Abstract
Fearful of losing its economic regional and global
dominance, Iran has sought to align itself diplomatically and economically with
Armenia and Russia to counter Azerbaijan’s new pro-western policies and rising
economic power. This paper analyzes the international relations of the Southern
Caucasus through a Neorealist paradigm to demonstrate how Iran’s behavior and
action in the area were a direct result of the anarchical system that ensued
after the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. The lack of a bipolar system
in the Caucasus has pushed the region to the brink of another regional conflict
that could potentially be more far-reaching and widespread than that of the
previously contained Nagorno-Garabagh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Iran’s foreign policy of the past decade demonstrates Iran’s pragmatism in the
Southern Caucasus that is not dictated by religious ideology, but rather by
Iran’s national interests, both economic and political, and national security
concerns. The “New Great Game” of the post-Cold War era in the southern
Caucasus will radically transform the region into one of great strategic and
geopolitical importance.
Keywords:
neorealism, anarchy, balance of
power, BTC Pipeline/Caspian Sea oil and gas pipelines, ethnonationalism,
external Influences—Russia, Iran, United States, Turkey
Introduction
The collapse of the Soviet Union and birth of
independent states in the Caucasus region sparked the strong interest of the
world because of its wealthy natural resources and strategic placement between
Europe, Russia, the Middle East, and Central Asia. As a result of the Soviet
Union’s disintegration in the Caucasus, the operation of the international
system has been forced again to find regional stability in what Kenneth Waltz
has described in his book, Theory of International Politics, as an
anarchical international system. Over the past decade, the countries of the
region, including Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, Russia, and Iran have sought to
reestablish their national interests and military power among the other
competing states.
By using Kenneth Waltz’s Neorealist paradigm, a
strong explanation can be given regarding the actions and policies of these
regional Caucasian countries. Indeed, a Neorealist international politics model
cannot explain every aspect of the international system in the Caucasus, but it
will be shown that it offers the best lens in which to view the behavior of the
states in this region. In particular interest to this paper is the role of
Iran and its unlikely increased economic and political relations with Armenia
during the past decade. This paper will elucidate why Iran, ruled by a heavily
theocratic Islamic government, acts as such a reliable trade and diplomatic
partner to Armenia, an openly Christian state.
Iran’s foreign policy of the past decade demonstrates
Iran’s pragmatism in the Caucasus that is not dictated by religious ideology but
rather by Iran’s national interests, both economic and political, and national
security concerns. Iran’s behavior in the Caucasus as a unitary actor in this
regional subsystem of the international system is best viewed through a
Neorealist paradigm because of its strong explanation of Iran’s behavior in the
region, such as its open pursuit of national interests and protection of its
national sovereignty. Furthermore, this paper will demonstrate through a
Neorealist paradigm that the increased polarity of the region, from a bipolar to
a multipolar system of alliances, has led to greater instability, drastically
placing Iran and the Caucasus at risk for future conflict or war.
To best understand Iran’s role in the Southern
Caucasus, Iran’s national interests in the region, including its national
security and hydrocarbon trade, will first be examined to demonstrate how they
dictate Iran’s behavior and policies in the region and in particular with
Armenia. Second, this paper will discuss, in relation to Iran and the Caucasus,
the anarchical and balance-of-power system that Kenneth Waltz posits as
operating the international system. Over the past decade, Iran has drawn closer
to Armenia because of its desire to counterbalance Azerbaijan’s regional rise in
economic and political power, in addition to the augmented presence of the
United States. Furthermore, Russia has acted as an unreliable ally to Iran in
the Caucasus, thus forcing Iran to align with the few remaining countries from
the region that are pro-Iranian. The third and last section of this analysis
will deal with the future of the Southern Caucasus, as well Iranian-Armenian
relations, as seen through a Neorealist perspective. With the increased role of
such countries as the United States and Israel in the region, in addition to an
insecure alliance system involving both Russia and Azerbaijan, Iran’s political
and economic power is significantly challenged for the future. This combined
analysis will demonstrate the validity of the Neorealist paradigm in explaining
the state relations of the southern Caucasus in relation to Iran and Armenia,
and shed light on the future precariousness of the region.
Iran’s National Interests
H.W. Bruck, Burton Sapin, and Richard Snyder write in
their book Foreign Policy Decision-making that a country’s foreign policy
is greatly affected by its national interests. Furthermore, state behavior is
determined by “heads of state, policy-makers, and diplomats [who] discover,
define, and preserve the “national interest” through a formula or formulas
employed to guide the choices and to legitimate choices already made.” Such a definition directly relates to
the Neorealist model that describes states as unitary rational actors where the
decision-making process leads to choices based on national interest.
Such definitions are aptly applied to explain Iran’s foreign policy in the
Caucasus and with Armenia during the past decade.
After the fall of the Shah in 1979 and prior to the
1990s, Iran’s foreign policy was largely characterized as both explicitly and
implicitly supportive of the growing number of Islamist movements in countries
such as Afghanistan, Lebanon, Tunisia, Algeria, and the Philippines. Beginning
in the 1990s, however, Iran’s Islamic rhetoric was largely toned down or
abandoned, as Iran grew more prone to external international markets with the
sale of its hydrocarbon reserves—gas and oil reserves were discovered during the
1960s in Iran. Additionally, Iran’s government understood that it was
economically dangerous to continue “exporting the Islamic Revolution” in a
global economy: “Iran had to give in to international capitalism to survive in
the world market and receive the maximum return on its oil revenues.”
As a new and industrializing country, Iran placed more emphasis on its economic
interests versus pursuing a fully religious ideology in its foreign policy and
understood that many countries were reluctant to trade with Iran, if it sought
to forcefully spread Islam around the world. Other factors leading to a more
pragmatic Iranian foreign policy came in 1988 after Iran lost an eight-year war
against Iraq. In addition, there was a lack of reception to the spread of
Iran’s Islamic Revolution after the breakup of the Soviet Union in the newly
formed Commonwealth of Independent States.
Overall, Iran’s foreign policy was more geared toward security and economic
concerns during the 1990s, preferring to nurture state-state relations over
Islamic ideology.
In 1988 when war broke out just beyond Iran’s border
in the Nagorno-Garabagh between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Iran remained largely
neutral despite the fact that a large Shiite majority inhabited Azerbaijan.
Iran, a country ruled by Muslim Shiites, has an Azeri ethnic minority population
living in the northwest corner of the country, known as “southern Azerbaijan”,
totaling more than 15 million people, compared with a population in Azerbaijan
of 8 million. During the Nagorno-Garabagh conflict, Iran grew worried that
support for Azerbaijan against Armenia would elicit a call for unification
between the two “divided” Azerbaijans that had been separated by the Persian and
Ottoman Empires since the nineteenth century. In addition, Iran did not want to
undermine Moscow’s role in the region and mire in what was viewed as a Soviet
internal affair. Moreover, if Iran were to increase the violence in the area,
it feared the external intervention by either Russia or NATO, which would have
brought international troops uncomfortably close to Iran’s borders and a
disturbance in the regional balance of power.
Therefore, alignment with either side was
not an option:
“Siding with Azerbaijan would produce unnecessary domestic
pressures from the rich upper Armenian elite in Iran. Such a move would also be
seen as religiously based and therefore stir international criticism. On the
other hand, the radical Islamic government would not support a Christian actor
fighting against a Muslim republic. Neutrality was therefore the safest
reality.”
Public opinion in Iran called for the government to support
the Azerbaijani side against the Armenian “infidels”, but the government refused
to take sides citing security concerns.
By 1992 Iran was confronted with new problems
regarding its policy in the Nagorno-Garabagh, in addition to being faced with
what to do regarding the newly established independent states in the Caucasus
region after the fall of the Soviet Union. By the end of that year, Armenia had
captured the majority of the Garabagh and forced approximately 700.000
Azerbaijanis to flee from their homes in the area.
This crisis triggered a mass exodus of Azerbaijanis to flow across the border
into Iran and further contributed to the government’s worries about an
Azerbaijani nationalist revival. Iran sent troops to the borders by the
beginning of 1993 and provided Azerbaijan humanitarian aid to feed refugees and
build refugee camps within Azerbaijan’s borders. Iran’s government did not want
to risk the increased presence of Azerbaijanis who might foment Azerbaijani
nationalist sentiment and therefore prevented further refugees from entering
Iran in the early 1990s.
Iran also feared that “secessionist movements in Iran and on its borders could
be used by outside powers to destabilize the country.”
Such historical foes in the region as Russia possessed the potential to fulfill
its neo-imperialistic impulses and tamper with Iran’s national security
interests both within Iran and the Southern Caucasus.
Aware of all of these internal and external
possibilities and factors along its borders, Iran attempted to broker a
ceasefire in 1992 with its national interest in mind but was unsuccessful
because of continued bloodshed and a buildup of troops between Azerbaijan and
Armenia. Iran was also dealt further troubling news during the same year when
Abulfez Elchibey was elected president of the Republic of Azerbaijan. President
Elchibey openly declared his government’s desire for unification with “Southern
Azerbaijan”, thus greatly contributing to Iran’s fears of national unrest and
insecurity. In addition, President Elchibey began to realign his government
with Turkey, a “secular” country viewed disdainfully by Iran, and the United
States, one of Iran’s other foes.
The tense events and Azerbaijani declarative policies against Iran of 1992
marked the beginning of strained relations between the two countries. As a
result of Azerbaijan’s increased rhetoric for unification with “southern
Azerbaijan”, Iran began to align itself more closely with Armenia and signed a
bilateral treaty of friendship and economic cooperation at the end of 1992.
Such an agreement marked the beginning of rapprochement by Iran towards Armenia.
Additional reports on Nagorno-Garabagh also claim that Iran permitted the
transit of weapons headed to Armenia during the Nagorno-Garabagh conflict. It
was also reported that Iran trained the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation
of Armenia (ASALA), which directly influenced the government in Nagorno-Garabagh
and directly fought against Azerbaijani military forces. In essence, Iran
opposed Azerbaijan and its new president, as well as Azerbaijan’s new
anti-Iranian policies, by aligning itself with Armenia.
By 1994, change and equilibrium in the international
system was once again established in the Southern Caucasus with a Russian-backed
ceasefire in the Nagorno-Garabagh and a coup d’etat that replaced President
Elchibey with a more “moderate” leader, Haydar Aliyev. Despite President
Aliyev’s more moderate tendencies and efforts to improve relations with Iran,
the Iranian government still remained wary of Azerbaijan and the threat it posed
on its ethnic Azerbaijani population. As a result of continued tepid relations
between the two countries, Iran adopted a policy to support the ceasefire in the
Nagorno-Garabagh in an attempt to further prevent the displacement of
Azerbaijanis who might stir national sentiment and threaten the national
sovereignty of Iran. Iran also began to boost its relations with Armenia after
Turkey and Azerbaijan implemented a trade embargo in 1994 that significantly
affected Armenia’s food and energy supplies.
Furthermore, Iran’s support for Armenia better insured the government of Iran
that Armenia could remain strong enough to stave off a future, armed conflict
with Azerbaijan.
Today, the government of Iran continues its
preoccupation about the possibility of ethnic Azerbaijani uprisings in Iran and
has maintained a policy to minimize or censure the voice of the National
Liberation Movement of Southern Azerbaijan that formed over the past decade,
along with other Azerbaijani nationalist news agencies in Iran. To uphold Iran’s national interest of
maintaining national sovereignty and unity, Armenia has been used as an initial
tool of the Iranian government in some preliminary formal and informal
agreements between the two states—this paper will later discuss more specific
arrangements between the two countries. In relation to Iran, one can begin
to see how Armenia slowly began to transform at the beginning of the 1990s into
what Kenneth Waltz has referred to as a “buffer” zone for the dominant powers in
the international system. Iran used Armenia as a potential buffer to
insulate against the future rise to power of Azerbaijan. Over the course
of the decade, Armenia acted as a balancing power in favor of Iran in a region
that experienced increased polarity and opposing alliances.
The conflict in the Nagorno-Garabagh posed serious
threats to Iran and caused an enormous outcry among its population in favor of
supporting the Azerbaijanis in their fight against Armenia. The government of
Iran, however, maintained its policy of preserving national security and
sovereignty as the ultimate deciding factor for its foreign policy in the
Garabagh. This aspect of Iran’s foreign policy further gives validity to the
Neorealist paradigm, which posits that a state will determine its foreign policy
based on national interests, such as security, as opposed to being influenced by
other forces like domestic politics or transnational organizations. Kenneth
Waltz further contributes to this model by stating that a country will at the
very minimum seek its own preservation, and at a maximum, strive for universal
dominance.
In Iran’s case, the government of Iran sought its national preservation instead
of being influenced of other ideologies and public opinion.
Aside from being preoccupied with protecting its
national borders and sovereignty, Iran’s involvement in the politics of the
region was greatly influenced because of its strong economic ties and
hydrocarbon interests in the Caucasus. After the ceasefire in the
Nagorno-Garabagh and the increase of Azerbaijan’s wealth from lucrative oil
digging projects in the Caspian Sea, Iran moved to counterbalance Azerbaijan’s
rise in economic power by further aligning itself with Armenia, in addition to
increasing its competition for hydrocarbon markets in the global economy.
According to Robert Gilpin, “states engage in
cost-benefit calculations about the alternative courses of action
available…[Furthermore,] a state will attempt to change the international system
by means of territorial, political, or economic expansion until the marginal
costs of additional change become equal to or exceed the marginal benefits.”
Contrary to a Realist paradigm, Neorealism more properly accounts for a
country’s economic interests in determining the makeup of the international
system. According to this model, a country not only seeks power politically and
territorially, but also strives for economic dominance. In Iran’s case, it
worked to build up its economic power and dominance in the Caucasus after a
lasting ceasefire was established in the Nagorno-Garabagh with the help of
Russia in 1994. However, Azerbaijan proved to be a major obstacle and
competitor for achieving Iran’s goal.
During the 1960s and 1970s, Iran began to reap a
major profit from the discovery of national hydrocarbon reserves. Aside from
the Persian Gulf, Iran was a major exporter of hydrocarbons for the region. By
the 1990s, however, Azerbaijan also began to capitalize on its hydrocarbon
resources, thus marking the beginning of competitive trade for global and
regional markets between the two countries. In September of 1994, Azerbaijan
signed a US$8 billion dollar deal, with a US$300 million signing bonus, headed
by British Petroleum and including twelve other national and private oil
companies from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. The deal, however,
excluded both Iran and Russia from a thirty-year contract that predicted a
profit of US$35 billion.
Azerbaijan compensated for Iran’s exclusion from the
“Western Consortium” of oil companies, also referred to as “Contract of the
Century”, by offering Tehran a 5% Azerbaijani stake in the exploitation of the
Caspian oil sea shelf. Iran reluctantly accepted the offer in November 1994
because of the country’s pragmatic foreign policy and economic interests.
However, under increased pressure from the United States because of America’s
new stakes in the Caspian basin oil projects, President Aliyev was persuaded to
annul the bilateral agreement with Iran in April 1995.
After the United States signed the 1994 Western
Consortium contract with Azerbaijan, President Bill Clinton’s administration’s
Caucasian policy significantly changed from one of ambiguity and passivity to
one of increased American presence and involvement in the Caucasus. The
following are some of the United States’ policy objectives in the Caucasus that
directly opposed Iran’s role in the region:
1) Find a solution for the regional conflicts; 2) Increase
and expand the world’s energy supply; 3) Promote and maintain the sovereignty
and independence of the Caspian Basin countries; 4) Uphold Iran’s isolation in
the region in order to limit its revenues, stopping it from building nuclear
weapons and supporting terrorism.
Iran’s behavior toward Armenia in the
last decade directly correlates to the Neorealist model that describes and
explains a state’s action in the international system in terms of its national
interest: “…states, like individuals, are basically motivated by egoism, which,
in the international context, is usually called ‘national interest’ or ‘raison
d’état’…on this assumption the survival of the state and self-preservation
become the supreme goal.”
In Iran’s case, economic factors and the share of regional and global
hydrocarbon markets significantly influenced its national interest in the
region. Therefore, Iran’s foreign policy goals during the past decade were more
in line with achieving economic and political power and stability in the
Caucasus versus pursuing the exportation of the Iranian Islamic revolution to
its neighbors in the region. Furthermore, Kenneth Waltz states that the
international system is a self-help system where a state seeks to defend its own
interests in reaction to the behavior of other units in the system:
A self-help system is one
in which those who do not help themselves will fail to prosper, and will lay
themselves open to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balances of
power…The theory says simply that if some do relatively well, others will
emulate them or fall by the wayside.
In this self-help system,
Iran guarded its economic and political influence and power by aligning with
Armenia to counter Azerbaijan as it slowly pushed to the forefront with its new
wealth and western alliances.
Anarchy and
the Balance of Power in the Southern Caucasus
After the breakup of the Soviet Union in
1991, a state of “anarchy” ensued in the international system as the newly
formed states of the Caucasus such as Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, in
addition to Iran and Turkey, worked to establish a balance of power both
economically and politically. Aside from defending each country’s own
sovereignty and national security, the individual states of the region also
sought to capture a share in the new and evolving financial and economic markets
in wake of the Soviet collapse.
Kenneth Waltz describes what is meant by
the balance-of-power theory in the international system in the following
citation from his book Theory of International Politics:
States, or those who
act for them, try in more or less sensible ways to use the means available in
order to achieve the ends in view. Those means fall into two categories:
internal efforts (moves to increase economic capability, to increase military
strength, or to develop clever strategies) and external efforts (moves to
strengthen and enlarge one’s own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing
one.)…The system, like a market in economics, is made by the actions and
interactions of its units, and the theory is based on assumption about their
behavior.
As seen in the previous section of this paper, Iran worked to
increase its “economic capabilities” by developing “clever strategies” to
achieve power in the region. At the same time, Iran also began to strategically
build up its alliances in a region that became increasingly multi-polar after
the fall of the Soviet Union.
The definition and concept of power is also important
to grasp in order to best understand the anarchical nature of the international
system, and especially in relation to Iran. According to Waltz, “an agent is
powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him…Power is
a means, and the outcome of its use is uncertain. To be politically pertinent,
power has to be defined in terms of capabilities; the extent of one’s power
cannot be inferred from the results one may or may not get.”
This definition of power differs from the previously accepted Realist definition
that views power as the ends to achieving international equilibrium rather than
the means. Furthermore, power is not thought to automatically establish
control, but rather to provide a “means of maintaining one’s autonomy in the
face of force that others wield.”
In relation to Iran, its government sought alliances and other strategies as a
way of avoiding physical conflict and to establish its “power”, both economic
and political, in the region. The power void present in the wake of the Soviet
Union’s collapse pushed Iran to seek more “power” in the absence of the Soviet
Union; forming alliances with such countries as Armenia and Russia was one way
of achieving this goal. Iran was not looking for territorial gain but rather to
strengthen its autonomy and economic dominance in the Caucasus. Therefore,
power in this case is not associated with territorial gain but rather with
national preservation aided by a system of alliances.
Aside from the concept of power in world order, the
idea of “anarchy” is also another important term that describes the operation of
the international system. In the 1990s the collapse of the Soviet Union led to
chaos and “anarchy” within the international system until a balance of power was
reestablished among the different unitary actors. As this paper will argue, the
balance of power that has been established over the course of the past decade is
one that is precarious, extremely multi-polar, and still possesses elements of
anarchy because of such unsettled disputes as the Nagorno-Garabagh. As Kenneth
Waltz notes, a multi-polar system is much less secure than a bipolar system and
therefore more likely to collapse and fall back into a state of anarchy until
proper stability can be reestablished.
After a tenuous Nagorno-Garabagh ceasefire was
brokered in 1994, the various countries of the region slowly formed two sets of
new but opposing alliances: Tehran-Moscow-Yerevan versus
Ankara-Baku-Tbilisi-Washington. Each alliance was insecure and internally
polarized in its own right.
Iran, Russia, and Armenia formed an alliance for many
similar reasons. First, Russia and Iran sought to thwart the rise of
pan-Turkism, as well the increased American presence in Azerbaijan and the
Caucasus.
Furthermore, Iran feared that if its
economy were to decline as a result of an Azerbaijani strengthened and
flourishing economy, then Iran would be more prone to ethnic Azerbaijani unrest
and a call for the unification of a “greater” Azerbaijan. In addition, both Russia and Iran
feared that Azerbaijan’s attempts to lure the United States or NATO to build
military bases in Azerbaijan would seriously threaten each country’s military
power in the region. From Armenia’s perspective, it suffered from being
completely isolated with the embargos implemented by Turkey and Azerbaijan after
1994 and therefore sought an alliance with Iran. From Iran’s standpoint,
it sought to stabilize Armenia’s economy and political situation in order to
maintain a lasting status quo in the Nagorno-Garabagh.
The alliance between Russia, Armenia, and Iran has
been significantly weakened since Russian President Vladimir Putin was elected
in 2000. Prior to 2000, Azerbaijan had excluded Russia in 1994 from the
“Contract of the Century”, greatly disgruntling Russia. In addition, Russia
viewed Azerbaijan’s alliance with the United States and Turkey as a direct
threat upon its national security and regional interests. Since 2000, however,
Putin has made efforts to normalize Russian relations with Azerbaijan and has
reassessed Russia’s policy in the Caspian Sea in order to reestablish the
credibility of Russia’s regional policy. In 2000, President Putin signed
important economic and security agreements with President Aliyev and emphasized
the strong need for regional cooperation. Furthermore, Russia adopted a “new
non-confrontational economic approach” to the area.
Russia’s increased rapprochement with Azerbaijan
throws the international system back into slight disequilibria, thus pushing
Iran closer both politically and economically to Armenia since it lacks other
stable allies. In 2002, for example, the defense ministers of Iran and Armenia
met in Yerevan to sign a protocol of understanding and to begin talks for
military defense cooperation. In addition, the two countries have
finally announced the official beginning construction of the 100-kilometer oil
and gas pipelines that could potentially be extended later into the Ukraine.
Due to Armenia’s increased economic and political
weakness in the region over the past decade, very few choices exist to help
Armenia preserve its national interests in the international system. Therefore,
Armenia has aligned itself with Iran, as well as Russia, because of the few
other viable options that will help maintain its national sovereignty and
security—such a tendency in the international system is referred to as
“bandwagoning” in Kenneth Waltz’s Neorealist paradigm. Now that Russia is beginning to
improve its relations with Azerbaijan, Armenia is left to rely more heavily on
Iran and vice versa. As a result of this beginning balance of power shift,
stability in the Caucasus begins to look less certain than before. Russia
will most likely never abandon Armenia because of their historically strong
ties, but the extent to which Russia might support Armenia in a future regional
conflict is more uncertain. Furthermore, as Russia increasingly gravitates
toward Azerbaijan, the Tehran-Yerevan alliance is an insufficient force to
oppose the other polarized alliance of the region consisting of the United
States, Turkey, and Azerbaijan.
Waltz’s Neorealist model for the operation of the
international system predicts the precariousness of a multi-polar system and
states that no balance of power can be maintained with more than four or five
countries vying for different demands. In the Caucasus, there are more than
six different countries wrapped into the two different alliances in the region.
Each country has its own interests and relatively significant power in their own
right. The currently preserved status quo among the two opposing camps is
very unlikely because of the varied national interests and insecure alliances.
The Future of Iran, Armenia, and
the Caucasus
The regional balance of power in the Southern
Caucasus continues to change on a regular basis with new alliances being
perpetually formed and broken. Such changes in the balance of power have not
been conducive to maintaining Iran’s dominance in the region. Recently, Israel
has increased its direct presence in the Caucasus and has begun military
strategic talks with Azerbaijan, in addition to having already bolstered its
relations with Turkey. Israel consistently reproaches Iran for funding
international terrorism and other illicit actions: “By mid-summer 2001, Tehran
obviously thought that the Turkey-Israel-U.S. pincer was drawing tighter.”
Since 2003, Iran’s freedom and maneuverability in the
region has also been further hindered with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Slowly being closed in by the United States, Turkey, Israel, and Azerbaijan,
Iran grows seriously isolated, thus putting the regional stability in flux. It
is no wonder therefore why Iran has become such a strong diplomatic and trading
partner with Armenia, one of its few reliable allies left in the region.
Furthermore, such increased isolation and lack of secure regional allies for
Iran posits an interesting response and explanation for why Iran is currently
trying to threaten the world with nuclear weapons. These recent Iranian nuclear
threats can be explained through a Neorealist paradigm: As a last ditch effort,
Iran seeks to preserve its national sovereignty in a region filled with enemies
and bereft of allies; a balance of power has shifted unfavorably away from Iran,
thus forcing Iran to maintain some semblance of sovereignty.
Lastly, Azerbaijan’s rise to economic power in the
region as a result of its lucrative oil revenues also jeopardizes Iran’s future
national security and sovereignty:
“A wealthier and more confident Azerbaijan will inevitably
begin to consider the option of going to war again in the next five to ten years
to recapture its lost lands [in the Nagorno-Garabagh].” Azerbaijan’s rise to regional power
further explains Iran’s strategic alliance with Armenia. Iran desires a
status quo to keep its ethnic Azerbaijani population pacified. A status
quo also permits Iran to continue the pursuit of its economic interests in the
Caspian Sea basin. Nevertheless, the fact that the Nagorno-Garabagh conflict was never properly resolved after 1994 leaves the
potential for future conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan a strong
possibility. Furthermore, conflict grows increasingly likely as Azerbaijan
builds ups its military from its newly established wealth.
Conclusion
Over the course of this paper, Iran’s relations with
Armenia in the international system have been examined and explained through a
Neorealist paradigm. Through initial analysis, Iran and Armenia appear to be
unlikely regional allies because of their different political and religious
ideologies. However, after a detailed political and economic breakdown of the
Southern Caucasus and through the lens of a Neorealist model, it is indeed
apparent why Iran has increasingly aligned itself with Armenia since 1994. As
examined in the first section of this paper and explained from a Neorealist
perspective, Iran sought to uphold and pursue its national interests in the
southern Caucasus during the 1990s. Armenia was a strategic partner in the
region for Iran to fulfill its national interests of preserving its national
sovereignty by quieting ethnic Azerbaijanis who called for the unification of a
‘greater’ Azerbaijan. Furthermore, it was shown how Iran possessed lucrative
economic interests in the region that were increasingly challenged as a result
of Azerbaijan’s Caspian Sea oil and gas revenues. Fearful of losing its
economic regional and global dominance, Iran looked to align itself with Armenia
and Russia to counter Azerbaijan’s new pro-western policies, in addition to
safeguarding its national economic interests. In the second portion of the
paper, Kenneth Waltz’s concepts of anarchy and his balance-of-power theory were
applied to explain the regional alliances of the Southern Caucasus. Iran’s
behavior and action in the area were a direct result of the anarchical system
that ensued after the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. Additionally, Iran
was increasingly forced to bolster its relations with Armenia because of
Russia’s unreliability as a secure Iranian ally in the region. Lastly, Waltz’s
international politics model was applied in explaining the present
precariousness of the Southern Caucasus. The lack of a bipolar system in the
Caucasus has pushed the region to the brink of another regional conflict that
could potentially be more far-reaching and widespread than that of the
previously contained Nagorno-Garabagh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Overall, a study of this a nature on the
international relations of the Southern Caucasus in relation to Iran and Armenia
helps demonstrate how world order and international stability is maintained,
further shedding light on why and how certain foreign policies are formulated.
Learning from this case of the Southern Caucasus will hopefully assist in
understanding the relations and actions of other countries in the international
system that currently challenge the international balance of power and world
order. Anarchy of the international system will continue to prevail in the
future of the Southern Caucasus. With the aid of such paradigms as Neorealism,
however, international relations’ scholars will better be able to understand and
predict future events in the region before the area reverts back to regional
conflict and permanent instability.