Abstract
After the Russia-Georgia war, tensions grew in the
relationship between Russia and the West. These tensions
have occasionally led some to argue that a New Cold War may
be on the horizon between Russia and the West. Others have
even claimed that the Old Cold War has not really ended.
This work investigates such arguments by examining Western
ties to Georgia, Russia’s power resurgence, and Georgia’s
role in that war. The authors claim that those, who
interpret the Russia-Georgia war within a Cold War paradigm,
neglect the complexities of that conflict. During similar
conflicts, the Cold War is an easily comprehendible and
adoptable paradigm for the West, particularly the US.
Adopting a Cold War perspective, however, ignores that
Tbilisi had a significant role to play in defining the 2008
war. Russia versus West tensions can no longer be
characterized by the ideological rivalries of the Cold War.
Moreover, the Russia-Georgia war appears to indicate a
return to older forms of international rivalry.
Keywords: New Cold War, Georgia, Russia, US, EU,
South Ossetia, Abkhazia
Introduction
Since the conclusion of the Cold War, there have been
repeated efforts to derive a new paradigm for the
understanding of international relations.
Proposals have ranged from Fukuyama’s The End of History
to Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations.
Now this debate has come full circle. Due to the 2008
Russia-Georgia war, tensions between Russia and the United
States rose markedly – sparking fevered discussion of a
possibly emerging “New Cold War.”
International attention was focused on the 2008 Olympics
when the Georgian military, in a surprising move, invaded
the separatist region of South Ossetia. Russia responded to
the crisis with overwhelming
military force, sending troops across the Georgian border
and rapidly routing Georgian troops.
The weight of the Russian counter-offensive, and the
duration of the Russian military operations, caused the West
(particularly the U.S.) to clamor for a halt to the
violence. While the US refrained from direct intervention,
it dispatched naval ships to the Black Sea and mobilized
humanitarian aid for Georgia.
In the following days, a chill settled on the US-Russian
relationship that was reminiscent of the Cold War.
The purpose of this work is to explore whether or not the
Russia-Georgia war was really a conflict between Russia and
the West that is indicative of an “unfreezing” of the old
Cold War or a possible New Cold War.
This examination will begin with an investigation of Western
ties with Georgia in the post-Cold War era, and then will
turn to Russia’s resurgence under Putin’s leadership.
Finally, Georgia’s role in the lead up to the 2008 war will
be examined. This approach will illuminate the nature of the
conflict and measure the implications of tensions between
Russia and West since the conclusion of hostilities.
The West &
Georgia
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus
opened up, as former Soviet republics gained independence.
The political opening of the Caucasus allowed an opportunity
for Western states to develop political and economic ties in
a region that had been almost solely Russian-dominated space
since the Tsarist Russian Empire forced Persia to sign the
Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828. As Russia’s economy imploded
in the early 1990s, its influence waned, and the influence
of the Europeans and Americans grew.
US, NATO, & Georgia
Diplomatic relations between the US and Georgia were
officially established in 1992. Since that time, Georgia has
come to view the US as “one of the main international
guarantors of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity.”
The US has consistently backed Georgian efforts to settle
its separatist disputes without loss of territory, and the
US has provided Georgia with military training, economic
aid, and diplomatic support in the international community.
Energy, security, and democracy constitute the three major
US priorities in its relationship with Georgia. Georgia is a
critical state for the establishment of East-West export
routes from the energy-rich Caspian Sea basin. The
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) natural gas pipeline have opened
this basin up to the West since the end of the Cold War.
While US companies have profited from involvement in the
Caspian energy sector, the US does not really need Caspian
energy for consumption. It does, however, have a strategic
interest in weakening Russian monopolization of this energy
sector. Such monopolization has two negative consequences
from the US perspective. The first is that Moscow might gain
an OPEC-like ability to manipulate market prices, and the
second is that Russian energy dominance translates into
political dominance in its former Soviet republics. Georgia
is a critical state in regard to energy, for if Russia can
dominate Tbilisi, it can control both the BTC and BTE.
Following 9/11, security considerations assumed the greatest
priority for the US, however. Together, Georgia and
Azerbaijan formed an air corridor through which NATO
aircraft could reach Afghanistan, with nearly all air NATO
air traffic to Afghanistan taking this route.
This has only recently begun to change with Russia’s
agreement to allow NATO to use its territory to supply
Afghanistan.
In addition to Georgia’s over flight cooperation, the
Washington and Tbilisi initiated two major programs to
improve Georgian defense forces, the Georgia Train and Equip
Program (GTEP) and the Sustainment and Stability Operations
Program (SSOP). Established in 2002, GTEP invested $64
million in developing Georgia’s military capabilities,
primarily for counter-terrorism. That year, the US also sent
200 Special Forces to train Georgian troops.
For Georgians, it was another successful step toward
escaping Russia’s long shadow.
Eager to cooperate further with the US on security matters,
Georgia reciprocated by participating in the US-led war in
Iraq. In fact, Georgia actually committed the third largest
body of foreign troops in that war, which is remarkable for
such a small country.
The real watershed moment in US-Georgia relations, however,
came with the democratic Rose Revolution, which swept
President Shevardnadze from office.
The 2003 election of Mikheil Saakashvili was hailed as a
great democratic victory in the West, presenting Saakashvili
with an opportunity to further ties with the US and Europe.
Security cooperation was soon joined by economic aid, and in
2005, the US initiated the Millennium Program to encourage
international investment in Georgia, committing $295 million
to the development of infrastructure and the private sector.
Around this time, US-Georgian trade also began to reach
levels comparable to Georgian trade with the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) and Russia. (See Tables in Appendix
2 & Graphs in Appendix 4.) Furthermore, the US increased
support for Georgia politically, pushing hard for Georgian
membership in NATO against European opposition.
When Saakashvili gained the presidency, Georgia had already
been participating in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP)
program since 1994.
PfP emerged after the Cold War as a flexible option for new
states to become partially integrated into the NATO security
mechanism. Through this program, states may design
Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs) for membership.
Under the PfP, all three states of the Southern Caucasus
(Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) have opted for some level
of cooperation with NATO. Georgia, though, is by far the
most involved in NATO cooperation, and its coordination with
NATO accelerated under Saakashvili.
In October 2004, NATO approved an IPAP for Georgia.
Georgia’s progress led NATO to then invite Georgia to join
in Intensification Dialogue in 2006.
In April of 2007, the US backed the further integration of
Georgia into Western institutions when it endorsed the NATO
Freedom Consolidation Act, which proposed the admission of
Albania, Croatia, Georgia, and Macedonia as member states.
On the doorstep of NATO membership, however, the issue of
Georgia’s separatist problem came to the fore. The disputes
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia have involved direct
confrontation with Russian forces. Therefore, if granted
NATO membership, Georgia would be able to call on Western
military intervention in its disputes under Article 5 of the
NATO Charter, and war with Russia is not a prospect that
other NATO members desire to risk. As a result, Georgia’s
membership process stalled in 2007, while NATO sought the
resolution of Georgian territorial disputes.
Despite US commitment to Georgia and the expansion of NATO
into post-Soviet space, European objections to Georgian
membership halted Georgia’s integration into the Western
security apparatus. Shortly after the recognition of
Kosovo’s independence in 2008, a NATO summit was held in
Bucharest. Knowing Russia’s displeasure with the possibility
of NATO’s expansion Germany and several other European
states opposed further integrative steps, and debate over
granting Membership Action Plans (MAPs) to Georgia and
Ukraine stalemated. Instead, NATO leaders made the weak
pronouncement that Georgia would inevitably be admitted to
NATO at some point in the future.
This opened the door for Russia to continue to dominate
Georgia while also providing incentive to take action
against Georgia’s NATO membership before that hypothetical
point in the future.
EU, OSCE, & Georgia
Like the US, the EU member states share an interest in
Georgia because of energy, security, and democracy. Unlike
the US, however, the EU states require Caspian energy for
their domestic consumption and have an even greater interest
in trade. Even before the Soviet Union’s collapse, Europe
had become reliant on Russian energy. By 2006, 33% of the
EU’s oil imports and 40% of its gas imports were imported
from Russia.
The BTC and BTE pipelines, then, are essential to Europe’s
energy security, providing energy import routes not under
Russian control. This diversification is a strategic
objective for the EU, and it is pursuing plans to extend the
BTC and BTE pipeline network across the Caspian Sea, to
access Central Asian oil and gas.
In regards to international trade, the EU has found Georgia
to be a ready market, and EU imports offer a strong
alternative to Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) members. (See Appendix 1 tables.) The EU has
also offered Georgia an alternative market for its exports,
which has become increasingly more important as
Russia-Georgia relations have worsened (See comparative
trade statistics in Appendix 4). Indeed, since the end of
the Soviet Union, Georgian trade with the West has grown
significantly, particularly if one includes Georgia-Turkey
trade in the balance against Russia and former CIS states
(See Appendices 3 and 4 for graphs of trade volume and
percentages).
The first EU-Georgia pact was signed on April 22, 1996. That
pact, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, addressed
measures to strengthen political and economic freedoms in
Georgia, and was in force by July 1, 1999. Also in 1999,
Georgia was admitted to the European Council and the World
Trade Organization, both with the backing of the EU. In
2001, the EU Cooperation Coordination Council was created to
guide the Georgia-EU relationship. Similarly to its
membership in NATO’s PfP program, Georgia’s EU integration
process accelerated under Saakashvili, and Georgia became a
member of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004.
That year, the EU began a Rule of Law Mission to Georgia
(EUJUST THEMIS), signaling a new phase of cooperation within
the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) structure.
Once Georgia was an ENP member, the EU began to exert itself
more in regard to Georgia’s separatist problem. On February
21, 2006, the Presidency of the European Union announced
that it recognized the territorial integrity of the Georgian
state and voiced support for Georgia’s attempts to find a
settlement for its disputes with the enclave of South
Ossetia. In 2007, the EU launched a fact-finding mission to
determine the feasibility of implementing the EU-Georgia ENP
Action Plan in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This was seen as
a first step toward implementing effective border control,
establishing a foundation for mutual ties, and an eventual
peaceful settlement.
In regard to security cooperation and dispute resolution
outside of NATO, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was central to
European-Georgian relations. From 1992 until 2008, the OSCE
has had a Mission to Georgia, committed to resolution of the
separatist conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Since
1993, the OSCE played a role in monitoring the
Georgia-Abkhaz border under the UN led peace process. The
Mission to Georgia also monitored the Joint Peace Keeping
Forces (JPKF) in the Georgia-Ossetia conflict area.
But the OSCE has neither the ability or will to influence
Russia’s role in preserving these “frozen conflicts.”
Vladimir Socor has stated that the OSCE “can either function
as a ‘community’ in consensus with Russia and remain
irrelevant, or give up on the consensus with Russia and risk
ceasing to function at all.”
This limit to European commitment to Georgia was
demonstrated in 2008 as, despite new levels of EU and OSCE
intervention, the crisis in South Ossetia spiraled out of
control. After the war, Russia stood in the way of any
further continuation of the Mission to Georgia, leading to
its termination.
Western Role in the
Russia-Georgia Crisis
The weakness of Western multilateral institutions in
opposition to Russian aggression was apparent even before
the Russia-Georgia War in August of 2008. In 2007, there
were two incidents in which unmarked Russian military
aircraft penetrated Georgian airspace and fired
air-to-surface weapons. The first incident, on March 11th,
involved at least one Russian Mi-24 HIND-E helicopter. The
second, on August 6th, involved at least one
Russian airplane, which was identified to most probably be a
Russian Su-24M fighter jet. An international team sent to
investigate the incident by the OSCE and the JPKF supported
Georgian claims that the aircraft originated from and
returned to Russian airspace, as well as corroborating that
the Georgian air force does not have aircraft that fit the
profile of the intruding fighter or the capacity to launch
that specific Kh-58 missile. After these incidents, however,
an OSCE spokesman would only say, “The [OSCE] report is not
going to point the finger at one side or another. The report
is forward-looking with the aim of building confidence
between both sides and avoiding similar incidents in the
future. We hope to find not just dialogue but a mechanism
between these two countries.”
In addition to being unwilling to confront Russia, the West
also complicated Georgia’s territorial disputes with its
recognition of Kosovar independence in early 2008. Moscow
had already warned that Kosovo’s independence would set a
precedent for the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
by supporting self-determination over territorial integrity.
Not unexpectedly, then, Russia responded by accelerating its
recognition of those separatist republics. Until that point,
Moscow had been pursuing what might be called “creeping
annexation” by providing Russian passports to the
inhabitants in these two territories.
During 2008, it also became increasingly obvious that
Georgia’s integration into NATO had reached its limits. Yet,
while the NATO countries would not approve a MAP for
Georgia, they continued to insist that Georgia would
inevitably receive NATO membership. It was clear by this
point that Russia would not stand for Georgia’s full
membership in NATO, and suspending Georgia’s membership
process gave Russia a window to act. On April 16, Moscow
announced that it would open direct trade, transportation,
and political ties with both Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
This was followed by the deployment of Russian paratroops
and artillery in Abkhazia, as well as the repair of the
railway between Russia and Abkhazia by Russian troops.
This build-up of Russian forces coincided with increasing
tensions in Georgia. Finally, on August 7, the Georgian
military responded to shelling by the South Ossetians. By
the next day the Georgian military was engaged with Russian
forces in the city of Tskhinvali.
Because of Georgia’s relationship with the West, it found a
surge of international sympathy in the wake of the ensuing
Russian invasion. The presidents of several Eastern European
countries (Ukraine, Poland, and Latvia) urged the UN to
stand against Russia’s unimpeded manhandling of Georgia and
the US and EU led international objections to the prolonged
Russian action in Georgia.
By August 11th, the UN Security Council was
considering a French resolution for a ceasefire, while the
Group of 7 (US, UK, Italy, France, Germany, Canada and
Japan) continued to urge Russia to immediately initiate a
ceasefire and to accept international intervention in the
crisis. The next day, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev
agreed in principle to the six components of the French
ceasefire, but while he announced that Russia would cease
military operations, he stated that Russian forces would
hold their positions. On the 15th, Georgia and
Russia would sign a ceasefire, but the Russians would draft
their own resolution regarding the conflict, countering the
proposed French resolution.
The US took one of the most proactive stances, airlifting
Georgia’s troops from Iraq and returning them to Georgia, as
well as mobilizing humanitarian aid, and warships to deliver
that aid in the Black Sea.
Yet, though Russia may have received a great deal of
international criticism, it suffered few punitive actions
from the international community and the West in particular.
Interestingly enough, despite the Great Powers involvement,
the nature of the Georgian-Russian conflict was not an
indicator of a New Cold War. Moreover, this conflict did not
enjoy the same urgency level of the Berlin Airlift which had
signified the Old Cold War.
Russia’s
Resurgence
In
order to understand Russia’s resurgence and its subsequent
war with Georgia, it is helpful to recognize Russia’s
historical role in the Caucasus. Russian expansion into the
region began in the 16th century under Tsar Ivan IV. Between
1722 and 1723, Peter the Great seized even more of the
Caucasus. Though these gains would temporarily be lost, by
1774, Kabarda and North Ossetia were once again in Russian
hands, annexed to Russia after the Russo-Turkish wars. In
1783, the Orthodox-Christian people of contemporary Georgia
chose to embrace Russian rule, rather than submit to the
Turks or the Persians. Georgia’s incorporation into the
Russian empire, would position Russia to dominate the rest
of the Southern Caucasus.
After forcing the Persians to sign the Treaty of
Turkmenchay, the remainder of the South Caucasus was gained
by the Tsarist Russian empire. When the Tsarist Russian
empire collapsed and gave way to the Soviet Union, the
Caucasus experienced its first brief taste of independence.
But once the Bolsheviks had consolidated their power, they
quickly turned toward restoring Russian dominance over the
Caucasus.
The collapse of the Soviet Union was an even more
disintegrative force, and left Russia struggling to pull
itself back together politically and economically. Today, as
Russia recovers its economic might, it is not surprising to
see Moscow reaching once again for the reins of power in the
Caucasus, because
the
Kremlin sees this area as its natural sphere of influence.
Indeed, it appears that Russia never intended for its former
republics to become completely autonomous from Russia’s
national interests. After the dismembering of the Soviet
Union, Russia founded the CIS in an effort to provide a
mechanism for the continuation of its relationships with its
former republics, as the British had earlier done with the
Commonwealth of Nations to maintain solid relations with
their former colonies. The CIS is an example of how Russia
has attempted to maintain political proximity to its Near
Abroad. While the CIS is supposed to protect national
sovereignty of member states while providing mutually
beneficial cooperation, the organization has come to be
perceived as a mechanism manipulated by Russia. As Putin
centralized power in his new Russia and began to pursue
aggressive new policies in its foreign affairs, some members
of the CIS began to discuss the possible necessity of a
“dignified divorce.”
In 2006, Georgian President Saakashvili took a step in this
direction, requesting that the government reassess its CIS
membership.
After the 2008 war with Russia, Georgia finalized its
withdrawal from that international institution.
Domestic Changes
Russia’s resurgence on the international stage has its roots
in domestic politics and economics. The critical moment came
on March 26, 2000, when Vladimir Putin won an astonishing
victory in his bid to become the President of Russia.
Formerly the Federal Security Service Chief for Yeltsin,
Putin was tough. He had been appointed by the ailing Yeltsin
as acting president in January of 2000, and immediately
launched an attack on government corruption before his
election. In his campaign, he exhibited shrewd political
tact, avoiding association with the unpopular Yeltsin and
positioned himself as a strong leader. Once elected, he then
began to centralize the power of the national government. He
weakened the autonomy of regional governments and restricted
the power of political parties within the Duma. Under his
presidency, the freedom of the Russian press has also been
restricted.
While these moves may prove to be detrimental to democracy
in Russia, Putin has remained immensely popular. He was a
leader, providing a firm new vision for Moscow. Russia’s new
political environment under Putin, however, did not signify
a new ideological superpower aimed at fighting the West in
all matters.
Nevertheless, the core reason for Putin’s success and
popularity was economic. Under his leadership, the Russian
economy took an upward turn, largely driven by increasing
oil revenues. In 2003, the profits of Lukoil (a major oil
exporting firm) rose by a startling 38%. Within the space of
the first four months of that year, the Central Bank’s
currency levels rose by $4.8 billion (10%).
This economic turnaround made Putin’s dreams of a new Russia
a possibility. For Putin and his successor, Dmitry Medvedev,
a unipolar international system dominated by a hegemonic US
has become unacceptable, and much of the Russian population
appears to have embraced the Russian vision of a multipolar
world.
This new vision, however, did not imply opposing the nature
of Western economic and political systems, as the Kremlin
had done during the Cold War.
Global Resurgence &
Regional Assertion
While placing Russia on a trajectory to return to global
power, Putin did not initially set out to oppose the West at
every turn. Instead, he initially focused on promoting
stability along Russia’s borders, a move that promoted both
security and economic growth. Putin’s handling of the
Chechen conflict erased the Russian military failures of the
first Chechen war and reduced that continuing threat to
Russian security and territorial
integrity.
Russia also reached out to its neighbors under Putin,
including Cold War allies of the US, Turkey and Japan.
Putin’s cooperation with the US-led
War on Terror demonstrates the evolution of Russia, becoming
increasingly assertive until cooperation with the US began
to break down. Initially, cooperation with the US allowed
Russia political cover for its war against Muslim
Chechnya as well as providing for the removal of the
anti-Russian Taliban in Afghanistan. But it did not take
very long for Putin’s attitude to change. The War on Terror
threatened to place US troops in the post-Soviet space for
the long-term. Russia, together with other members of the
Shanghai Co-operation Organization (which also includes
China, and Central Asian states), has called for the US to
leave its bases in the region. This unprecedented US
military presence threatened Russia’s role as the security
provider for its post-Soviet republics.
More importantly, however, Russia’s turn from the West may
be seen as a function of its energy interests. Like the US,
Russia does not necessarily need energy from Central Asia or
the Caucasus to satisfy domestic consumption. Russia
possesses the world’s largest gas reserves and the world’s
eighth largest oil reserves. Russian oil production in 2007
was roughly 9.87 million barrels per day (mbd), and
sometimes even surpasses Saudi Arabia. Domestic consumption
of oil is only around 2.85 mbd, allowing Russia to export
around 7.01 mbd in 2007. Its gas production also far
surpasses domestic consumption, as Russia consumed only 16.6
trillion cubic feet (tcf) of the 23.17 tcf that it produced
in 2006.
Central Asian energy is strategic,
enabling Russia to expand its economic gains in the energy
market. Russia’s gas and oil fields are aging and production
is slowing. Bringing additional reserves online will take
both significant time and investment.
In order to maintain its position in energy markets, then,
it is estimated that Russia might require around 3,531 bcf
of Central Asian gas per year, for some years. If
Russia can secure Central Asian energy, it can profit from
transit fees, sustain its energy exports to Europe, and even
supply China’s growing energy consumption. At the same time,
Russia stands to lose political and economic ground if
foreign companies are allowed to continue to encroach on the
region. In the Caspian Sea basin, Western companies already
account for roughly 70% of oil production.
The primary threat to Russian energy dominance originates in
the Caucasus. The Western energy corridor through
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey offers the opportunity for
the West to break Russia’s grip on Caspian and Central Asian
energy. While the BTC and BTE already allow Caspian oil and
gas to flow west along this corridor, it might be expanded
by trans-Caspian pipelines to tap Central Asia’s large
deposits. Though such a pipeline route would be a feat of
both engineering and politics, it is a possibility that
Russia appears to view as a serious threat.
In order to secure its future as a global energy superpower,
Russia needs to reassert itself in the former Soviet regions
of Central Asia and the Caucasus and Georgia provides a
strategic chokepoint. If Georgia could be brought in line,
Moscow could use its political dominance to cut the NATO air
corridor into Central Asia, the Western energy corridor, and
reduce the negative consequences of Russia’s declining
economic importance for Georgia and the former CIS. The
problem for Moscow is that Tbilisi has been anything but
pro-Russian, particularly since Saakashvili’s election in
2003.
The Rose Revolution and other democratic color revolutions,
like Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, have unsettled the
Kremlin. These democratic movements brought pro-Western
leaders to power in Russian geopolitical space, and those
leaders sought membership in the EU and NATO in order to
escape their historical domination by Moscow.
Not only is energy a source of economic wealth, but also it
translates into political power. In 2006, Putin ordered a
re-evaluation of the old Soviet energy distribution and
pricing system. Under that system, former Soviet republics
were receiving gas prices significantly lower than the
prices paid by European consumers. Austria’s payments for
natural gas at the time were priced around $221 per thousand
cubic meters of gas per year, while Germany was paying $217,
and Turkey $243. Former Soviet republics, on the other hand,
were paying only $50-80 per thousand cubic meters.
Subsequent adjustment of gas prices for former republics
like Georgia, then, might merely be seen as an attempt to
develop even gas pricing that would deliver greater
financial gain to Moscow. However, the timing of Russia’s
price hikes raised suspicions that new gas prices were also
designed to punish former republics for seeking greater
autonomy from Russia. Gazprom announced these changes in
price structure just before the beginning of winter, placing
many consumer states in a budgetary crisis over energy
supply to their citizens.
Coercive energy diplomacy is not the only source of leverage
that Russia has in the case of Georgia, however. Having
assumed responsibility for mediating Georgia’s separatist
conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow has the
ability to manipulate these internal disputes for political
gain.
The Georgia-Russian war may be seen as a culmination of
Russian opposition to Tbilisi’s Western stance, but a deeper
understanding of that conflict may be achieved when
Georgia’s role is also examined.
Georgia –
Victim or Villain?
In order to understand the roots of separatist conflict in
Georgia, one must at least return to the Soviet era. When
Georgia emerged from the Soviet Union, its territory
incorporated three different separatist-minded regions:
Abkhazia, Adjaria, and South Ossetia. All three regions were
historically distinct due to ethnic and/or religious
differences. In accordance with Lenin’s policy of national
self-determination, Georgia originally joined the Soviet
Union as a part of the Transcaucasus Federated Soviet
Socialist Republic (TFSSR) which included Armenia and
Azerbaijan. Abkhazia was originally federated with Georgia
as an autonomous republic, Adjaria was a sub-national
autonomous republic, and South Ossetia was granted the
status of an autonomous district.
This encouragement and protection of national identity
allowed the Soviets to curry favor with the local people but
also led to the fragmentation of the Caucasus, creating
political sub-groups that could be played off one another.
The political autonomy and nationalist identities that were
encouraged under the Soviets made it difficult for Georgia
to create a new, unified nation-state. Georgian nationalism
was fostered and encouraged under the first Georgian
President, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who ran his election based on
the slogan, “Georgia for Georgians!”
Nevertheless, Georgian nationalism sparked, in turn, Abkahz,
Adjarian, and Ossetian nationalism, as all three minority
groups moved to protect their political autonomy.
The first fighting broke out in South Ossetia. When
Gamsakhurdia moved to strengthen Georgian control of the
region and declared an end to Ossetian political autonomy,
the South Ossetians declared their own independence. The
ensuing violence was only stopped by Russian intervention on
behalf of South Ossetia. Gamsakhurdia’s decision to champion
Georgian nationalism had not only alienated domestic
minorities but also Russia. He refused to join the CIS and
his dislike of the Western darlings, Gorbachev and
Shevardnadze, did little to endear him to the West. Soon
Georgians began to oppose Gamsakhurdia as well. Several
warlords, with possible backing from the Russian military,
organized an opposition force that prompted Gamsakhurdia to
flee Tbilisi on January 5, 1992. Shevardnadze returned to
Georgia, and was elected president on October 11, 1992, in
an election that was boycotted by the Abkhazians, Ossetians,
and supporters of Gamsakhurdia.
After fleeing first to Azerbaijan, then to Armenia, and
finally to Chechnya, Gamsakhurdia organized his supporters
in a rebellion against Eduard Shevardnadze. As
Shevardnadze’s forces moved against Gamsakhurdia’s
supporters, Abkhazia made its bid for independence. Unlike
the Ossetians, who were the majority in their small
district, the Abkhaz were only 17% of the population in the
autonomous region of Abkhazia. Shevardnadze and the
Georgians were unwilling to let Abkhazia depart, and
Georgian forces initially gained the advantage in the
conflict. However, the Abkhaz found Russian support as well
as fighters from Chechnya. During the
conflict, there were several reports of fighter/bomber
attacks on Georgian positions, and the Abkhazians had no air
force. Even when Georgians managed to down a Russian MIG 29
with a fully uniformed Russian pilot, Russia continued to
deny its involvement. After several halted advances,
Abkhaz forces managed to expel the Georgians after defeating
them in the siege of Sukhami. Shevardnadze’s defeat gave
Gamsakhurdia an opportunity to oust him. It was only by
turning to Moscow and joining the CIS that Shevardnadze was
able to cling to power, receiving Russian tanks with which
he could suppress the Georgian rebellion. When the dust
settled, Russia had troops in both Abkhazia and South
Ossetia and Georgia had become a CIS member.
While Georgian ultra-nationalism may be blamed for Georgia’s
territorial disintegration in the 1990s, it had already
inherited a splintered foundation from the Soviet Union.
From the beginning, Russia also demonstrated little regard
for the sovereignty of Georgia, which it considered as a
natural part of its sphere of influence. While nearly every
side in the early stages of Georgia’s conflicts received
some aid from the Russian military, it appears that Moscow
played an important role in preventing the defeat of Abkhaz
and Ossetian forces. Russian intervention preserved the
separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, resulting in de
facto independence that has been accompanied by perpetual
conflict. In 1998, Georgian militias operating within
Abkhazia stirred up violence again, provoking a reaction
from Abkhazian forces that lead to the killing of around 200
Georgian guerillas and perhaps as many as another 50,000
Georgians forced from their homes inside Abkhazian
territory.
When further skirmishing flared up again in 2001,
Shevardnadze’s apparent inability to protect Georgians in
Abkhazia took its toll on his approval.
During Shevardnadze’s 11 year presidency, the economy
suffered, poverty spread, and corruption ran rampant.
Shevardnadze’s inability or unwillingness to affect any
significant reforms also contributed to his increasing
unpopularity. When his party committed electoral fraud in
the parliamentary elections of 2003, Shevardnadze’s
unpopularity peaked and he was forced out of office by yet
another popular revolt –the Rose Revolution.
The Rose Revolution shook Georgia, and led to the election
of Mikheil Saakashvili. In 2004, Saakashvili demonstrated a
new assertiveness in regards to Georgia’s territorial
integrity and challenged South Ossetian separatists in a
crackdown on smuggling and the drug trade. Saakashvili also
managed to bring Adjaria back under Georgian administration.
In 2006, Georgia also regained control of the Kodori Gorge
in upper Abkhazia, defeating the local warlord. Still, under
Saakashvili Georgia also reversed its policy of isolating
Abkhazia and South Ossetia and began to seek economic
engagement in order to bring them back into consideration of
federation with the Georgian state.
In 2005 and 2006, the Georgian government also began to
pressure Russian forces to leave Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Moscow showed no interest in removing its troops, however,
and both Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained hostile toward
Tbilisi. In both 2006 and 2007, there were several reports
of violence between Abkhaz and Georgian forces along the
border, including several rocket attacks by Abkhazians. By
that time, both Putin and leaders of the separatist
republics were comparing their situation to that of Kosovo,
warning that Kosovo’s independence would be perceived as
international legal precedent for their own independence.
By 2008, Abkhazia and South Ossetia had experienced de facto
independence for roughly one and a half decades. Abkhazia
reiterated its call for the UN, EU, and OSCE to recognize
its independence, and Moscow strengthened its support for
both of these republics. Russia withdrew CIS sanctions which
had been placed on Abkhazia and the Russian Duma encouraged
the recognition of both republics as independent. Additional
Russian troops were also deployed in Abkhazia, and a
military unit sent to repair the Russian railway with
Abkhazia.
Even before 2008, Russia had already begun a process of
“creeping annexation.” Russian passports have been
distributed to locals in the separatist regions, effectively
creating Russian Federation citizens where there had been
none. Additionally, Russian officials have also been
appointed to serve as military leaders of separatist forces.
Russian general Sultan Sosnaliev has served as Abkhazia’s
defense minister, and Major General Vasily Lunev as South
Ossetia’s.
Thus, when Georgian troops entered South Ossetia in response
to rocket attacks in August of 2008, Russia could claim that
its “peace keepers” and citizens had been attacked. It also
helped that both Abkhazia and South Ossetia issued calls for
Russian intervention.
Conclusion
To address the initial question, our discussion clearly
indicates that the current politics of the Caucasus region,
particularly Georgia, is much more complex and sophisticated
than the binary politics of the Cold War era when there were
only two major political players. By using a Kenneth Waltz’s
methodological perspective, we summarize that there were
active political actors at System level-of-analysis (e.g.,
Great and Regional Powers), State level-of-analysis (e.g.,
Russian Duma and Georgian ultra-nationalism), and Individual
level-of-analysis (e.g., each Georgian President) involved
in the process of contributing to the rise of this conflict
by their decisions. Nevertheless, the 2008 Russian-Georgian
war did not have the characteristics and conditions that are
often associated with conflicts of the Cold War era. Thus,
we conclude that the 2008 War neither signifies the start of
a New Cold War, nor it suggests that the (old) Cold War did
not really die.
In this light, despite Georgia’s ultra-nationalistic
treatment of its own ethnic minorities, the Russia-Georgia
war appears to be a conflict in which Georgia was provoked
into military action. The decision to invade South Ossetia
was certainly a strategic mistake, inviting a Russian
invasion which led to the further loss of Georgian autonomy
and the destruction of its military.
Yet it is not difficult to imagine how 2008 may have been
perceived in Tbilisi as the critical moment to act
decisively. With OSCE talks producing few results and Moscow
tightening its hold on Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia
had few options to bring about a resolution to the
separatist question. Tbilisi had hoped to be eligible for
NATO membership in 2008, and instead, Georgia’s membership
process stalled as NATO members talked about the need to
resolve the separatist conflicts.
It is clear, then, that the separatist movements of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia had become central to the strategic, and
diametrically opposed, strategic goals of both Georgia and
Russia. For Georgia the independence of its separatist
territories was politically unacceptable. Russia’s growing
role in those regions threatened not only to permanently
establish Abkhaz and Ossetian independence, but also to sink
Georgia’s chances at NATO membership. For Russia, the
separatists offered an excuse to exert leverage on Georgia,
in order to counter the manner in which Georgia was
undermining Russia’s security buffer through NATO and
Russian energy interests through East-West pipelines.
Given the strategic goals of the West, particularly the US,
it is not surprising that the resultant Russia-Georgia war
aroused anti-Russian feeling in the West (and vice versa).
So, is all of this indicative of an “unfreezing” of the old
Cold War or a New Cold War? The challenge in answering this
question lies in how the Cold War is defined. The current
rivalry or conflicts between Russia and the West are no
longer about ideology, nor are they necessarily about
bringing down free markets, although Moscow appears to be
taking a mercantilist approach toward energy. Moreover, such
rivalry and conflict do not appear to be as bifurcated as
the Cold War, with the free world facing Moscow and its
satellites. Rather, they appear to be a return to something
more akin to the sort of competition for spheres of
influence that Russia participated in during the era of the
Great Game in the 19th Century. This is an older
pattern of behavior, a more mercantilist pattern, and one
which indicates geopolitical thinking that precedes the Cold
War.
In sum, for Georgia, the conflict with Russia boils down to
a fight for national sovereignty, policy independence, and
territorial integrity. For Moscow, it is the preservation of
traditional spheres of influence in its surrounding
geopolitical space that the Russian leaders call the Near
Abroad. For the US and Europe, it is primarily a struggle to
spread their own democratic values as well as maintain an
energy and security corridor that reaches into the Caspian
basin. The energy resources of this geographic region are to
diversify the fossil fuels imports of many Western nations,
especially in the EU.
Yet Europe and the US perceive the 2008 conflict and their
natural rivalry with Russia differently. Europe has had a
long history as a neighbor to Russia; and it has
participated in rivalry and competition for spheres of
influence with Moscow for centuries. However, the US is a
rather newcomer to this “old game” with Russia; and it
primarily recalls a recent memory of the Cold War paradigm
through which it perceives its rivalry with Moscow. Thus, it
seems rather natural for some scholars and policy corners in
Washington to perceive major Russian moves as aggressive
behavior and reminiscent of the Cold War days which they
recall so well.
For those with a short memory, it is rather difficult to
conceptualize the 21st Century political
challenges in the context of an older game--a 19th
Century game. For such actors, it is equally challenging to
consider a common or traditional pattern of state rivalry
and competition similar to the Great Game, for which
Washington has no historical experience as a Great Power.
ANNEXES
Appendix 1: Georgian Export & Import
Volumes
Appendix 2: Georgian Export & Import
Percentages
Appendix 3: Georgian Volume Graphs
Appendix 4: Georgian Percentage Graphs
(pp. 126-144)