praised
by various international organisations. It was decided that the
international financial institutions (the IMF and the World
Bank) would continue working with Georgia on the basis of this
very document.
Unfortunately,
neither the adoption of the programme nor its international
recognition had any influence over the Georgian Government at
that time, which had neither the political will nor the ability
to launch its implementation (nor that of some other programmes
as well).
In November
2003, the Rose Revolution took place and the Shevardnadze
Government stepped down.
Because the start of the programme implementation was constantly
delayed and some important institutional changes were put in
place after the revolution, it became necessary to make some
significant changes to the programme. Instead of working on
such changes, however, the post-revolution Government decided
that the programme was an unnecessary burden and put it on the
shelf.
Despite this, and for
reasons unknown, the international financial institutions
continued to believe that the Georgian Government still had a
poverty reduction programme and continued working with the
central administration upon the basis of this programme.
Furthermore, in September 2007, the IMF solemnly declared that
it had successfully concluded the poverty reduction programme in
Georgia. The programme was “finished” (ostensibly even
successfully), but poverty remained.
However absurd
it appeared, a situation developed wherein the post-revolution
Government refused to recognise the Shevardnadze-approved EDPRP,
on one hand, and the international financial institutions
continued working with the Georgian Government upon the basis of
this very declined programme, on the other.
In November
2007, President Saakashvili was forced to resign and order an
extraordinary Presidential election. Poverty reduction became
one of the key points of his electoral campaign. This may be
explained by the following: the key driving force of the mass
protests in the fall of 2007 was the self-esteem of the Georgian
public, which believed that it had been humiliated by the
government.
To neutralise this, Presidential candidate Saakashvili made an
attempt to shift the public’s focus towards social hardships and
poverty within the electoral marathon. This attempt, it can be
said, was successful.
During the
Presidential and Parliamentary elections in early 2008, the
Government’s electoral slogan was “An Integrated Georgia Without
Poverty!” This catch-phrase was later “fleshed out” by a
so-called programme with the same title which was approved by
the Parliament of Georgia in late January 2008, when it gave a
vote of confidence to a newly appointed government. This
document may be labelled as a “programme” in name only: it
consists of some catch-phrases set forth on a few pages. In
this already “fragile” document, the problem of poverty is
mentioned not more than once within the words: “In the next
five years, poverty will be reduced significantly.” Clearly,
this short statement is no justification for the title of the
document whose promise is that there will be no poverty in
Georgia. Judging by the text of the document, the significant
reduction of poverty is aimed to be reached through a 50%
decrease in the number of social beneficiaries; that is,
recipients of the Government’s allowances.
Within the framework of the
five-year governmental programme “An
Integrated Georgia Without Poverty!”, the Government’
created a 50-Day Action Plan
which was scheduled for implementation within the first five
months of 2008; that is, from January to May for a total of 152
days. Some projects in the Plan are directed towards economic
development and, consequently, reducing the level of poverty
whilst others are more questionable. Thus, within the framework
of the Government’s 50-Day Action Plan, a so-called
‘revolutionary’ economic package of laws was developed
with the aim of turning Georgia into a global financial centre
by offering tax exemptions on income to large financial
companies whose activity in Georgia does not exceed ten percent
of their financial turnover. This ‘revolutionary’ package also
provided for a significant reorganization of the National Bank
of Georgia (NBG), the country’s central bank, by subordinating
it to the Government. This meant that exceeding a threshold
level of annual inflation would allow the Government to demand
the resignation of the President of the NBG through Parliament.
Within the framework of the
Government’s 50-Day Action Plan was the issuance of Eurobonds of
$500 million with a maturity of five years and with a coupon set
at 7.5% in April 2008.
Unfortunately, the Government did not make clear public
announcements on the purposes of increasing the foreign debt of
Georgia by half a billion dollars. Firstly, it said that the
money was needed for implementing new energy power projects, but
afterwards the plans were changed and it was said that all the
money would be channeled to the Fund of Future Generations (the
Fund is mainly set up for the economic rehabilitation of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia after they are reintegrated into
Georgia) and the Fund for Stable Development (this Fund was set
up specifically for preventing crisis developments in the
economy). Finally, it was said that these Funds would get only
half of the money received from the Eurobonds and a decision
would be taken at a later date as regards the purpose for the
other half of the amount. Thus, the Government either does not
know what the purpose is of increasing the country’s foreign
debt by $500 million, or it is concealing its intention from the
taxpayers who will pay this debt with interest. Thus, during and
after the 2008 Presidential and Parliamentary elections, the
Government implemented several large-scale projects whose
economic viability is doubtful or certainly poorly thought out.
As one can see—and
however regrettable it may sound—the Georgian Government did not
have any sort of realistic poverty reduction programme in the
period following the elections. Moreover, it has not even fully
realised what the meaning of poverty is and how it may be
addressed.
After the Rose
Revolution, the Government gave some informal instructions to
some private firms to set up a broad network of free catering
facilities to attempt to mitigate the plight of the country’s
poorest.
In 2006, in
support of employment in the private sector, the post-revolution
Government embarked upon a so-called National Employment
Programme
which was rather populist by nature and actually brought no
results other than the further growth of inflation. This
programme was reproduced by the Government in late 2007 and
early 2008.
Under the
programme, businesses were imperatively “requested” to create
some three-month-long jobs for the unemployed. In exchange, the
unemployed would get National Budget donations to the amount of
GEL
150 per person per month in 2006 and GEL 200 per person per
month in 2007 and 2008. Thus, as a result of wasted tens of
millions, a few people actually acquired employment. In most
cases, however, employers and new “employees” reached a mutual
consensus: the former were ready to sign whatever document was
necessary to show that some employee was working whilst, in
fact, he was not. The unemployed, at the same time, were happy
because they received GEL 450 or even GEL 600 for doing nothing
at all. At times there were even more dishonest collusions
wherein some businessmen demanded half of the salaries in
exchange for their signatures attesting to the fact that such
“jobs” were being performed. In the end, tens of millions of
lari spent from the National Budget funds, ostensibly
designated for creating jobs, were by nature nothing more than
allowances for the unemployed. These amounts were thrown out to
the consumer market even though no adequate amounts of goods and
services were produced which, as a result, naturally encouraged
the growth of inflation.
In the spring of
2006, Moscow closed the Russian market to Georgian wines and
mineral waters which put Georgian producers in a very difficult
situation. In the fall of the same and subsequent years, the
Government called upon all private companies (and not only
them), irrespective of their business orientations and
interests, to take part in the grape harvest and fund wine
bottling businesses. Georgian companies were forced to use some
part of their working capital for different purposes other than
their own business plans, which caused the slowdown of their
development to a certain degree.
From the Georgian
Government’s other initiatives, one should distinguish a
so-called “cheap loan” programme under which some low-interest
credits were extended to newly established businesses. In
theory, such loans should have stimulated private sector
development. The essence of the Government’s mistake in the
implementation of this programme, however, was that the cheap
loans were administered by the Government itself and there was
little room in this process for commercial banks and other
private lending institutions. Eventually, this led to little
efficiency in the distribution of loans (given the fact that the
government is a political body not a lending institution).
The government’s
legislative efforts in the areas of private sector development
and poverty reduction have also been controversial. As far as
legislative initiatives are concerned, one must draw attention
to those which, on the one hand, may stimulate the private
sector development but, on the other hand, by no means lead to
poverty reduction.
Amongst
positive steps, one should mention the enactment of a new tax
code in January 2005 by which the overall number of taxes was
reduced from 21 to 7. Accordingly, the overall tax burden
diminished as well.
Furthermore, to encourage competitive practices in the country,
the import tax on all kinds of imported goods—with the exception
of agricultural produce and construction materials—was
abolished. Procedures for obtaining business start-up licenses
and permits were simplified and the requirement for such
licenses and permits was removed with respect to some
businesses. Property rights registration procedures were also
significantly liberalized. All of the foregoing must be regarded
as encouraging measures for private sector development.
The adoption of a new
labour code is considered one of the “achievements” of the
post-revolution Government. Presently, this code gives employers
the maximum rights which one might think of and leaves employees
with literally no rights at all. The Government justified the
need for such labour relationships with the desire to make
Georgia rather more attractive to foreign investors. It is true
that endowing employers with maximum powers may encourage
private sector development but depriving employees of all rights
makes no room for legislative guarantees and job security which
will block the way towards poverty reduction in the long run.
In 2006, the
President of Georgia proposed combining a 20% social tax and a
12% income tax into a single 25% income tax. Despite the strong
resistance from the trade unions, the President’s legislative
initiative was passed and the new tax amendments went into
effect in 2007. Because social tax and income tax are calculated
based upon different tax bases, it is impossible to combine the
two in principle. As a result, Georgia is facing the situation
that whilst a 20% social tax payable by employers was cancelled,
a 12% income tax payable by employees was raised to 25%. The
abolition of the 20% social tax does encourage private sector
development, whilst the raising of the former 12% income tax to
25% in no way stimulates poverty reduction.
In late 2008, it was
decided that the income tax rate would be reduced from 25% to
20% as of January 2009 which, of course, represents a positive
decision for employees. It should be remembered, however, that
the tax rate was as low as 12% some two years ago.
The level of
involvement of civil society in the process of poverty reduction
through private sector development is clearly inadequate. In
the main, however, it is a problem of civil society itself which
in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution had to deal with some
serious difficulties.
Gaps and
Opportunities
Amongst the existing
gaps, one should mention, first of all, the fact that the
Georgian Government has no clear understanding of the meaning of
poverty reduction. Moreover, the Government seems to not have
counted the actual number of people living below the poverty
line in the country.
Obviously, there is
no country in the world wherein poverty does not exist. Even in
the United States, some 12% of the country’s population lives
below the poverty line (in the US, an average family of four
people whose annual income is not more than $20,000 is
considered poor). By international standards, in the most
underdeveloped countries of the world, any person who subsists
on no more than $2.50 a day is considered poor and those who
subsist on no more than $1.00 a day are considered amongst the
poorest.
It must be
remembered, however, that every individual country, based upon
its own level of development, has its own criteria for measuring
the poverty standard. One, therefore, has to answer the
question of whether or not poverty as such can ever be
eliminated. This problem is closely associated with the poverty
line criterion. Of course, to the extent that there is a sound
economic policy, it may be possible - by using a preliminarily
established poverty criterion - to reduce the number of people
below the poverty line to zero. It must be remembered, however,
that it may be necessary to revise the criterion itself
depending upon the current level of economic development.
Poverty - to a great degree - is a relative value and some
people who were not considered poor by the previous criterion
may become poor based upon the new one with the growth of the
country’s wealth.
The best illustration
of this is the above information about the poverty standard in
the US: presently, any Georgian family of four which has an
annual income of $20,000 by no means can be considered poor.
After the passage of a certain amount of time, however, the
above amount of income may become the poverty line such as it
currently is in the US. It is impossible, therefore, to
eliminate relative poverty just like it is impossible to create
a perpetuum mobile. Consequently, the slogan “Georgia
Without Poverty” is both incorrect and unrealistic.
In the summer of
2003, when the President of Georgia approved the EDPRP, it was
established that 52% of the country’s population lived below the
poverty line and 25% were the poorest part of the population.
Changing the
methodology by which poverty was defined became one of the most
“effective” tools of the post-revolution Government’s fight
against poverty. Firstly, it diminished the calorie-capacity of
the subsistence minimum products. Secondly, it replaced retail
prices with wholesale ones. As a result, the Government proudly
announced that the poverty rate in 2004 had been reduced to 35%.
Interestingly enough, the poverty assessments of 2005 showed
that the percentage of the poor grew to 39% which was a fact
that was not only unexpected but also unacceptable for the
Government. For this reason, the Government refused to make any
poverty statistics public in 2006, because the poverty line
further increased and reached 42% according to unofficial
sources. In December 2007, when the Presidential campaign was
underway in the country, some top Government officials claimed
that as few as 28% of the population lived below the poverty
line. If all the previous indicators of the poverty line in
Georgia had been based upon the calculations of a subsistence
minimum, this 28% was artificially produced by counting just
those people who had received allowances from the Government.
Obviously, the Government needs to develop a realistic and
consistent poverty reduction programme which would be based upon
global experience in this area.
As far as
private sector development is concerned, the post-revolution
Government has also made numerous serious mistakes. The most
unacceptable one is the regular infringements upon the rights of
private property owners. Under the law-enforcement’s pressure,
many owners were forced to “wilfully” concede their properties
to the state. This process was labelled as “de-privatisation”
ostensibly required to remedy the Government’s mistakes
committed during the privatisation programme before 2004. In
reality, the Government’s interference with the owners’ rights
pursued the only purpose of redistributing formerly public
properties to so-called elite businesspeople who were on good
terms with the Government. The already bad situation was
further worsened by unlawful demolitions of numerous
privately-owned buildings. Each individual case amounted to a
blatant violation of property rights.
To ensure the proper
protection of property rights, it would be insufficient to only
improve the existing legal basis. The Government must also show
a strong political will that no such infringements upon private
owners’ rights can ever take place. Moreover, every person who
was illegally and forcibly deprived of his property, or whose
property was destroyed, must be paid a fair compensation.
Another serious
hurdle along the path of development faced by the private sector
in Georgia is the Government-solicited “voluntary contributions”
to the Government’s electoral campaigns and other mass
initiatives which puts obstacles in front of private sector
development.
The privatisation of
state-owned property is a matter of great importance for private
sector development. From 2004 onwards, a large-scale
privatisation has been underway in Georgia although the process
has unfortunately developed in gross violation of the law. It
is no wonder that this is exactly how Russian, Kazakh and Arab
capital entered the Georgian market. Often, the prices indicated
in the sales contracts signed by the Government and the new
investors were by far lower than those announced in the
invitations for bidding. Often, too, brand new companies with
suspicious founders and suspicious capitals were established
right before the start of a privatisation process with a sole
specific purpose of taking part in tenders. Strangely enough,
these brand new companies were often the winners of the tenders.
The privatisation of
state-owned property must be conducted with maximum transparency
so that every interested person can have access to information
about the founders of particular companies taking part in the
privatisation process. It is recommended that the Georgian
economy be closed legislatively for any companies registered in
the offshore zones.
It is common
knowledge that competition is a great stimulus for private
sector development, which is why any measure which may block
competition must be unacceptable. In late 2004, instead of
taking all efforts to encourage the development of sound
competition in the country, the post-revolution
Government—ostensibly aiming at further enhancement of
market-oriented reforms—abolished the antimonopoly legislation
which led to the drastic growth of the level of monopolisation
of the Georgian market.
However absurd as it
may sound, the President of Georgia assigned the Ministry of the
Interior to carry out some antimonopoly regulatory functions in
the market of salt, sugar and other similar products in October
2007 during a Governmental meeting. It is undisputable that
these kinds of regulatory functions have nothing to do with the
police or state security agencies. There is no doubt that one
more indispensable step which needs to be taken for private
sector development is to adopt a new antimonopoly legislation
and establish a new pertinent Government agency in the nearest
time.
To make Georgia
more attractive to foreign investors, the Government decided to
establish a special industrial zone in the Poti area.
By its legal nature, a special industrial zone is the same as a
free economic zone (which means that it is an area wherein
economic agents may enjoy various tax exemptions unlike in the
rest of the country). The Government intends to establish
similar zones in Batumi and Kutaisi as well.
The bad news is
that today—like before and especially after the August-2008 war
between Russia and Georgia—the Georgian economy suffers a
serious shortage or “hunger” for foreign investments. Under
such circumstances, establishing free economic zones will even
worsen the feeling of this investment “hunger” and eventually
lead to the further slowdown of the country’s economic
development. tax
exemptions will push not only foreign but also domestic
investors to invest their resources exclusively in the free
economic zones. It is, therefore, expected that investments
will go exclusively to the Poti, Batumi and Kutaisi free
economic zones in the future with no investor having any
enthusiasm to invest his money in any other region of Georgia.
In other words, Poti and other adjacent areas will be developed
at the expense of the rest of Georgia.
As a result, beyond the free economic zones, there will be far
less attractive environments for private sector development.
Furthermore, extensions of free economic zones to different
regions of Georgia will have a negative impact upon the national
budget whose revenues will decrease drastically.
The Russian
aggression in August 2008 caused extremely serious damage to the
country and its economy with the private sector (especially the
construction business, which has been one of the fastest growing
sectors in post-revolution Georgia) not being excluded. The
negative impact of the global economic crisis further
exacerbates the problem. Both of these problems have also
caused serious damage to the system of small-business lending by
private banks and other lending organisations, which was rather
well developed. What partially mitigates the situation is that
Georgia is to be allocated some $4.55 billion in financial aid
by 2010, as was pledged at the donors conference in Brussels on
22 October 2008. A significant portion of this amount will also
be provided for private sector development.
Today, business
associations which are independent from the government do not
exist. The most famous one, the Georgian Federation of
Businessmen, suspended its activities in 2007 following
Governmental pressure.
In conclusion, it
must be stated that the existing situation in the areas of
poverty reduction and private sector development is quite poor
overall and requires some serious remedy.
Conclusion
The goal of poverty
reduction through private sector development cannot be
accomplished without the active involvement of all stakeholders.
The key role is to be
played by the Georgian Government, which has to fully realise
the severity of the problem and develop an appropriate long-term
economic programme which will be based upon broad international
experience in this area. To this end, it is necessary that the
Statistics Office ensure the regular publication of accurate and
realistic information about the subsistence minimum and the
number of people living below the poverty line. The Government
has to accept this information as one of the key indicators of
its performance.
There are different
organisations which are able to provide the Government with some
technical assistance in developing such a programme. In this
connection, an important role may be played by the UNDP, which
has the unique capability for generalising global experience and
providing broad technical assistance for the Georgian
Government.
The IMF and the World
Bank may also play an indispensable role in helping the Georgian
Government to achieve the goal of poverty reduction through
private sector development. These two cannot only provide the
Government with some technical assistance for developing such a
programme, but can also allocate some important monetary
resources which may be necessary for the programme’s
implementation. Furthermore, depending upon the results of the
programme implementation monitoring, the decision for providing
more funds may be made, which will make the Georgian Government
be more effective in addressing the problem of poverty reduction
through private sector development.
Transition to a
free trade regime with the EU and the US may also be a very
important incentive for private sector development. It will
push potential investors to consider manufacturing high-quality
goods in Georgia which would be capable of being competitive in
the European and American markets. If the question of
transition to a free trade regime with the US is still in its
embryonic stage, Georgia will need to change its labour code to
make it compatible with the European standards in order to
obtain this privilege from the EU whilst also passing brand new
antimonopoly and consumer-rights protecting legislations. These
are some of the clearly defined conditions that Brussels has set
for Tbilisi.
It is also very
important that the Government and private sector conduct a
continuous mutual dialogue. This will enable the Government to
be permanently informed of those difficulties which may be
encountered by the private sector.
For its part, the
private sector needs to establish and make more effective
various associations which may provide for the protection of its
interests. Businesspeople need to have a forum where they can
meet each other and advocate for and lobby their collectively
developed proposals to the Government.
Poverty reduction
must become the result of the mutual and co-ordinated efforts of
two key stakeholders: the Government and the private sector.
In the process of this co-ordination, the interests of employees
need to be protected which, of course, is the task for the trade
unions. The role of trade unions, therefore, must be expanded
so that employers’ interests can be protected and the
advancement towards the goal of poverty reduction could be
supported.
The involvement of
civil society in the process of decision-making as concerns the
problem of poverty reduction is of particular importance. To
this end, the role of the mass media should be increased in that
it must ensure a greater coverage of issues and events relating
to poverty reduction and private sector development.
It is advisable to
develop a grid of NGOs which will carry out the monitoring of
poverty-reduction-oriented steps of both central and local
governments in different regions of Georgia.
For example,
Branko
Milanovic,
Income, Inequality and Poverty during the
Transition from Planned to Market Economy
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank,
1998);
Jeffrey D. Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic
Possibilities for Our Time (New York: Penguin Press,
2005).
For example,
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Coppieters and Robert Legvold, eds., Statehood and
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(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005); Charles H. Jr.
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Jones, “The Rose Revolution: A Revolution without
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and James V. Wertsch, eds., “Enough.” The Rose
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Lincoln Mitchell,
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The Harvard
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February 27, 2008,
http://www.harvardir.org/index.php?page=article&id=1684&p=
(accessed June 5,
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Papava, “Georgia’s
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The Harvard
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February 27, 2008,
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(accessed June 5,
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April 2,
2008,
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=17503
(accessed June 5, 2009).
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