Abstract
This paper aims at
exploring the prospects for Turkmen natural gas participation in
the Nabucco pipeline project. Since the Azerbaijani and Iranian
resources suffer technical and political setbacks,
Turkmenistan’s inclusion among the supplying countries is
turning out to be essential even if its prospects are probably
unsustainable in the long term, when huge amounts of Iranian gas
will be needed. However, Turkmenistan could be considered as a
“bridging provider” justifying the realization of Nabucco in
preparation for a reduction of the international tensions
stemming from the Iranian nuclear program. Despite the improved
political landscape in Turkmenistan, several obstacles still
persist: among them, the commitment of the new leadership to
supply Russia and China as well as the weak prospects for the
Trans-Caspian pipeline.
Keywords:
Turkmenistan, natural gas, Nabucco, Caspian Sea, EU, Russia,
Iran
Introduction
The idea to supply
gas to Europe from the Caspian basin and the Middle East has
been around for a long time. The 31 bcm [billion cubic
meters]/year Nabucco project dates back to 2002, and a
consortium led by Austrian OMV was established in 2004. The
project is strongly supported by the EU and the US as a means to
boost competition in the European gas market, by reducing the
dependence on Russian gas as well as to emancipate the
transition paths of former Soviet countries from their
dependence on Russian-controlled gas export routes. The
feasibility of the project is often questioned because of
uncertainty related to supply.
This paper aims at
assessing the role of Turkmenistan’s natural gas in enhancing
the prospects for Nabucco, by analyzing the drawbacks related to
the other actors involved. To reach this aim, the first section
will explore the main characteristics of the Turkmen natural gas
sector such as the reserves, the production, the export routes,
the transport system and the organization of the sector. The
second section will be dedicated to the limits of Azerbaijan and
Iran in filling the pipeline. The importance of these countries
stems from the fact that Azerbaijan is the only safe source so
far and Iran was considered as the main potential supplier
during the first years of the project. Finally, the third
section will focus on the problems and prospects of
Turkmenistan’s participation, by analyzing the doubts arising
from the size of the Turkmen reserves and the uncertainties
related to the transport facilities.
Turkmenistan:
natural gas profile
In order to
evaluate the relevance of Turkmenistan gas for the Nabucco
project, it is necessary to reach a clear understanding of the
real amount of this gas. Turkmenistan had proven natural gas
reserves of 2.67 tcm at the end of 2007, ranking the country
among the top 11 countries in terms of natural gas reserves with
a 1.6% share of global reserves and the second highest after
Russia as far as former Soviet Union republics are concerned.
In terms of production, Turkmenistan’s natural gas output was
62.2 bcm in 2006. In the aftermath of the USSR’s collapse in
1991, the production fell from 57 bcm/y in 1992 to 12.4 bcm/y in
1998 due to a pricing dispute with Russia, the only outlet for
Turkmen gas given the centralized post-Soviet infrastructural
profile. Having dropped throughout the 1990s, natural gas
production sharply recovered from 1998 thanks to a
Turkmen-Russian long-term agreement, skyrocketing from 12.4 bcm/y
to 43.8 bcm/y within two years. Since 2000, output grew steadily
at a 6% rate annually. According to the chairman of TurkmenGaz,
Yashigeldy Kakayev, the country is planning to double gas
production to 120 bcm/y by 2010 and to triple to 240 bcm/y by
2030.
In terms of reserves/production ratio, Turkmenistan performs
very poorly in comparison to the other Central Asian republics:
with 214 and 70 years of production remaining respectively,
underexploited Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan lie far ahead. At the
current level of exploitation, Turkmen fields can last about 44
years.
All the major
gas fields are located in the Amu’Darya basin, the Murgan basin
and the South Caspian basin. Among the operating ones, most of
them have begun to show early signs of natural depletion.
Furthermore, the fields expected to provide the most of the
foreseeable additional output in the near future are likely to
produce sour gas with high contents of sulfur and mercaptan
which increase the costs of refining as well as the challenges
for the companies involved in the resources’ development.
The Turkmen
government seems to be willing to develop the offshore fields
located in the Caspian shelf. Malaysia’s Petronas, as one of the
most involved international oil companies (IOCs) in Turkmenistan
since the signing of the first 25-year Turkmen Production
Sharing Agreement (PSA) in 1996, completed in 2002 the drilling
of East Livanov 2A, which is the fourth well in the offshore
Block 1 field. According to the company, the well is likely to
produce 10 bcm/y for 20 years.
Dragon Oil is involved in the offshore Cheleken field that is
supposed to hold 100 bcm gas reserves.
A PSA between the Turkmen government and the Zarit joint
venture, established in 2002 by the US-registered Russian gas
trader Itera, Russian State-owned Rosneft’ and ZarubezhNeft’
along with TurkmenGaz , is likely to be signed to develop the
offshore 29, 30 and 31 Blocks.
The biggest Turkmen
gas field is Dauletabad, located in the Amu’Darya basin. Brought
into operation in the early 1980s, it currently accounts for
24.47% of the country’s proven reserves. Dauletabad is one of
the most important fields for the Central Asia-Centre pipeline (CAC),
the regional gas grid dating back to Soviet times. This field,
hosting 0.7 tcm, is a key factor for the integrity of the
current Russian-oriented Central Asian infrastructural profile.
The most
recently discovered fields are South Yolotan and Osman, in the
Murgan basin. Up to now there has been difficulty in reaching
some acceptable estimate concerning the new fields’ reserves,
officially claimed by Turkmengaz as 39.6 bcm. South Yolotan
and Osman attracted Chinese CNPC, which signed a PSA with
Turkmenistan to develop these deposits along with the
Bagtiyarlyk field in the Amu’Darya basin in order to transport
up 30 bcm/y of gas for 30 years to a planned Central Asia-China
pipeline beginning in 2009.
As far as
exports are concerned, Turkmenistan’s performance is impressive
in comparison to the other former Soviet republics of the
Caspian area. The difference between production and consumption
in 2007 freed 43.3 bcm for export, considerably higher than
Kazakhstan (3.7 bcm), which suffers from the underdevelopment of
its fields; Uzbekistan (12.2 bcm), which despite outstanding
level of gas production needs to exploit the most of it to meet
domestic requirements because of its growing population; and
Azerbaijan (2 bcm), which was a net importer until 2006.
To this extent, Turkmenistan benefits from the high rate of
exploitation of its gas and the low domestic demand due to a
small population and a poor industrial base. As a result, Russia
accounted for 86.6% of Turkmen gas exports in 2006, by importing
37.5 bcm through the CAC. Most of these imports are subsequently
sold to Ukraine. The rest (5.8 bcm) reaches Iran through the
Korpedzhe-Kurt Kui pipeline. This amount is likely to increase
from 2008 but the prospects seem to be poor, given the frequent
supply cuts due to pricing disputes. Export revenues stemming
from the hydrocarbons sector account for some 80% of the
country’s total merchandise exports, allowing Turkmenistan to
develop a sound public finance stance and a positive current
account since 2000. As one can see,
Turkmenistan is considerably dependent on energy rent that
granted robust economic growth, masking, however, limited
improvements in economic reform.
Turkmenistan is
connected to the CAC through two routes. The western branch,
running from the Turkmenbashi terminal alongside the Caspian
coast, links the South Caspian basin to the Russian Orenburg
pipeline meeting the CAC in the Kazakh Baynau terminal. The
eastern branch delivers gas from the Amu’Darya and Murgan basins
to the Uzbek Urgan hub where Turkmenistan’s eastern gas joins
the CAC.
The combined projected capacity of CAC is about 100 bcm/y,
currently reduced to 65 bcm/y because of poor maintenance.
Capacity is actually underexploited to a rate lower than 65%,
with the eastern branch accounting for over 90% of the country’s
exports on the CAC system. Gazprom is actually planning to
upgrade the western branch’s 4 bcm/y capacity by building an
additional 20 bcm/y-pipeline aimed at restoring the 10 bcm/y
Soviet-era capacity by 2010 and raising the flow to 30 bcm/y by
2016-2018.
The whole investment is expected to require 1 billion USD.
The only route
independent from CAC is the Korpedzhe-Kurt Kui pipeline. Dating
back to 1997, this corridor connects South Caspian gas from
Turkmenistan to Iran’s north-eastern provinces. The total
capacity is 13.5 bcm/y, currently underexploited at a rate lower
than 50%.
The
organization of the hydrocarbon sector in Turkmenistan is highly
centralized. The President oversees the sector, and signs PSAs
and sales contracts. The State Agency for Management and Use of
Hydrocarbon Resources and the Oil and Gas Ministry depend on the
President, with the former interacting with foreign investors
and the latter controlling the State-owned companies. The
companies are Turkmenneft, responsible for the offshore oil
production, and TurkmenNefteGaz, responsible for refining,
marketing and distribution of oil and gas. These functions were
transferred into the Oil and Gas Ministry in 2005. TurkmenGaz is
responsible for onshore gas production; TurkmenGeologiya is
involved in hydrocarbons exploration; TurkmenNefteGazStroy
manages the upstream construction services for the whole sector.
Problems and
prospects of Azerbaijani and Iranian natural gas contribution to
Nabucco
Azerbaijan is
considered as the supplier most likely to contribute to the
Nabucco pipeline given its geographic position and its
infrastructural network, which both make the country independent
from the Russian-controlled gas grid. Azerbaijan’s reserves are
calculated between 1.35 and 2.30 tcm, but the country became a
net exporter only in 2007. The most hopes are related to the
giant offshore Shah Deniz
field. The first phase, launched in 2006, is about to produce up
to 15 bcm/y, but the phase expected to fill Nabucco is the
second one. Phase II of Shah Deniz is supposed to produce 8-12
bcm/y by 2013 according to optimistic forecasts,
allowing to fill the projected pipeline during the early phase
from 2013 to 2018 and then to provide 20 bcm/y.
Other assessments expect Shah Deniz to provide only 4-5 bcm to
Nabucco during the early period given the growing demand of
Georgia and Turkey.
In both cases, even by forecasting 20 bcm/y of future supply,
Azerbaijan gas alone will be unable to fill the double outlet –
the northern branch to Baumgarten and the southern branch to
Brindisi thanks to the Turkey-Greece and Greece-Italy
interconnectors - of Nabucco. Furthermore, the impressive growth
rates of Azerbaijan’s domestic gas consumption are turning out
to be powerful leverage at Russia’s disposal to prevent massive
gas outflows from Azerbaijan: by means of technical reasons or
pricing quarrels Gazprom is threatening from time to time to cut
off gas deliveries to Azerbaijan. In this case, Azerbaijan will
be forced to exploit Shah Deniz to cover its own growing
requirements to the detriment of its export commitments.
Russian willingness to prevent Azerbaijan from exporting its gas
westwards is confirmed by the recent Gazprom proposal to buy at
European prices all Shah Deniz’s future output.
Iranian
outstanding gas reserves were essential to the early prospects
for Nabucco. Iran has 28.13 tcm of natural gas reserves,
accounting for 15.5% of global and ranking the country the
second place in the world after Russia. These resources are both
mismanaged and underexploited, so that the huge 105 bcm/y output
is not enough to meet the domestic demand. As a result, Iranian
gas is totally removed from the international markets with the
exception of a small amount (5.60 bcm/y) exported to Turkey.
Several scholars consider Iranian gas as the only source able to
meet Nabucco’s needs
to a twofold extent: on the one hand, obviously, the size of the
reserves and the high reserves/production ratio. By exporting an
additional 30 bcm/y to fill Nabucco, Iranian reserves are
expected to last about 205 years. On the other hand, the
strategic position which makes Iran the most economically viable
way to ship Turkmen gas away from Gazprom’s control.
Unfortunately, Iranian gas exports suffer considerable setbacks
as far as the systemic level is concerned. By limiting foreign
investments in Iranian hydrocarbons sector to 20 million USD,
the US Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) seriously undermines the
attractiveness of Iran for western IOCs. Despite the fact that
most of the penalties harmed US companies such as ConocoPhillips
and no European company has been targeted so far, the threat of the
sanctions, focused on credit access, prevented companies such as
OMV and Shell from undertaking massive investments in
development of both Iranian upstream and domestic transport. As
a result, given the political climate stemming from the Iranian
nuclear issue, it seems to be considerably difficult for the EU
to engage Iran in participating in the Nabucco project, whilst
avoiding at the same time the emergence of disruptive effects on
transatlantic relations. In other words, Nabucco turns out to be
undermined by US sanctions more than by Russian attempts to
build up alternative routes like Southern Stream. Other
commentators are more dismissive about the necessity of Iranian
gas. Their main argument is rooted in the poor Iranian
infrastructural network, which is under massive strain because
of growing domestic demand as well as the lack of investments
aimed at upgrading the grid, notably the south-north trunk line
which should ship the gas from the giant South Pars offshore
field.
In other words, leaving aside the political consequences caused
by Iranian involvement, the question of how Iran ultimately will
be able to free up gas for export remains unresolved.
The Turkmenistan
factor
Given the inability
of Azerbaijan to serve the Nabucco’s double outlet and the
unlikelihood of Iranian involvement, Turkmenistan turns out to
be crucial for the gas pipeline prospect, but both the available
resources and the export routes seems to pose very serious
challenges.
With Azerbaijan
supposed to provide 20 bcm/y, Turkmenistan is expected to
deliver the remaining 10 bcm/y. President Berdymuhammedov
recently confirmed the country’s willingness to commit itself to
the west-sponsored routes, on the occasion of talks with EU
Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner
and the Memorandum of Understanding signed with EU Commissioner
for Energy Andris Piebalgs.
Notwithstanding this, the prospects for extraction remain
unclear. While the eastern basins have definitely fallen under
Russian and Chinese companies’ control, western companies have
some room to maneuver in the Caspian shelf, particularly Block
1.
Unfortunately, even in the case of a massive IOCs’ involvement
in the South Caspian basin, Turkmenistan has already committed
itself to supply Russia with 80-90 bcm/y for 25 years
and China with 30 bcm/y for 30 years. Adding a further 20 bcm/y
absorbed by domestic consumption, these commitments turn the
reserves/production ratio down to 21 years, less than the period
established by the aforementioned agreements. As a result, some
doubts do not stem from upstream investments, but from the
overall reserves’ amount.
IOCs themselves, by experiencing the usual tendency of the
Turkmen leadership to overestimate the country’s gas reserves in
taking commitments during the ‘90s, are now much more cautious
about the potential of the Caspian basin as a source of
competition for European market, ranking it at the 3rd
or 4th place after Norway, North Africa or Gulf
countries such as Qatar. Anyway, in dismissing the Turkmen
reserves’ capability to fill multiple outlets, it should be
taken into account that Ashgabat is becoming very pragmatic. To
this extent, western IOCs and governments as well as the EU
should pay more attention to frequent pricing disputes among
Turkmenistan and Gazprom.
Furthermore, despite the low reserves/production ratio
suggesting that Turkmen participation in Nabucco is not
sustainable in the long term,
it could be considered as an option to bolster the prospects for
the pipeline whilst waiting for a reduction of the international
tensions arising from the Iranian nuclear issue. In other words,
Turkmenistan could be expected to be a “transitional provider”.
However, remarks concerning volumes should not be separated from
the important issue of pricing. It should be taken into
consideration that as the Russian gas giant promised to raise
the prices paid to Turkmenistan to the European level by 2009,
Europe is losing its last source of leverage on Ashgabat.
As far as
transport infrastructure is concerned, the main obstacle to
Turkmenistan’s participation in Nabucco has to do with the
political unreliability of the Iranian corridor, unanimously
considered as the most rational way to deliver Turkmen gas
westwards. Turkmenistan already exports about 5.5-6 bcm/y to
Iran through the aforementioned Korpedzhe-Kurt Kui pipeline.
Iran consumes domestically this gas, which allows the Islamic
Republic to swap a similar amount to Turkey. Despite the overall
capacity of these pipelines, which is about 15-20 bcm/y, the
Iranian domestic section needs improvements that are unlikely to
be undertaken under the US sanctions. As a result, the only way
to connect Turkmenistan’s offshore fields to Nabucco is by way
of the Caspian Sea. Feasibility studies concerning the
Trans-Caspian pipeline (TCP) date back to several years ago. The
early version of the project, endorsed by a consortium composed
by Enron, Bechtel and General Electric, was strongly supported
by the Clinton Administration. Unfortunately, thanks to the
discovery of the Shah Deniz field, Azerbaijan began to consider
itself as the main source for Nabucco and not only a transit
country. This allowed Baku to become more assertive in its
relations with Turkmenistan, poisoned by the disagreement about
the Caspian Sea’s legal status as well as the right to exploit
the offshore Kyapaz/Serdar field lying in the middle of the sea.
The worsening of relations between the two countries, along with
the former Turkmen President Niyazov’s concerns about the US’
tough stance against Saddam-style dictatorships in the aftermath
of Operation Iraqi Freedom, made the 2 billion USD-estimated TCP
fall apart.
From a broader perspective, within the Central Asian context TCP
has been the second collapsing West-backed corridor after the
Trans-Afghan Pipeline (TAP). Some argue that the main reason for
these failures lied in the unpredictable and bizarre behavior of
the former Turkmen President,
so that something could be achieved with the new leadership.
However,
leaving aside Niyazov’s choices, it should be taken into account
that both corridors relied upon a very uncertain political
background hindered by often inconsistent US efforts to isolate
Iran, fight Islamic terrorism, reduce world dependence on Middle
East hydrocarbons, promote democracy in Central Asia and drive
post-Soviet regimes away from Russian influence at the same
time. All these factors determined the emergence of an
international environment that turned out to be detrimental to a
diversification of routes, to the extent that Russian
involvement in keeping the current infrastructure alive has been
considered less dangerous by Central Asian leaderships for
regional stability. In the light of this context, it seems to be
difficult to take the Turkmenbashi as the only one
responsible for the TCP and TAP failures, so that the emergence
of a new climate in the Ashgabat leadership is not a guarantee
for these projects’ revival. There is of course some room for
optimism stemming from the improvement of the relations between
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan and the completion in 2007 of the
South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP). These events increase the
prospects for TCP.
But it should be taken into consideration that Berdymuhammedov
is probably making more promises than his country’s amount of
natural gas can keep. The first to become aware of it seem to be
the western IOCs.
Conclusion
Turkmenistan has huge
natural gas resources and high levels of production, but these
resources need massive western investments to be developed. At
the same time, Russia is apparently succeeding in boosting its
grip on the Central Asian infrastructural landscape.
The Nabucco pipeline
needs to rely on Turkmen gas given the position of two other
potential suppliers. Azerbaijan is the safest source, but it is
still importing gas to satisfy its increasing domestic demand
and the gas predictably coming from the giant Shah Deniz field
is unlikely to fill the Nabucco’s double outlet. As a result,
the participation of Azerbaijan alone seems to be unable to
justify the huge investments required by the construction of
Nabucco. Furthermore, there are strong elements of uncertainty
related to the Russian leverage, given that Russia is the only
source for Azerbaijani gas imports.
Iran has at its
disposal a huge amount of gas reserves, able to challenge the
Russian dominance on European markets. Unfortunately, the
political climate is preventing western IOCs from undertaking
investments aimed at developing the Iranian gas upstream as well
as the Iranian domestic grid, given the limited capacity of the
south-north corridor.
Turkmenistan’s
engagement is needed to fill Nabucco in the short and medium
terms, but several doubts arise concerning the available
resources and the transit corridors. As far as resources are
concerned, the EU should consider Turkmenistan gas as a
“transitional source” whilst waiting for significant improvement
of the political climate around Iran. However, Turkmenistan has
committed itself to long-term agreements with Russia and China,
with Europe losing its sole attractiveness as Gazprom promised
to raise the prices paid to Turkmenistan to the international
levels. From a broad political perspective, Russia profited from
the need of Berdymuhammedov to consolidate his power in the
light of a regional context potentially sensitive to
“destabilizing pressures” coming from the systemic level, within
the framework of the US involvement in the “broader Middle
East”. Furthermore, given the unlikelihood of exporting Turkmen
gas to Europe through Iran, Nabucco’s prospects seem to be
highly dependent on TCP prospects, which are turning out to be
poor so far in the aftermath of the previous mid-2000s failure.
However, the improvement of Azerbaijani-Turkmen relations, as
well as a partnership between Turkmenistan and Russia which is
not so stable as it seems, leave some room to maneuver for the
EU and western IOCs. As a result, one can consider
Turkmenistan’s involvement in the Nabucco project weak, but
still not dead.